@miladvisor First of all, in terms of progress the two are comparable. The Russians have been going over much more difficult terrain & crossed several rivers (the US did not yet have a foothold over the Euphrates), but they have suffered much higher casualties and equipment loss.
@miladvisor Operationally, there were two big developments today: the envelopment of Mariupol and the push south of some forces past Kharkov, threatening to encircle the Ukrainian army units. Militarily, both would be disastrous for Ukraine and give Putin a lot of political options.
@miladvisor Meanwhile, tough fighting continues in Kharkov and around Kiev:
@miladvisor A consensus has emerged in some corners that it's simply incompetence, that the plan was ridiculous, execution poor, and everything's falling apart.
I agree there IS a lot of tactical incompetence on display, but I think there's a lot more to the picture
@miladvisor In the first place, the Russians have been VERY shy about using fires in civilian areas. They have not taken out the grid, communications, or other civilian infrastructure—which suggests a pressing political imperative.
@miladvisor There have also been reports that most of the Russian troops at the front have been inexperienced and poorly-equipped units. The destroyed equipment tallied by @oryxspioenkop certainly suggests as much. oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack…
@miladvisor@oryxspioenkop To understand this, first remember that Russian doctrine, going back to the origins of Soviet operational art, dictated attacks in several waves. The first echelon made the penetration, the second held the shoulders and exploited if it could, following echelons pushed through.
@miladvisor@oryxspioenkop This lets the attacker strike objectives in the operational and strategic depth and envelop defensive formations....
@miladvisor@oryxspioenkop Russian troops from the Crimea have bypassed many other towns to reach Mariupol, while DPR forces have broken through the front that has been frozen since 2015 to help.
@miladvisor@oryxspioenkop What of the failure to achieve air supremacy? The Russian air force probably did not have the stockpiles of PGMs to do this out the gate and was constrained by the urgency of the campaign (more on this later) to act fast.
@miladvisor@oryxspioenkop As @SamoBurja and I have both noted, Russian doctrine has long accounted for this. The gap is met through speed and organic AD capabilities:
@miladvisor@oryxspioenkop@SamoBurja ....which is not to say that this has been entirely successful. As noted above, there has been plenty of tactical bungling even where SAMs are present, as shown in this strike video of a Buk (SA-11)
@miladvisor@oryxspioenkop@SamoBurja Even apparent failures, like observed logistical shortfalls, reflect the lightning pace of a first-echelon advance.
@miladvisor@oryxspioenkop@SamoBurja But there are a few oddities. As I mentioned, a lot of this first echelon seems poorly trained and underequipped. How to account for that?
@miladvisor@oryxspioenkop@SamoBurja This is why I don't believe the line that Putin was counting on Kiev falling within 48 hours—why not send your very BEST formations in first if your entire plan depends on it?
@miladvisor@oryxspioenkop@SamoBurja Instead, I believe they were sent in to seize as much as possible and take the worst of the enemy's fire. Remember too that only a third of Russian troops were committed as far as 2 days into the conflict.
@miladvisor@oryxspioenkop@SamoBurja The Russians have now surrounded Kharkov, Kherson, and Mariupol, and partly surrounded Kiev. This phase of the operation is bound to be much more deliberate.
@miladvisor@oryxspioenkop@SamoBurja The forces around all four cities can now be well supplied and large concentrations of Ukrainian field forces appear at risk of envelopment. I am therefore very skeptical of claims that after 96 hours the advantage shifts to the defender.
The big question is what will happen in the cities. Urban combat is unavoidably bloody and destructive. At the same time, Putin has been decidedly averse in employing fires. This leaves several possibilities:
@miladvisor@oryxspioenkop@SamoBurja 1. A cordon of the cities. Negotiating surrender, using a combination of force and softer measures (shutting off power, IO, etc.) to gain control.
@miladvisor@oryxspioenkop@SamoBurja 2. Assault. Will inevitably bring worse casualties for combatants on both sides and for civilians, but can be conducted by more professional units of the second echelon.
@miladvisor@oryxspioenkop@SamoBurja 3. Some combination of 1. and 2. for the provincial cities, plus a cordon of Kiev to allow time to negotiate an end to the war.
If he thinks a reasonable compromise can be reached, he has time; if he thinks he needs a military fait accompli, he will have to move fast before urban defenses can be set up.
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Russia's apparently bizarre actions in Ukraine have confused many, especially their alleged failures of preparation. But these are surprising only in extent, not in type—they follow from two characteristics of the Russian army...
1. Top-down C2: subordinates are usually given—and expected to take—a lot less initiative than in NATO armies. This extends all the way down to junior officers and NCOs. In Afghanistan, the Mujahideen knew the best way to halt a Soviet attack was by killing the battalion CO.
A corollary to this:
2. Much more emphasis on the operational level, where Russian arms excel. WWII offensives were often shambolic and costly at the divisional level, but the combined effect was crushing.
This gets things wrong in the same way a lot of the military analysis does. Russia has sharply departed from usual practice—flooding the zone with obvious, heavy-handed propaganda.
If an actor completely diverges from standard form, the next question should be: "Why?"
There are overriding political considerations at play, he's clearly willing to sacrifice some advantages for them. While I think his specific war aims are still difficult to judge, THAT is what should drive analysis of both the campaign and the info war.
Excellent thread detailing the opposite interpretation of my own, from a true expert on the Russian military.
Points of agreement/divergence: 1. Tactical failures: Agree that Russian forces may be performing well short of expectations. This also has to be balanced against....
....operational objectives. A lot of his analysis hinges on the assumptions quoted below and in the tweet that follows it. On that, I strongly disagree.
2. This is the meat of where we differ. Yes, thunder runs are unworkable by themselves. And I agree that those early pushes may have been poorly-coordinated attempts at a coup de main. However, I also think...
This brings up an important point. Short answer: not necessarily.
Remember, doctrine is the body of practices that an army uses. So even though Russia is facing a very different situation from what its doctrine was designed for, it will still be based on that doctrine...
So even though Russia is not trying to break through a heavily-defended line stretching 100s of km (except perhaps in the Donbas), it's still approaching objectives in the operational and strategic depth similar to classic deep operations.
Other operational considerations are different though. BECAUSE it is not facing a WWI- or WWII-style German army (or a 1980s NATO one, for that matter), calculations for things like tempo, force protection, etc. are completely different.
Unfortunately, he's right: most military analysts ARE bewildered by this.
What's stranger is that they can't reconcile this with indubitable Russian success up to this point, or imagine how it might support Putin's political objectives.
I still don't think anyone appreciates the significance of Russian operations at Hostomel airport.
It's ~75 km from the river crossing at Chernobyl to the airport. Compare that to the doctrinal template of Soviet deep operations, which calls for airborne operations 80 km deep...
One purpose of airborne troops in the operational depth is to exploit any fleeting opportunities. But the main reason is to disrupt the rear of forward echelons and render their position untenable.
The breakthrough around Chernobyl was crucial, the Russians' only available mobility corridor on the right bank of the Dnieper. The crossing at Chernobyl is one of the few through the Pripyat Marshes, an otherwise impassable obstacle.