This is a thread that will explain the implied poor Russian Army truck maintenance practices based on this photo of a Pantsir-S1 wheeled gun-missile system's right rear pair of tires below & the operational implications during the Ukrainian mud season.🧵
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For the sin of being the new guy, I was the DCMA quality auditor in charge of the US Army's FMTV "vehicle exercise program" at the contractor manufacturing them from the Mid-1990's to the mid-2000's Then we got more new guys.
Short form: Military trucks need to be...
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...turned over and moved once a month for preventative maintenance reasons.
In particular you want to exercise the central tire air inflation system (CTIS) to see if lines have leaks or had insect/vermin nests blocking the system.
CTIS Controller & CTIS diagram👇👇
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One of the biggest reasons for the repositioning, per TACOM logistic Representatives, was that direct sunlight ages truck tires.
The repositioning of Trucks in close parking prevents a lot of this sun rotting and cycling the CTIS keeps the tire sidewalls supple.
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When you leave military truck tires in one place for months on end. The side walls get rotted/brittle such that using low tire pressure setting for any appreciable distance will cause the tires to fail catastrophically via rips.
There is a huge operational level implication in this. If the Russian Army was too corrupt to exercise a Pantsir-S1. They were too corrupt to exercise the trucks & wheeled AFV's now in Ukraine.
The Russians simply cannot risk them off road during the Rasputitsa/Mud season 7/
And there is photographic evidence of this.
There are 60(+) Russian army trucks crowded & parked on this raised road bed to avoid the fate of the mud-bogged Pantsir-S1.
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Given the demonstrated levels of corruption in truck maintenance. There is no way in h--l that there are enough tires in the Russian army logistical system.
So their wheeled AFV/truck park is as road bound as Russian Army columns were in the 1st Russo-Finnish War. 9/
What that means is that as long as and where ever the Spring Rasputitsa is happening. The Russian Army attack front is three wheeled AFV's wide.
When the Ukrainians can block the road with ATGM destroyed vehicles. They can move down either side of the road like Fins in 1939 10/
...destroying Russian truck columns.
The Crimea is a desert and the South Ukrainian coastal areas are dryer. So we are not seeing this there.
But elsewhere the Russians have a huge problem for the next 4-to-6 weeks.
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The process was invented by a Russian, Via wikipedia:
"The Russian chemist Sergei Vasilyevich Lebedev was the first to polymerize butadiene in 1910....
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...In 1926 he invented a process for manufacturing butadiene from ethanol, and in 1928, developed a method for producing polybutadiene using sodium as a catalyst.
The government of the Soviet Union strove to use polybutadiene as an alternative to natural rubber ...
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That War Department technical manual codified how the US Army would apply mechanized logistics - pallets, forklifts and warehousing using same - world wide.
But as the figure I used above noted, Ukraine is mostly flat and that is bad for DSMAC accuracy.
An analysis of the data bases of downed Shaheds will yield the landmarks these drones are using.
That data, plus an AI analysis of past Shahed trajectories in GNSS jammed...
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...areas, plus maps of Ukrainian cell phone tower networks that Shahed SIM cards access, should allow operational analysis predictions of future Shahed landmark checkpoints to set up quick reaction Ukrainian TDF mobile AA gun "flak traps."
The British Army in WW2 need it's "Phantom" or "J-Service" to listen to its own army's radio circuits to get accurate reports to senior leaders that were slow and...call it...garbled on the way to senior leadership.
The WW2 US Army duplicated this practice and created a dedicated radio units called SIAM - Signal Information and Monitoring - whose sole mission was to monitor the radio traffic of US units for violations of signal procedures and cipher security.
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Ukraine's use of landlines and Starlink in lieu of point to point HF/VHF/UHF radio to beat Russian electronic warfare will require something very different than a WW2 British J-Service or US Army SIAM platoon.
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OSINT & Western intelligence now needs to be looking for mass deployments of Chinese 21st century prefabricated Mulberry harbor equivalents.⬇️
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The @thinkdefence article on the Expeditionary Elevated Causeway (ELCAS) will give anyone caring to look an idea of what to be searching for in Chinese ports and military exercises.
The economic barriers to entry for drone airpower have fallen so far as to make current Western expeditionary warfare model insertions by paradrop, heliborne landing and by naval landing craft obsolescent.
This is denied by the "usual suspects" for the historical, US Army Horse Cavalry branch protecting its bureaucratic empire from the reality of the 1939 Nazi blitzkrieg of Poland, after France fell in 1940, reasons.
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When new threats emerge US Defense Dept. & Senior Service bureaucrats go to extraordinary lengths to ignore them, and actively suppress the voices of those pointing out what they want ignored.
The colloquial term "wilful ignorance" describes this bad behavior to a 'tee.'