Thread by @RichardBSpencer

Putin has already sent forces of some kind into the break-away regions. A full invasion of the country, including Kyiv, is more that possible. I’d say it’s probable, and I’ve been saying this for a while. The reasoning behind my assessment is the basic structure of the conflict.

Returning Ukraine to the Russian sphere—the long-term Russian empire, which stretches back further than the USSR—means quite a bit to Moscow, and, apparently, Putin in particular. It means more to Moscow than the option of Ukraine entering NATO does to Washington.

Biden might change his tune (as Macron seemed to suggest…), but he told the world in clear language that Washington will not send ground troops into Ukraine. It follows—or I hope it follows—that catastrophic retaliation, like aerial bombing or nukes, is off the table.

In other words, if Putin is willing to suffer through a Cold War-style East/West divide, get kicked off SWIFT, etc., then Biden effectively gave him the “green light” to go in.

Putin might have assumed that Nord Stream (the offshore gas pipelines) would be a wedge that divides NATO: Europe would choose energy over America. That didn’t happen. Germany just rejected Nord Stream 2, and the dividing lines are now much clearer.

The Biden admin has whispered sweet nothings about Ukraine’s “sovereign right to choose its own alliances” etc. The reality is that military control over Europe, particularly heartland Europe, is a long-term U.S. strategy.

It is completely understandable that Putin views NATO expansion as aggressive. It is. Ukraine (whose membership is still a potentiality) is simply a “no go,” a “hard nyet,” as it were. Again, this means more to Putin than expansion means to Washington.

Putin has become somewhat of a hero to conservatives, much like Orban: the tough, “un-woke” badass leader. Back in 2016, I viewed this, optimistically, as uniting the White world. I no longer view it this way.

In order to shore up power, Putin is eager for a East/West division. The sanctions from the West might be painful, but he’s more than willing to tolerate them. The East/West division secures his power and delineates the Russian sphere.

Hunkering down makes things more stable, and, again, Washington is simply not willing to go to war—that is, send in ground troops—over the Ukraine Question.

I thus see that latest developments as a tragedy. There will be less communication with the Russian world; it will be increasingly demonized; and a conception of a broader European culture, which includes Russia, will be set back decades.

Putin’s worldview and personality are a central cause of this tragedy. Simply blaming America for everything is childish. Putin has no vision of a common European culture, and he views the West through a conspiratorial lens (understandable, to a degree) and seeks to weaken it.

25 years ago, Putin might have been somewhat open to ending the East/West divide—even countenancing expanding NATO to Russia. But he seems to associate the advancement of the West and Europe with the economic and humanitarian disaster of the 1990s (again, understandable).

For a while, the “dissident” sphere has widely claimed that a war over Ukraine isn’t happening: “wag the dog,” “only Washington wants a war,” etc. Perhaps this came from a base urge to contradict the MSM or offer “esoteric” takes … perhaps some are actual Russian shills.

It certainly wouldn’t cost Moscow much to buy the services of various anonymous eCelebs … or nothing at all, as such people are eminently suggestible. Who knows? The important thing is, for my purposes, they can be used as a “reverse compass” for good analysis.

Over the past five years, the Kremlin’s contributions to discourse on the Right in America have been to encourage idiocy, division, and conspiracy. Putin does not want to spread “traditionalism” or whatever. Chaos and stupidity in the West better suit his objectives.