A short thread on the war and where we are with the Russian government’s goals of re-writing the European security order to reflect a weakened West and a stronger Russia.
To recap, in the last week, the Russian government has:
Launched an unprovoked invasion of the whole of Ukraine for no obvious reason;
Embarrassed itself militarily;
Caused NATO and the EU to unite as they haven’t done for years, if ever before;
Caused Germany to overturn 75 years of post-WW2 defence policy;
Caused Switzerland to break with 200 years of neutrality;
Caused Finland to debate joining NATO;
Caused neutral Sweden to send lethal aid to Ukraine;
Triggered crippling sanctions, which currently appear to be sending the Russian economy back to the 1990s;
Caused Nord Stream 2 to be cancelled;
Caused Western energy companies to walk away from Russian partners;
Caused a rethink of the energy relationship with Russia by European states – a critical relationship for the Russian economy;
Been shut out of most of Europe’s airspace;
Annoyed the oligarchs;
Got Russia kicked out of Eurovision, the World Cup, and international ice hockey;
Triggered an ICC war crimes investigation;
Triggered significant domestic protests, despite the great costs to the people involved in them;
Caused the EU Parliament to recommend accepting Ukraine as an accession candidate
Caused widespread discussion about Putin’s mental health;
Transformed a former comedian and Paddington voiceover from a not very popular president to a global icon of courage and resistance;
United countless people around the world in admiration of Ukraine.
But apart from that, it’s all been a great success.
I missed this out. Another triumph:
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A few quick thoughts on the reporting and the reality of the Trump administration’s foreign policy.🧵
Both US and European news media are likely to talk a lot about the “unpredictability” of Trump’s foreign policy as if it’s some kind of strategy. This is misleading – Trump foreign policy wasn’t and isn’t unpredictable, it’s incoherent.
Trump 1 policy was incoherent because what Trump said and did often didn’t align with his own administration (not just career State Dept people but his own appointees). And, of course, we could see very little of what Trump and his inner circle were doing behind closed doors.
If Trump's demands for 5% spending on defence really plunges European NATO members into crisis mode then they haven't been paying attention. It seems to me that the point of this demand is that it's designed not to be met. That's what should be causing alarm. 🧵
Since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATO members' defence spending as a percentage of GDP has been transformed. Compare 2021 and 2024 estimates:
In his 1st term, Trump talked often (in the style of a mafia boss running a protection racket) about the need for European NATO members to "pay" 2% for their defence, referred to those that didn't as "delinquent", and threatened them:
Time for another end of year 🧵. Apologies (again) for the enormous length.
In many ways, late 2024 looks like late 2023, but choices confronting policymakers and citizens are both more constrained and more urgent as we move closer to a temporary ceasefire in Ukraine and to a post-West US - and thus a post-US West - under a Trump administration.
2024 has been the year when everyone except China lost.
Not sure any state in the world has a foreign policy or diplomatic infrastructure that can cope with what’s going on at the moment.
Foreign policy is, obviously, about advancing priorities (and dealing with the legacy of previous governments’ foreign policies) while broadly trying to hold everything else as constant as possible in order to achieve that.
The policies themselves and the institutions that develop and implement them reflect that focus. In order to function within budget and staffing constraints they have to assume that lower-priority areas are stable or unimportant enough not to spend a lot of time and attention on.
Given how cautious the Biden admin has been in Ukraine because of this fear, it was always clear they wouldn't have authorised the use of ATACMS if there had been any risk of Russia using nuclear weapons. 🧵
The fact that Putin revised the nuclear doctrine, used his exciting new missile, and made threatening noises on TV isn't an indication that we've moved nearer to the use of nuclear weapons in the last week - on the contrary, it's a strong indication that nuclear use is not likely
If you're a normal Westerner who doesn't spend much time thinking about Russian foreign policy or war or nuclear weapons, and you suddenly see wall-to-wall media coverage of ICBMs and nuclear threats it's likely to be very scary. As others have pointed out, that's the point of it
Many analysts and journalists are still framing what's coming as roughly like a traditional presidency: led by the president, filled with appointees that have real roles, aiming to produce workable policy that serves US interests. I don’t think any of this is looking correct.
Looking at the incoming administration picks from Gabbard to Kennedy to Gaetz to Hegseth, it seems pretty obvious that these are not serious nominations in the sense that they are expected to conduct government business in the way that’s normally understood of those roles.
These nominations are so odd, even by Trump standards, that I wonder if they are intended not to be serious (even if confirmed) but to signal contempt for the normal functioning of US democracy: a joke cabinet member for a joke system of government.