We've heard a lot of discussion in recent days about how our real exit game in this nightmare could be a palace coup or a popular revolution against Putin. Putting my historian's hat on, let's dissect this proposition. I am not very hopeful. 👇🏿
Russia/USSR does not have a very convincing track record when it comes to doing away with No. 1. Consider Stalin. He unleashed a bloodbath like Russia had never seen and even terrorised his closest comrades. But they were afraid to gang up on him.
Now, I know some will say: but there are rumours of him having been poisoned. I've never seen any convincing evidence to support this theory. As far as we can tell, he died from a stroke in March 1953.
That same year, there was a successful move on Beria who was arrested during a Presidium meeting and later executed. But Beria, as terrifying as he was, wasn't really No. 1 in 1953. Note that Georgii Zhukov's (and the military's) involvement was crucial to make this happen.
Next, we have Khrushchev. There was an attempted coup against Khrushchev in 1957, involving Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich. The latter two were hardline Stalinists but it's more sensible to interpret this coup as just pure power struggle.
Khrushchev was savvy enough to undercut his opponents (with Zhukov's help), staying in power. He ultimately lost power in a successful coup in 1964, when his proteges (notably Leonid Brezhnev) plotted against him while he was on vacation in Abkhazia.
Brezhnev ruled for a long time, overseeing Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, and died peacefully in his sleep. There were no attempted coups against his sickly successors Andropov and Chernenko.
But of course we had an attempted coup against Gorbachev in August 1991, once again when Gorbachev, like Khrushchev, had gone on vacation. The plotters (KGB, Defence, other hangers-on) entered history as the most incompetent coup crew on record. The coup failed after 3 days.
Then we have Yeltsin and his stand-off with the Russian Parliament in 1993. We remember how that ended: Yeltsin ordered tanks to fire on the parliament. The tsar survived. The opposition was arrested.
In any case, the track record of palace coups is not encouraging. Only one successful coup in the last century. A popular revolution is also a non-starter. The Russians have a wonderful tradition of high-minded dissidents speaking truth to power. Many have suffered.
But the "masses" have never been a factor in replacing rulers. Even though we saw street action in Russia in 1990-91, it only happened because Gorbachev untightened the screws first, making it safer to speak out. Putin is going in the opposite direction.
This doesn't mean that we won't see him overthrown (after all, 1964 did happen). It's just that the odds are not great.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
My view on this is that it does not represent a new departure for Trump or the United States. Trump is doing here what he has already threatened to do many times: wash his hands of the whole Ukraine situation and let the Europeans sort it out.
As long as the Europeans are willing to purchase US weapons for Ukraine, he is willing to sell them. That's good. But the financial burden will fall on Europe, and Ukraine for its part will have to come up with the necessary manpower.
But there is no backstop. There is no promise of direct US support, just "good luck to all."
So here's the bizarre thing. Steve Witkoff, Marco Rubio et al are now arguing that Russia's acceptance of Art. 5-style guarantees for Ukraine is some kind of an incredible breakthrough that amounts, per Rubio, to Russia's major concession.
However, if you follow this story, as, for instance, Sam Charap and I have, over the years, you'll see that the idea of something *like* Art. 5 was being negotiated at Istanbul in 2002, and that the key obstacle was *not* Russia but U.S. unwillingness to offer such guarantees.
In other words, what today Trump is presenting as Russia's major concession is actually a major concession by the United States, because up to now the U.S. was unwilling to offer viable security guarantees to Ukraine. This below is from our recent piece for @ForeignAffairs.
A few reflections on where we are after another meeting in Istanbul. Since we now have both the Ukrainian and the Russian documents in full, I will do a full analysis on my Substack () tomorrow morning, so subscribe, but for now, here are some thoughts.profradchenko.substack.com
The fact that we have both documents already means that neither side is currently prepared to seriously negotiate. Recall we didn't have this at Istanbul 1.0: those were secret talks, and it was only much later that we obtained the leaked documents.
Now the positions are being leaked in real time, which means that they are not actual positions: just propaganda. Even so, is there any room at all for compromise?
On Putin's obsession with history, an interesting quote. He says here: "Clearing out of the historical memory dissolves our very selves, we lose our identity... A nation that has no past, has no future. This attempt to dissolve us in an amorphous state is not accidental."
In other words, Putin understands history-writing as a nation-building exercise. His history is by necessity propagandistic. History that is not, as he describes it, "patriotic" is automatically suspect as a probable foreign imposition.
What he is describing here is not history in any sense that a historian would recognize and describe it. Putin's "history" is basically propaganda employed by the state for the purposes of the state. Still, such references offer a window into Putin's thinking.
So, since I am a fan of primary sources, let's go through the new US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund Agreement: . At first, it's pretty bad. At second, it (possibly?) amounts to little. An explainer.kmu.gov.ua/storage/app/up…
The first part - WHEREAS - explains the underlying intentions and principles. This bit, to me, is pretty interesting. I guess this refers to denying Russia any future economic stake in Ukraine. But it could mean anything. It could mean excluding China, for example.
Note the weird wording here: "acknowledges" (doesn't mean "accepts"). There is more blah-blah-blah in this agreement about how it will sit in the context of Ukraine's possible future membership in the European Union and common market. EU lawyers will not be happy.
. This is not dissimilar from Istanbul, and looks pretty good for Putin (if Trump can arm-twist Zelensky into signing off on this, which he may well be able to). Several questions:axios.com/2025/04/22/tru…
Let's distinguish here between U.S. recognition of Crimea as Russian (could be done unilaterally in a declaration), and Ukraine's recognition of Crimea as Russian. The latter would require an "all-Ukrainian referendum" (the outcome cannot be guaranteed).
My guess is that "U.S. recognition" is not an accident: the deal would *not* include Ukraine's recognition of Crimea. The other Russia-occupied regions are recognized as "de facto" under Russian control within the limits of current control (no surrender of territory by Ukraine).