Senior Lecturer, Dept of War Studies, King's College London. Russian and US foreign & security policy, US-Russia relations, European security. Views my own.
26 subscribed
Dec 31, 2023 • 36 tweets • 6 min read
Since it’s that time of year again, 12 end-of-year and start-of-new-year thoughts about Russia’s war against Ukraine and its implications. A long 🧵
1. Russia can’t win. In recent months, there’s been a lot of discussion in the West about Russian victory, but the Russian govt’s objectives were unrealistic from the start, and impossible to achieve almost as soon as the fighting started.
Dec 4, 2023 • 13 tweets • 3 min read
The idea that the US is to blame for Russia's war against Georgia in 2008 is partly correct, though not for reasons Lavrov claims to think. Quick 🧵
By encouraging Georgia to seek NATO admission in 2008 without the necessary support from members, the US created a strong incentive for Russia - with its delusions of rights over its "near abroad" - to act to stop it before reluctant members changed their minds.
Nov 3, 2023 • 26 tweets • 4 min read
Given some of the reporting of the last week, it’s clear that we’re in for another wave of discussion about whether Ukraine should be pushed to the negotiating table. A 🧵
I don’t want to focus on the ethics, or otherwise, of trying to pressure Ukraine to make concessions in order to freeze the conflict. Instead, I want to look at the implications of these policies for regional, European, and therefore also US security.
Oct 31, 2023 • 17 tweets • 4 min read
Working on my book (post-Cold War US-Russia relations) and realised that the whole relationship can pretty much be summarised in pictures of the two presidents meeting. A thread.
Bush 41-Gorbachev:
Sep 6, 2023 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
Hard to overstate how embarrassing this is for Russia. Armenia was one of its two closest allies among states formerly part of the USSR (Belarus the other). Russia's priority in the region has always been blocking US military influence/presence. What a failure of Russian strategy
And this is happening at the same time as the humiliation of Russia, allegedly one of the world's great military powers and previously a major arms exporter, having to turn to North Korea for weapons.
May 11, 2023 • 21 tweets • 4 min read
I mentioned at the start of my last thread that, in my experience, Western policymakers and advisors who are reluctant to see Ukraine de-occupy Crimea are concerned about nuclear dangers and the risk of Russian disintegration. A 🧵 on this second point.
Since the USSR began to come apart in the very early 90s, there’s been a lot of Western anxiety about the consequences of Soviet, and then Russian, disintegration.
May 9, 2023 • 22 tweets • 4 min read
We’re seeing another round of media items about whether the US and some European states want to push Zelensky to make concessions, above all on Crimea. A 🧵
Anxiety among some Western policymakers about Ukraine doing too well and retaking Crimea seems, in my experience, to be focused on 2 things: fear that Russia will use nuclear weapons and fear of Russian collapse (which I may do a thread on tomorrow if I have time).
Mar 8, 2023 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
This feels like a potentially very important moment for Georgia, almost 20 years after the Rose Revolution. 🇬🇪
Just yesterday my MA class was discussing Georgia and Moldova since the collapse of the USSR. Among other things, we talked about was the way the relative positions of the two states on membership of the EU and on European/Western identity has changed in the last decade.
Feb 23, 2023 • 26 tweets • 7 min read
Like everyone else, I’ve been thinking about the anniversary of Russia’s unprovoked war against Ukraine. One striking thing about the last year i how hard it is for people, particularly the media, to ditch the myth of Russian invincibility and Putin’s cunning.
The decision to invade Ukraine was an error of staggering proportions, the most profoundly stupid decision made by a powerful state in living memory. The obvious and epic stupidity of it was one of the reasons that a lot of observers, including me, didn’t think it would happen.
Feb 17, 2023 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Olaf Scholz at #MSC2023: “For the first time in history a nuclear armed state is waging an imperialist war of aggression in Europe and there’s no blueprint for that. […] Caution must take place over hasty decisions.” Don't think anyone is going to accuse him of hastiness.
One of the problems he and others seem very reluctant to acknowledge is that excessive caution facilitates that imperialist war of aggression, both because it hands the aggressors a time advantage and because it reinforces the impression of Western fearfulness and weakness.
Feb 13, 2023 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
Fascinating MSC survey of citizens' perceptions of whether other countries are allies (part of the Munich Security Index securityconference.org/en/publication…). The UK scores 2nd highest among Ukrainians, higher than the US.
