Senior Political Scientist, @RANDCorporation. Co-Author, Everyone Loses https://t.co/y8cHhiDh0w
Sep 21, 2022 • 8 tweets • 1 min read
Some thoughts on the "partial" mobilization and annexation announcements. 1/x
As many have noted, the battlefield impact of this move is a big question mark. We'll have to see. 2/x
I see there's a lot of renewed interest on twitter in pre-war predictions about how Russia would fight. The bottom line is that no one I'm aware of predicted how (badly) Moscow would mess up the initial invasion. THREAD 1/
here's one pre-war analysis: "The Russian military would likely open its campaign with airstrikes targeting command-and-control systems, logistical centers, airports, air defenses, and other critical infrastructure. To carry them out, Moscow could use hundreds of bombers ... 2/
Jul 28, 2022 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
This critique has gotten a fair amount of attention and I have a lot of respect for Ruth's scholarship but she consistently mischaracterizes our article.. 1/
We don't argue "support for Ukraine has resulted in an escalation of the war". We do argue that the west's support has "escalated". the path from stingers to HIMARS is clear. everyone should agree that there has been an increase in quality and quantity of weapons provided 2/
Jun 1, 2022 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
A couple of points of information on security guarantees. First, the Budapest Memorandum was not a security guarantee. It was an assurance about the intentions of the signatories, not a commitment to come to Ukraine’s defense if it were attacked.1/4
Nowhere in Budapest does it say that the US or UK would respond to an armed attack by taking action other than by calling for a UNSC meeting. Russia violated Budapest — no question. The other signatories did not. 2/4
Since there has been a lot of interest in a pre-war argument my colleague Scott Boston and I made about military assistance to Ukraine, I'm happy to admit that we were (partially) wrong. But it's important to understand why we were wrong, rather than engage in point scoring 1/8
First, what we got right: Western military military assistance did not deter Russia from attacking Ukraine in the first place. 2/ 8
Mar 10, 2022 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
This piece lays out some of the escalation concerns keeping many up at night. I’m less worried about accidents now that the deconfliction mechanism is up and running but deliberate escalation appears likely. Thread 1/4
“Russian retaliation against nato and other American allies thus seems a matter of when, not if—not because Moscow wants a broader conflict, but because it believes itself to be engaged in one already.” 2/4
Mar 5, 2022 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
So Putin claimed today that UK FM Truss's (alleged) statement about potential NATO involvement in the conflict was the reason he "raised" the nuclear alert level (although USG has said they haven't seen physical signs of that, it might not have manifested itself physically) 1/4
the closest I could find was: “If we don’t stop Putin in Ukraine we are going to see others under threat – the Baltics, Poland, Moldova, and it could end up in a conflict with Nato." 2/4 scotsman.com/news/politics/…
Mar 4, 2022 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
One gets the sense that folks in this town smell blood in the proverbial water regarding the stability of the (odious) Putin regime. Let's file that under "careful what you wish for". Thread. 1/7
The scenario of a liberal reformist successor coming to power who begs forgiveness for Putin's sins would be great, but it would also be great to win the lottery. Equally if not more plausible are regime change scenarios that work out badly for everyone, Ukraine included.2/7
Mar 2, 2022 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
Brief thread on my new @FT oped:
"Russia has launched an unprecedented act of aggression against Ukraine. The United States and its allies must respond forcefully." 1/x
on.ft.com/3hxsuPV
"But as they do, they should take into account the possibility of triggering a spiral of escalation that could lead to the only outcome worse than the invasion of Ukraine itself: a hot war between Russia and Nato." The piece briefly describes the risks and offers 4 recs. 2/x
Feb 22, 2022 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
One thought about what Russia's exit from the Minsk agreements — aka recognition of DNR/LNR — tells us about what is to come. Thread 1/x
Minsk was a mechanism for Russia to cement its influence over Ukraine by returning the Donbas on its terms -- a constitution renegotiated with its proxies and an asymmetric confederal structure with hyper-empowered pro-Russian regions. 2/x
Feb 21, 2022 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
Main takeaway from that barnburner of a speech is that Russia now has given itself a pretext to respond to "attacks" on DNR and LNR with no need to conceal its direct military involvement. thread 1/x
Putin not only recognized the DNR/LNR, he also signed "friendship and cooperation" treaties with them, essentially security guarantees. 2/x
Feb 21, 2022 • 55 tweets • 3 min read
Putin's address starting. Thread.
"Ukraine is an inseparable part of our cultural space"
Feb 21, 2022 • 31 tweets • 2 min read
Some thoughts on the ongoing show/RF security council meeting: Shoigu now going off on the potential for Ukraine developing a nuclear weapons capability.
Now claiming Ukraine plans to retake the ORDLO by force.
Feb 19, 2022 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
This is an important point. It also underscores the absence of a “playbook” that we’ve heard so much about in recent weeks. In 2014, Moscow only had to twist reality in constructing narratives. This time, they’re just making things up. Thread 1/8
In 2014, there was a revolution led by an armed far-right nationalist vanguard that ousted a democratically elected (though repressive and autocratic) govt dominated by pols from the south and east. 2/8
Feb 4, 2022 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
Since everyone is looking for military and informational signs of Russia’s seriousness (or not) about launching an invasion, it might make sense to also think about signs that the diplomatic track might actually be more than Kabuki theater/time-buying tactic/ point-scoring/ 1/9
/alliance management opportunity/letter-writing campaign/pretext creation/etc. — something that might actually preclude the invasion. Here are some things to look for 2/9
Jan 29, 2022 • 10 tweets • 2 min read
You might have noticed Lavrov is fixated on the “indivisibility of security” principle these days. As Tim Colton and I note in our book, the debate over principles of “freedom to choose” and “indivisibility of security” dates to the 1990s. A thread. amazon.com/dp/1138633089/…
BLUF: since the 1990s, both sides cherry-picked their respective preferred principle to justify their respective preferred policies. [quotes below are from the book]
Jan 21, 2022 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
New piece @ForeignPolicy with my RAND colleague Scott Boston. foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/21/wea…
There are a lot of calls for military aid to #Ukraine at the moment. This might well be morally justified. But it will have little impact on the situation on the ground.
Jan 20, 2022 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
With all due respect for @IvoHDaalder, I find this line particularly unconvincing: "Putin worries that if any of these states becomes a successful and prosperous democracy, let alone fully integrates with the west, the Russian people will demand the same." Thread
To be clear, Ivo is far from the only one who makes this argument.
Jan 13, 2022 • 7 tweets • 1 min read
New oped in @FT today. a thread. ft.com/content/74089d…
I am increasingly concerned about the prospect of a disastrous war. Creative diplomacy, in addition to strong deterrence measures, is going to be necessary to avoid it.
