1/ Russia's sovereign debt (presumably new) is sanctioned. No more access to the US/EU markets. What does it mean?
Russia's government is in fiscal surplus, apart from the rollover of debt, Russia is "overfunding" borrowing when strictly speaking it does not need to.
2/ Foreign participation fell in Russian market due to sanctions concerns. Russian domestic banks stepped in to buy more of the additional issuance.
3/ Non-residents have been leaving the market since the beginning of hostilities.
4/ Russian sovereign debt continues to make up a substantial share of local currency emerging market indices such as the GBI. While Russia’s weight has declined in recent years (to 7.5%), this is largely a result of the inclusion of Chinese bonds since early 2020.
5/ Roughly $64 bn of debt is held by foreigners. Including in the Eurobond market.
6/ Russia's banks' liquidity surplus of $11bn is smaller after COVID relative to the total FX holdings $64 bn, but still can go a long way to accommodate foreign investor exit. The @bank_of_russia can also provide liquidity support as needed.
@bank_of_russia 7/ Russia also has reserves (including gold, US$, EUR, CNY) in excess of US $630 bn
8/ Full text of the US sanctions announcement here
1) Russia didn’t give concessions. It, potentially got a win, 30 day no energy strikes would force Ukraine to stop hitting Russian refineries. Russia hasn’t been as effective as feared in disrupting Ukrainian energy.
2) Russia got validation that it is not the aggressor WH “this conflict should never have started and should have been ended … with …good faith peace efforts”
3) WH readout brings back Russia to “bilateral” discussions about Ukraine. Europe doesn’t have “spheres of influence” Trump and Putin do. It even loops Russia in MENA issues akin to the USSR/US talks.
4) Russia reiterated it maximalist demands and asserted it “legitimate security concerns”: no military or intelligence aid to Ukraine, no mobilization in Ukraine, no armament of Ukraine, inability of Kyiv regime to negotiation (hint at a regime change?).
5) the WH seems to want reset even more than Russia. WH last para on “enormous economic deals and geopolitical stability from improved bilateral relationship” goes against macroeconomic logic.
2) Russia got validation that it is not the aggressor WH “this conflict should never have started and should have been ended … with …good faith peace efforts”
3) WH readout brings back Russia to “bilateral” discussions about Ukraine. Europe doesn’t have “spheres of influence” Trump and Putin do. It even loops Russia in MENA issues akin to the USSR/US talks.
The EU should take over Russian assets. Here is why and here is how. A thread🧵
1) The EU is sitting on Russia's frozen assets, more so than any other country. It would have been wonderful to do this with the G7, but the US is now unlikely to do so. The EU is the most exposed to Russia's aggression.
2) The EU raised "financial stability" concerns in the past. The euphemism is for Saudi or China to drop bonds of European countries, for example France with debt to GPD over 110%, and significant holdings by sovereign funds.
3) Saudis warned G-7 over Russia Seizures with debt sale threat (warning made to EU states, said people familiar with matter @business
Sanctions don’t work… they say. Sanctioning Gazprom and another 50 or so banks without wavers had an immediate impact. It also came from fertile soil under macro pressure in Russia. 1/
2/ Inflow of “unfriendly” FX has already been diminishing for months to come, putting pressure on the ruble.
3/ As a result of the pivot to “friendly” currencies, Russia doesn’t have FX to support the Ruble
2/ Federal budget is back to a large deficit in April. A deficit of 3.4 trillion for the first four months of 2023—already 17% above the full-year budget target.
3/ War is expensive. Expenditure continued to trend up in April despite the stories of pre-payment that would have explained Jan-Feb pick-up. Revenues continue to underperform (-22% vs. 2022M1-4) but as big of a problem are soaring expenditures (+26%)
3/ Effect of export controls on Russia, now China and others are stepping in to save the day. Chips, drones and overall trade, recommendations how to strengthen implementation and enforcement.
1/ Russia substantially increased chip imports in 2022, past the pre-war peak. The value of chip imports is up from $1,8 bn recorded for Jan-Sept 2021 to $2,45 bn over the same period in 2022.
2/ China has stepped in to support Russia's access to chips.
3/ China and HK support can be quantified by the value of shipments as well as the number of transactions (exports of chips to Russia). Others, like the US, Germany, and the UK have scaled back.