And it's reciprocated: Ukraine is joint top ally for UK (again, higher than the US). Yet another thing I wouldn't have imagined a year ago, and an indication of how far and how fast things have changed:
Jan 26, 2023 • 18 tweets • 4 min read
Excellent thread. Of course, one of the interesting things about Trump-Russia was how ultimately individuals and structures undermined attempts by Trump and others to give the Russian govt much of what it wanted from the US. 🧵
@TimothyDSnyder mentions Trump holding up military aid for Ukraine. It's interesting, though, that it was the Trump administration that moved from allowing the export of weapons to Ukraine but not providing arms directly - the Obama policy - to direct provision of military aid.
Jan 15, 2023 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
This whole thread raises very important issues that everyone should be thinking about (if they aren't already). One of the key questions is whether the Russian govt does indeed see this war as existential - or rather, what possible ending they see as an existential threat.
There's a large grey zone between outcomes that would almost certainly be seen in that way (an invasion of Russia's legal territory) and those that look very much as if they wouldn't (loss of much of the rest of the Ukrainian territory they've occupied since 24 Feb).
Dec 29, 2022 • 35 tweets • 8 min read
It’s that time of year when everyone looks back on the last 12 months, thinks about the next 12, and is more tempted than usual to offer unsolicited advice.
So, I thought I’d surface from my time off to suggest some things western policymakers, media, and analysts need to do as we go into 2023 and the 11th month of Russia’s genocidal and self-destructive war against Ukraine.
Dec 1, 2022 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
No time to comment on this in detail today, but this is staggeringly poorly thought out. The pre-war European security order is as completely gone as the post-WW1 order was in 1940. It is never coming back.
I was saying at an event only yesterday that this kind of wishful thinking about the future of security (and energy) on the part of some European and US political and analytical elites is one of the biggest problems for the west in relation to the war.
Nov 27, 2022 • 18 tweets • 4 min read
Didn't see the tweet @SamRamani2 mentions here at the time, but this strikes me as so very unlikely - even for someone as gifted at making disastrously stupid foreign policy decisions as Putin - that I'm surprised the story has got any traction at all. 🧵
As Sam says, it's very hard to see how the Belarusian army could be expected by anyone to have any effect on the outcome of the war against Ukraine. And even if it had the size and experience to make a difference in Ukraine, that would probably be short-lived for domestic reasons
Nov 21, 2022 • 15 tweets • 3 min read
Today is the 9th anniversary of the start of Euromaidan. It was obvious from the start that something exceptional was happening, even compared with the Orange Revolution. It now looks like the most significant turning point in Europe's politics/security in the post-Cold War era🧵
A lot of western Europeans seemed bemused that something as arcane as the failure to sign an Association Agreement with the EU could trigger popular protests on this scale. But, of course, it was about much more than that.
Nov 15, 2022 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Not yet clear what exactly happened but *if* a Russian missile has killed NATO civilians on NATO territory then, at a minimum, it's hard to see how Western states can encourage Ukraine to negotiate with Russia in the short/medium term
There've recently been even louder than usual noises from some quarters about the need for Ukr. to make concessions. If any Western govt or institution pushes this after Russia has crossed a red line, even accidentally, it'll be taken by Russia as confirmation of Western weakness
Nov 4, 2022 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
Seeing this reminded me of my favourite tenuous claim to fame: the vicar who christened me had, as a small child, known Bismarck. It's always seemed like an appropriate connection for a War Studies person.
The vicar, who apparently came out of retirement to christen me, had been a judge in Weimar Germany but was removed because he was Jewish. He came to the UK as a refugee and became a vicar. His wife was stuck in Germany during the war and survived the Dresden fire bombing.
Oct 27, 2022 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
Watching Putin's Valdai speech. For someone who's so certain about the decline of the west and the end of a US-led liberal international order, he spends a lot of time talking about them.
What's even more striking is that he's been saying the same things for 15 years (see the 2007 MSC speech) - though the cultural aspects of the west's alleged authoritarianism are a more recent development (but still many years old now).
Oct 13, 2022 • 22 tweets • 4 min read
There’s another wave of analysis on here and in the media suggesting or implying that the US/EU/NATO should push Ukraine to compromise with Russia. Thoughts about one reason why (apologies for any lack of clarity – dealing with covid brain fog). 🧵
Many people with expertise on Russia or Ukraine (e.g. my colleague @samagreene) have explained why negotiations now would be ineffective. Rather than rehearse that here, I want to look at something else: limited knowledge as a factor driving some of the pressure for off-ramps.
26 subscribed
