Trent Telenko Profile picture
Mar 2, 2022 11 tweets 5 min read Read on X
This is a thread that will explain the implied poor Russian Army truck maintenance practices based on this photo of a Pantsir-S1 wheeled gun-missile system's right rear pair of tires below & the operational implications during the Ukrainian mud season.🧵

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For the sin of being the new guy, I was the DCMA quality auditor in charge of the US Army's FMTV "vehicle exercise program" at the contractor manufacturing them from the Mid-1990's to the mid-2000's Then we got more new guys.

Short form: Military trucks need to be...

2/ Image
...turned over and moved once a month for preventative maintenance reasons.

In particular you want to exercise the central tire air inflation system (CTIS) to see if lines have leaks or had insect/vermin nests blocking the system.

CTIS Controller & CTIS diagram👇👇

3/ ImageImage
One of the biggest reasons for the repositioning, per TACOM logistic Representatives, was that direct sunlight ages truck tires.

The repositioning of Trucks in close parking prevents a lot of this sun rotting and cycling the CTIS keeps the tire sidewalls supple.

4/ Image
When you leave military truck tires in one place for months on end. The side walls get rotted/brittle such that using low tire pressure setting for any appreciable distance will cause the tires to fail catastrophically via rips.

See early video:

5/
Now look at the same Pantsir-S1 tire sidewalls after the Ukrainians tried to tow or drive it out of the mud.

The right rear tire fell apart because the rips in it were too big for the CTIS to keep aired up.

No one exercised that vehicle for 1 year

6/
There is a huge operational level implication in this. If the Russian Army was too corrupt to exercise a Pantsir-S1. They were too corrupt to exercise the trucks & wheeled AFV's now in Ukraine.

The Russians simply cannot risk them off road during the Rasputitsa/Mud season
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And there is photographic evidence of this.

There are 60(+) Russian army trucks crowded & parked on this raised road bed to avoid the fate of the mud-bogged Pantsir-S1.

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Given the demonstrated levels of corruption in truck maintenance. There is no way in h--l that there are enough tires in the Russian army logistical system.

So their wheeled AFV/truck park is as road bound as Russian Army columns were in the 1st Russo-Finnish War.
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What that means is that as long as and where ever the Spring Rasputitsa is happening. The Russian Army attack front is three wheeled AFV's wide.

When the Ukrainians can block the road with ATGM destroyed vehicles. They can move down either side of the road like Fins in 1939
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...destroying Russian truck columns.

The Crimea is a desert and the South Ukrainian coastal areas are dryer. So we are not seeing this there.

But elsewhere the Russians have a huge problem for the next 4-to-6 weeks.
11/End Image

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More from @TrentTelenko

Jun 3
Just...no. The 8th AF fudged its accuracy numbers.

It excluded "gross error" bombing runs beyond 3,000 feet from the target. Which were above 10% of all 1944 bombing runs.

Below, the inner circle is what a 1944 1,000 foot (304m) CEP in WW2 looked like when dropped from 400(+) four engine heavy bombers.
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Using this document:

THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
Bombing Accuracy, USAAF Heavy and Medium Bombers in the ETO
MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION
First Edition 3 November 1945
Second Edition January 1947

You find both mission failures & gross errors were "excluded data"
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And that both increased altitude and the number of combat boxes involved made CEP worse.

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Read 12 tweets
Jun 3
There are sound photographic reasons I'm talking about Russia's domestic fuel tanker supply distribution chain breaking down.

Dead tanker trucks can't move fuel.

Plus additional tanker trucks diverted & moving from 🇷🇺 to 🇺🇦 can't deliver fuel domestically either.

Fuel🧵
1/
For additional photographic proof of 🇷🇺 tanker truck supply distribution breaking down, see here in Belgorod:


2/
And see here elsewhere in Crimea:



3/
Read 8 tweets
Jun 2
This manpower sweep problem is actually a lot worse for the Russians than Western military intelligence is capable of giving credit.

It takes a Russian labor gang about 3 hours to load 16 tons of wooden boxes w/o a convenient box car to truck line up. (below upper right)

🧵
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Image
Image
Because the Russian Army doesn't use pallets, forklifts, telehandlers nor D-rings anywhere in their supply chain to strap down pallet loads.

You need massive numbers of conscripts to load and unload from train cars to trucks & vice versa.

See⬇️
2/
This has a whole lot of knock on effects in how the non-mechanized Russian supply system works in the age of GMLRS & drones.

You see here a commercial to tactical truck swap of wooden boxes in the Russian Army operational/strategic depths.

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Read 8 tweets
Jun 2
This:

>>This is essentially a complete tactical bomber cell in a box, sized for a small mobile drone team operating at brigade level or below. It is not a strategic deep-strike weapon, and it is not pretending to be one.

...is "Federalized airpower."
Here are two key concepts for you --

1. Federalized Airpower - local ground unit as opposed to theater air commander asset

2. Kill Chains.

#1 has to do with every ground unit from platoon up owning a bit of airpower (a small UAV) outside central air command.
2/
#2 has to do with the ability of that UAV to call/deal lethal firepower for ground units w/o or w/little regard to superiors.

This drone kit is one of those subtle military technology developments that is in fact a game changer that brings those two ideas into reality.

3/3
Read 4 tweets
Jun 2
I've spent the last few hours reposting my 2022 to date take down's of Alex Vershinin's "Truck beer math" (from the Nov. 2021 War on the Rocks article "Feeding the Bear") which I used to review this Tochnyi article⬇️

TLDR: Tochnyi screwed up & used Vershinin's disproven work.
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Specifically this bit stating Russian trucks did three trips a day because they spent one hour loading and one hour unloading trucks.

That is, like Alex Vershinin, they assumed mechanized logistics loading times with pallets & forklifts⬇️

2/ Image
This is Alex Vershinin's truck "Beer Math" for comparison.

It assumes 45 miles vice 50 km, but both show the same mirror imaging of Western mechanized logistics on Red/Russian Army non-mechanized logistics.

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Read 12 tweets
May 29
Oh My!

The electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) of these jammer mountings has got to suck.

How many "nulls" this jammer throws (AKA where no jamming energy transmits) will be substantial.

1/
I did a thread on this in 2024 when the first turtle tank jammers appeared.

2/
The basics of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) studies of antenna mounting have been around since 1944.

3/
Read 5 tweets

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