Thread by @bazaarofwar

Updated scaled side-by-side of the 4th day of Iraq & Ukraine (map by @miladvisor).

It was an interesting day, here's a thread with some observations.

https://twitter.com/bazaarofwar/status/1497764944355414018

@miladvisor First of all, in terms of progress the two are comparable. The Russians have been going over much more difficult terrain & crossed several rivers (the US did not yet have a foothold over the Euphrates), but they have suffered much higher casualties and equipment loss.

@miladvisor Operationally, there were two big developments today: the envelopment of Mariupol and the push south of some forces past Kharkov, threatening to encircle the Ukrainian army units. Militarily, both would be disastrous for Ukraine and give Putin a lot of political options.

@miladvisor Meanwhile, tough fighting continues in Kharkov and around Kiev:

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498115203392847883

@miladvisor This rapid pace of operations has come at a heavy cost to Russian forces, both in casualties and equipment.

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1497940431040098309

@miladvisor A consensus has emerged in some corners that it's simply incompetence, that the plan was ridiculous, execution poor, and everything's falling apart.

I agree there IS a lot of tactical incompetence on display, but I think there's a lot more to the picture

https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1498042673667706884

@miladvisor In the first place, the Russians have been VERY shy about using fires in civilian areas. They have not taken out the grid, communications, or other civilian infrastructure—which suggests a pressing political imperative.

@miladvisor There have also been reports that most of the Russian troops at the front have been inexperienced and poorly-equipped units. The destroyed equipment tallied by @oryxspioenkop certainly suggests as much.
oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack…

@miladvisor @oryxspioenkop To understand this, first remember that Russian doctrine, going back to the origins of Soviet operational art, dictated attacks in several waves. The first echelon made the penetration, the second held the shoulders and exploited if it could, following echelons pushed through.

@miladvisor @oryxspioenkop This lets the attacker strike objectives in the operational and strategic depth and envelop defensive formations....

@miladvisor @oryxspioenkop ...which, if we look at @miladvisor's map, is exactly what's happening in the east.

@miladvisor @oryxspioenkop Russian troops from the Crimea have bypassed many other towns to reach Mariupol, while DPR forces have broken through the front that has been frozen since 2015 to help.

https://twitter.com/AmichaiStein1/status/1498058049067618304

@miladvisor @oryxspioenkop What of the failure to achieve air supremacy? The Russian air force probably did not have the stockpiles of PGMs to do this out the gate and was constrained by the urgency of the campaign (more on this later) to act fast.

@miladvisor @oryxspioenkop As @SamoBurja and I have both noted, Russian doctrine has long accounted for this. The gap is met through speed and organic AD capabilities:

https://twitter.com/bazaarofwar/status/1425162711458066436

@miladvisor @oryxspioenkop @SamoBurja ....which is not to say that this has been entirely successful. As noted above, there has been plenty of tactical bungling even where SAMs are present, as shown in this strike video of a Buk (SA-11)

https://twitter.com/COUPSURE/status/1498000664789663745

@miladvisor @oryxspioenkop @SamoBurja So far, a lot of what we've seen from the first day looks like textbook Russian practice.

https://twitter.com/bazaarofwar/status/1497448661063712768

@miladvisor @oryxspioenkop @SamoBurja Even apparent failures, like observed logistical shortfalls, reflect the lightning pace of a first-echelon advance.

https://twitter.com/Ostrov_A/status/1497575259041640453

@miladvisor @oryxspioenkop @SamoBurja But there are a few oddities. As I mentioned, a lot of this first echelon seems poorly trained and underequipped. How to account for that?

https://twitter.com/bazaarofwar/status/1498126277416566787

@miladvisor @oryxspioenkop @SamoBurja This is why I don't believe the line that Putin was counting on Kiev falling within 48 hours—why not send your very BEST formations in first if your entire plan depends on it?

@miladvisor @oryxspioenkop @SamoBurja Instead, I believe they were sent in to seize as much as possible and take the worst of the enemy's fire. Remember too that only a third of Russian troops were committed as far as 2 days into the conflict.

Now the second wave is arriving:

https://twitter.com/ckoettl/status/1498019431804510216

@miladvisor @oryxspioenkop @SamoBurja The Russians have now surrounded Kharkov, Kherson, and Mariupol, and partly surrounded Kiev. This phase of the operation is bound to be much more deliberate.

@miladvisor @oryxspioenkop @SamoBurja The forces around all four cities can now be well supplied and large concentrations of Ukrainian field forces appear at risk of envelopment. I am therefore very skeptical of claims that after 96 hours the advantage shifts to the defender.

https://twitter.com/amlivemon/status/1497994982556323840

@miladvisor @oryxspioenkop @SamoBurja WHAT TO LOOK FOR ON FEB 28

The big question is what will happen in the cities. Urban combat is unavoidably bloody and destructive. At the same time, Putin has been decidedly averse in employing fires. This leaves several possibilities:

@miladvisor @oryxspioenkop @SamoBurja 1. A cordon of the cities. Negotiating surrender, using a combination of force and softer measures (shutting off power, IO, etc.) to gain control.

@miladvisor @oryxspioenkop @SamoBurja 2. Assault. Will inevitably bring worse casualties for combatants on both sides and for civilians, but can be conducted by more professional units of the second echelon.

@miladvisor @oryxspioenkop @SamoBurja 3. Some combination of 1. and 2. for the provincial cities, plus a cordon of Kiev to allow time to negotiate an end to the war.

@miladvisor @oryxspioenkop @SamoBurja This all depends on a lot of unkowns: Putin's precise political goals, assumptions, & timetable.

If he thinks a reasonable compromise can be reached, he has time; if he thinks he needs a military fait accompli, he will have to move fast before urban defenses can be set up.