it’s a well-worn canard of armchair tacticians to asset that “tanks do poorly in urban combat,” but is that necessarily true? what is really being argued? should tanks sit parked on the outskirts of an urban battle?
a short thread debunking this tired maxim:
where does this idea come from?
tanks, from their outset, were designed to withstand enemy fire and destroy hard points, while also being mobile enough to exploit breakthroughs in the front. armor, firepower, and mobility is the balanced trinity of good tank design.
the tank excels in the plains, where it can take full advantage of the armor plating providing its own cover, the main armament reaching its maximum effective range, and mobility to maneuver effectively over flat terrain.
the urban environment couldn’t be more different.
urban environments channelize armored vehicles, limiting them to streets and alleys, moreso with the ever-present wreckage, rubble, and intentional barricade. buildings obstruct sight lines, and also enable enemies to attack at the vehicle’s weakest points, the top and the rear.
given the severe terrain/design mismatch, wouldn’t it be foolish to employ armor in a city? not true! in reality, the use of armor is critical to successful urban operations. stalingrad, aachen, hue city, n. ireland, rimadi, aleppo, mosul all REQUIRED armored vehicles.
wars aren’t minmaxed best case scenarios, but sets of objectives each full of tactical problems. the key to holding territory, the infantry, is just as vulnerable in cities as any other, and armor provides solutions. you fight with what you have and make use of what you can.
armor can destroy fortified positions that most infantry weapons can’t crack, and likewise can withstand those same weapons. they can provide rolling cover to patrols within the city, and act as their own fortified position, with the advantage of being able to be repositioned.
armor is much more vulnerable within a city, but infantry is worse off without it. fighting an urban battle is bloody, confusing, and extremely dangerous, so any asset that can multiply the survivability and effectiveness of the infantry is by definition good for operations.
the conflict in the ukraine has birthed a deluge of ignorance regarding the nature of modern warfighting, and having a clear perspective necessitates critical thinking and reasoned analysis, not regurgitated talking points.
remember this as we watch the coming battles unfold!
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remarkably common view among the dissident right: do you think the regime cares if you in particular view it as legitimate? do you think it cares if you check out of the process all together? I never mentioned anything about voting.
there are more republican voters concerned with fantasy football than will ever interact with any of our content directly. that is not our audience. our audience is ambitious young men of vision and potential that can actually accomplish something if given the opportunity.
we don’t constitute a voting block and never will. our strength is not numerical. the point was about influence and infiltration, about there being a party of consequence that exists when we, and people sympathetic to us, occupy decision making positions within the apparatus.
the republican party today is not ideal, and it is easy to view them with contempt. their continued failures, confused messaging, and corrupted priorities leaves little to admire. regardless, it is still important for the right that they succeed.
it is not what they currently represent, but what they enable the right to do moving forward. they provide a stopgap against the left; imagine an unopposed democratic party. every roadblock they present to the left’s agenda is time bought for us.
their real value exists in the established political apparatus they provide for us to usurp; it’s the only ticket for our political success. among us are many staffers, operatives, interns, still too fresh faced to make decisions and seek office, but we are the next generation.
it’s said that things have to get worse before they get better, but the idea that the worse will be some simple collapse is naively hopeful. it assumes the white middle class today is on the level, and will spontaneously rise up to set things right.
as things get worse, it’s that class (our only political base) that will be one of the last to really feel the squeeze, and all the imported labor and lumpenproles will be well past the revolutionary point. this is already happening, and will only escalate.
the spontaneous right wing revolution theory also assumes that the establishment, various leftist organizations and institutions, will simply standby and watch, instead of seizing their revolutionary opportunity via their client classes before ours even turns off the TV.
a lot of focus on veteran suicides in the last two decades in the context of the global war on terror, and most of it has missed the forest for the trees. it’s not just a phenomenon unique to veterans, but an extension of white deaths of despair.
white veterans have double the suicide rate of the next largest demographic, black veterans. in the general population, this rate is tripled. veterans may end their lives more violently, but slower suicides through drugs and alcohol trend higher among whites generally.
the only demographic with similar rates are native americans. the cause for both is despair, at the loss of their country, downward mobility, a society that offers no opportunity. the difference is that for whites this has occurred while they are still the nominal majority.
the ultimate goal of russia's war in the ukraine was never the simple annexation of territory, it was the destruction of ukrainian miltary capability and the elimination of the threat on russia's southern border posed by NATO's incursion into the country.
what this has meant in practice since the opening campaign of the war is the use of russian forces dedicated to the theater as efficiently as possible. there is a serious reservation to full mobilization. whether this is still tenable is in question.
this was never a war measured in miles, but men and materiel. the economic cost for NATO has been destabilizing, the cost in ukrainian lives unrecoverable. territory controlled was only ever useful insofar as it improved the ability to destroy the enemy.
given the destabilization of law and order occurring in the united states, it is not only important you know how to defend yourself, but also what to do in the aftermath of a self defense situation.
the very first thing to do is call 911. remember that all 911 calls are recorded from the moment you dial the number. do not overshare information, it’s all useable in a court of law. relay this information:
• your name and location
• request EMS for yourself/your assailant
• state you were a victim of a crime
do not say more! if necessary to prevent incrimination, hang up! the most important thing is that first responders are dispatched, police and EMS.