1/9 So far regulators aren't responding to the crisis among private-sector property developers by easing their access to credit, except indirectly, by forcing banks to expand mortgages, even as home-buying interest declines. scmp.com/business/artic… via @scmpnews
2/9 Instead, the credit easing takes place mainly in the form of transfers of market share from the private sector to state-owned property developers.
This also makes it easier for the regulators to direct a larger share of new building towards low-income rental.
3/9 More low-income housing would definitely be a good thing for China: cheap housing for the poor is one of the most efficient ways to rebalance income (depending on how it is funded).
But you can't ignore a problem for 10-20 years and then just hope it will somehow go away.
4/9 The facts remain that prices of Chinese real estate are probably 2-3 times what can be economically justified, and that roughly 60% or more of the wealth of households in China consists of the value of their homes.
5/9 You can't create a meaningful number of cheap apartments and hope to segregate the price impact from the rest of the market. If Chinese can buy reasonably-priced apartments, that will sharply reduce demand for similar apartments at 2-3 times the price.
6/9 More generally, there has never been a real estate bubble that hasn't eventually adjusted, even if authorities were able to postpone the adjustment for decades, because at some point rising real-estate prices themselves undermine the economy.
7/9 One way or another, in other words, real-estate prices will adjust downwards in China, and this can happen quickly, as occurs in the US, or (more likely) slowly, as occurred in Japan. Either way, it will erase large amounts of household wealth and will undermine the banks.
8/9 Obviously I am not the only person to know this. From what I understand, regulators in Beijing have long had a systematic understanding of the real-estate problem in China, which is why they are so worried and were so determined in the past two years to clamp down.
9/9 Unfortunately, however, they don't yet seem to have a systematic understanding of the alternatives, or perhaps they don't yet have the ability politically to recognize the cost. This is probably why there still remains so little clarity on the ultimate adjustment process.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
1/7 Greg Ip argues here that globalization, which was already in retreat in the past decade, is likely to be further hurt, perhaps badly, by Russia's actions in the Ukraine. I agree. @greg_ip wsj.com/articles/clash… via @WSJ
2/7 Events in the Ukraine and elsewhere seem to reinforce claims made by some people, like Kristalina Georgieva at the IMF, that a world in which countries increasingly raise barriers to trade is also likely to be one of increasing geopolitical tension and conflict.
3/7 I look at it differently. I'd argue that both trade and geopolitical conflicts are likely to reflect the same underlying imbalances, in which case a stronger commitment to the existing global trade regime won't reduce geopolitical tension but may instead make them worse.
1/4 Yu Yongding argues that slowing growth creates a bigger debt problem for China than infrastructure and property investment. He criticizes Beijing for not having adopted more expansionary policies last year. scmp.com/comment/opinio…
2/4 What is more, he argues, Beijing "should have made more efforts to boost growth in infrastructure investment to offset the negative impact of the slowdown of real estate investment on economic growth."
3/4 I think this year we will see Beijing do just that. Because growth in the past quarter (and, so far, in this quarter) seems to be slowing much more quickly than Beijing can tolerate, it is easing credit to the property sector and accelerating infrastructure spending.
1/4 This is interesting. According to a Beijing-based institute, it takes 6.9 years of per-capita GDP to raise a child in China, compared to 4.1 years in the US and 4.3 years in Japan. Of the countries studied, only South Korea is more expensive. reuters.com/world/china/ch…
2/4 Perhaps not surprisingly, South Korea is also one of the few countries with a lower birth rate than China's. Correlation isn't causality, of course, but the study does suggest strongly why it will be so difficult to raise Chinese birth rates.
3/4 I'd add two points. First, China's number would be even higher if its GDP were adjusted to make it comparable to the GDPs of other economies which, unlike Chin's, operate largely under hard budget constraints.
1/4 Unfortunately as less money enters Turkey and more money leaves, Turkey's current account deficit will contract. But if its current account deficit contracts, Turkey must either produce more, invest less, or consume less. nytimes.com/2022/02/19/wor…
2/4 Internal imbalances, after all, must be consistent with external imbalances. Obviously producing more would be best, but in the near term that's pretty unlikely. Because investing less would make things worse in the long run, ultimately Turkey must cut consumption.
3/4 Unfortunately the only real way to cut consumption is to reduce the real wages of workers and the middle class. Even putting a substantial burden on the rich won't affect consumption by nearly enough.
1/5 No big surprises here. Beijing plans to cut taxes and increase transfers to local governments while "calling for infrastructure investment to be frontloaded to help cushion the slowdown, which looks set to worsen in the first half of this year."
2/5 "At present" according to vice finance minister Xu Hongcai, "China's economy is facing new downward pressure, which requires the strength of fiscal policy to be appropriately front loaded."
3/5 Given weakness in domestic demand, which Beijing expects will only get worse, it would have been far more effective to increase direct and indirect transfers to households. Increased consumer spending would have encouraged more business investment and healthier growth.
1/4 China's trade surplus is caused by distortions in its distribution of domestic income, with households retaining too low a share and local governments too high a share. No trade "tools" the US can yield will change that. reuters.com/business/ustr-…
2/4 More importantly, US deficits are driven by the US role in absorbing excess global savings. Again, no trade "tools" can change that unless they were substantial and were imposed on all trade partners. Even matching China's effective manufacturing subsidies won't change that.
3/4 Trying to resolve trade imbalances as if trade and capital flows still operated as they did in the 19th or early 20th centuries hasn't worked in the past four decades. It won't work in the future either. We need a very different trade strategy.