A short thread on the war and where we are with the Russian government’s goals of re-writing the European security order to reflect a weakened West and a stronger Russia.
To recap, in the last week, the Russian government has:
Launched an unprovoked invasion of the whole of Ukraine for no obvious reason;
Embarrassed itself militarily;
Caused NATO and the EU to unite as they haven’t done for years, if ever before;
Caused Germany to overturn 75 years of post-WW2 defence policy;
Caused Switzerland to break with 200 years of neutrality;
Caused Finland to debate joining NATO;
Caused neutral Sweden to send lethal aid to Ukraine;
Triggered crippling sanctions, which currently appear to be sending the Russian economy back to the 1990s;
Caused Nord Stream 2 to be cancelled;
Caused Western energy companies to walk away from Russian partners;
Caused a rethink of the energy relationship with Russia by European states – a critical relationship for the Russian economy;
Been shut out of most of Europe’s airspace;
Annoyed the oligarchs;
Got Russia kicked out of Eurovision, the World Cup, and international ice hockey;
Triggered an ICC war crimes investigation;
Triggered significant domestic protests, despite the great costs to the people involved in them;
Caused the EU Parliament to recommend accepting Ukraine as an accession candidate
Caused widespread discussion about Putin’s mental health;
Transformed a former comedian and Paddington voiceover from a not very popular president to a global icon of courage and resistance;
United countless people around the world in admiration of Ukraine.
But apart from that, it’s all been a great success.
I missed this out. Another triumph:
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Since it’s that time of year again, 12 end-of-year and start-of-new-year thoughts about Russia’s war against Ukraine and its implications. A long 🧵
1. Russia can’t win. In recent months, there’s been a lot of discussion in the West about Russian victory, but the Russian govt’s objectives were unrealistic from the start, and impossible to achieve almost as soon as the fighting started.
The explicit aims of the invasion were: reset the strategic map of Europe in Russia’s favour; stop “genocide” in Eastern Ukraine; create a pro-Russian Ukraine, including a puppet govt in Kyiv (i.e. “denazify” Ukraine).
By encouraging Georgia to seek NATO admission in 2008 without the necessary support from members, the US created a strong incentive for Russia - with its delusions of rights over its "near abroad" - to act to stop it before reluctant members changed their minds.
If the Bush administration had either paid enough attention to the region or been more realistic about the limits of US power, this wouldn't have happened. It was obvious at the time that France and Germany wouldn't approve Georgia and Ukraine's accession to NATO.
Given some of the reporting of the last week, it’s clear that we’re in for another wave of discussion about whether Ukraine should be pushed to the negotiating table. A 🧵
I don’t want to focus on the ethics, or otherwise, of trying to pressure Ukraine to make concessions in order to freeze the conflict. Instead, I want to look at the implications of these policies for regional, European, and therefore also US security.
I think it’s very unlikely that Western govts would try to force Ukraine to cede any of its territory to Russia. The sovereignty/territorial integrity principles are too important for their conception of international order (as long as you ignore Kosovo).
Working on my book (post-Cold War US-Russia relations) and realised that the whole relationship can pretty much be summarised in pictures of the two presidents meeting. A thread.
Hard to overstate how embarrassing this is for Russia. Armenia was one of its two closest allies among states formerly part of the USSR (Belarus the other). Russia's priority in the region has always been blocking US military influence/presence. What a failure of Russian strategy
And this is happening at the same time as the humiliation of Russia, allegedly one of the world's great military powers and previously a major arms exporter, having to turn to North Korea for weapons.
Also, of course, happening shortly after Putin was unable to attend the BRICS summit because he's hiding from an international arrest warrant.
I mentioned at the start of my last thread that, in my experience, Western policymakers and advisors who are reluctant to see Ukraine de-occupy Crimea are concerned about nuclear dangers and the risk of Russian disintegration. A 🧵 on this second point.
Since the USSR began to come apart in the very early 90s, there’s been a lot of Western anxiety about the consequences of Soviet, and then Russian, disintegration.
In 1990-91, Western fears of Soviet disintegration concerned the explosion of Yugoslavia-style ethno-nationalist conflicts in the world’s largest state, involving over a quarter of a billion people and the USSR’s huge conventional and nuclear, chemical, and biological arsenals.