Russia's apparently bizarre actions in Ukraine have confused many, especially their alleged failures of preparation. But these are surprising only in extent, not in type—they follow from two characteristics of the Russian army...
1. Top-down C2: subordinates are usually given—and expected to take—a lot less initiative than in NATO armies. This extends all the way down to junior officers and NCOs. In Afghanistan, the Mujahideen knew the best way to halt a Soviet attack was by killing the battalion CO.
A corollary to this:
2. Much more emphasis on the operational level, where Russian arms excel. WWII offensives were often shambolic and costly at the divisional level, but the combined effect was crushing.
It might seem silly to invoke WWII in describing the modern Russian army, but large institutions have a lot of inertia and are often shaped by enduring doctrine and thought processes.
....plus the fact that militaries naturally play to their strengths. It's hard to appreciate, for instance, just how reliant the US has ALWAYS been on firepower and material superiority.
So put these two factors together: top-down C2 which does not keep subordinates informed, with a plan that emphasize the operational over the tactical.
If the POW interviews are accurate, then the lack of lower-level preparations is genuinely shocking and would explain the apparent worse-than-expected tactical performance in the first few days....
...but just because we are used to efficient C2 and tactical excellence being the hallmark of a successful operation, that does not mean the current one is by any means a failure.
Logistics has to be looked at different levels, from national stockpiles down to tactical units.
When we hear about Russian logistical difficulties, those are smaller units—battalion-sized or smaller, pushed far in advance of the rest of the army. But Russia was clearly....
...planning on a multi-week campaign and has been stockpiling materiel for the past year. The supplies are bound to last for the active period of the campaign and account for an occupation period of at least several more weeks (likely months).
This isn't to say there won't be continued supply disruptions from attacks on convoys, but security problems tend to be worked out with time (this is just as much a problem of executing the basics as it is Ukrainian action), and as more supplies are brought forward to the...
For comparison's sake, here's what the road system in that area looks like. At the operational level, any modern army is going to be entirely road-bound—especially in muddy conditions like we're seeing.
This really limits the extent of an army's dispositions in the first place. It also means that "encircling" them requires occupying a relatively limited number of areas in force, with patrols in between.
This gets things wrong in the same way a lot of the military analysis does. Russia has sharply departed from usual practice—flooding the zone with obvious, heavy-handed propaganda.
If an actor completely diverges from standard form, the next question should be: "Why?"
There are overriding political considerations at play, he's clearly willing to sacrifice some advantages for them. While I think his specific war aims are still difficult to judge, THAT is what should drive analysis of both the campaign and the info war.
Excellent thread detailing the opposite interpretation of my own, from a true expert on the Russian military.
Points of agreement/divergence: 1. Tactical failures: Agree that Russian forces may be performing well short of expectations. This also has to be balanced against....
....operational objectives. A lot of his analysis hinges on the assumptions quoted below and in the tweet that follows it. On that, I strongly disagree.
2. This is the meat of where we differ. Yes, thunder runs are unworkable by themselves. And I agree that those early pushes may have been poorly-coordinated attempts at a coup de main. However, I also think...
This brings up an important point. Short answer: not necessarily.
Remember, doctrine is the body of practices that an army uses. So even though Russia is facing a very different situation from what its doctrine was designed for, it will still be based on that doctrine...
So even though Russia is not trying to break through a heavily-defended line stretching 100s of km (except perhaps in the Donbas), it's still approaching objectives in the operational and strategic depth similar to classic deep operations.
Other operational considerations are different though. BECAUSE it is not facing a WWI- or WWII-style German army (or a 1980s NATO one, for that matter), calculations for things like tempo, force protection, etc. are completely different.
@miladvisor First of all, in terms of progress the two are comparable. The Russians have been going over much more difficult terrain & crossed several rivers (the US did not yet have a foothold over the Euphrates), but they have suffered much higher casualties and equipment loss.
@miladvisor Operationally, there were two big developments today: the envelopment of Mariupol and the push south of some forces past Kharkov, threatening to encircle the Ukrainian army units. Militarily, both would be disastrous for Ukraine and give Putin a lot of political options.