Nine days since the Russian conquest of Ukraine began. The potential encirclement of Kyiv is the focus of my 9th daily thread. 1/25 (Image via @Osinttechnical)
4/25 Kyiv is an industrial, cultural and political centre for Ukraine. It is a transportation hub and a city of historic value.
5/25 At the same time, both the Russians and Ukrainians have assigned significant political value to Kyiv. As @spencerguard & @JaysonGeroux have written “while a city may have no initial military value, it becomes so when political value is assigned to it" mwi.usma.edu/urban-warfare-…
6/25 The ongoing defence of Kyiv is a major psychological boost for Ukraine’s soldiers and civilians. It also acts to catalyse international support for Ukraine. (Image - @IAPonomarenko).
7/25 Denying Kyiv to the Russians frustrates them in achieving their key military and political objective in war. Holding it also buys the Ukrainians time for provision of international support to continue building up.
8/25 How does an encirclement, and possibly the capture, of Kyiv play out?
(Image - Google Earth)
9/25 First, the Russians need to physically cut the city off on the ground. This will be an enormous undertaking. The city measures about 25km east to west and 35km north to south. Roughly, the Russians will need to create (at least) a 90km long cordon around the city.
10/25 In defensive operations, a battalion sized organization (what the Russians call a BTG) occupies a ‘frontage’ of about 1000 metres. This means that an effective encirclement of the city would take up the vast majority of Russian forces in Ukraine. This probably isn’t viable.
11/25 The Russians might opt for a looser cordon around the city. But this would allow the Ukrainians to resupply the defenders, prolonging any siege by providing reinforcements to defend the city in the event of a Russian assault.
12/25 The Russians will seek to cut the city in half by destroying the Dnieper River bridges. This makes coordination and internal reinforcement difficult for the defenders. The Russians might also conduct riverine operations to prevent defenders from crossing the river.
13/25 The Russians will need to cut the city off to prevent defenders and others from leaving. This will be the mission of the ‘inner cordon’ of any Russian encirclement.
14/25 The Russians will also need an ‘outer cordon’ to prevent supplies and reinforcements getting into the city. This is what the US Army calls a ‘perimeter defence’. It requires an integrated force of infantry, armour, engineers, artillery, air defence, EW, and logistics.
15/25 The Russians will also want to prevent journalists entering the city to report on the Russian tactics needed to secure the city. They will want to deny the world pictures of the starving citizens that a Russian siege would produce. (Image - @CNN)
16/25 And they will not want international aid organisations getting into the city either.
17/25 The Russians will also attempt to cut off power to the city. This has a major impact on civilian morale. It prevents long term storage of food. It also restricts the kinds of communications systems that might be used.
18/25 The Russians will be desperate to destroy communications networks. This is to break down the command and control of defenders in the city. It also prevents the defenders communicating with outside military forces to coordinate resupply and reinforcements.
19/25 Importantly, if the Russians destroy the terrestrial & cellular networks in Kyiv, they may stop the Ukrainian President talking to & rallying in his people. This would have a major strategic impact for the people of Ukraine, & for the coordination of international support.
20/25 Concurrently, the Russians will be using artillery, rockets and air dropped dumb bombs to kill defenders and break down C2. They will also hope to harass the city’s inhabitants into leaving the city so there are fewer potential defenders in the city. Image- @IAPonomarenko
21/25 Finally they will want to deny Ukrainian air power over the city, including stopping aerial resupply. But the Russians have failed to far to dominate the skies. A Pentagon brief today notes briefed that “Ukraine has a significant majority of its aircraft still available”
22/25 Indeed, some are speculating about whether the Russian air force is capable of what is required of it in Ukraine: rusi.org/explore-our-re…
23/25 All of this is what we could call ‘shaping operations’ by the Russians. These are the activities that are required to provide a foundation for their subsequent assault on the city. There are several different ways the Russians might do this.
24/25 How this assault might play out will be the subject of my thread tomorrow. A warning – it will be very grim. We already know that the Russian way of war has embraced the destruction of cities in Chechnya & Syria. They are using this playbook in Mariupol & other cities.
25/25 My observations, part 9, ends. Thank you to the many followers, old and new, who have been reading and sharing these posts. I hope they have provided useful insights.
(Image - @IAPonomarenko)
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It is the night before Russia's Victory Day parade, and all through Moscow, air defenders are stirring. There has been a lot of discussion about the potential for a Ukrainian attack during the parade, so I thought I would explore this issue in more detail. 1/5 🧵🇺🇦
2/ The head of Ukrainian military intelligence General Budanov intimated in his own way that the Russians should “bring ear plugs”. But what might be the strategic rationale for a Ukrainian attack against the 9 May Victory Day parade in Moscow?
3/ To answer this, there are 4 key issues that need to be resolved. 1. Can Ukraine penetrate Russia's air defence & get its drones to Red Square? 2. What might be the advantages of an attack? 3. What would be the downsides of an attack? 4. Is this just a big deception plan?
There has been a lot of coverage about the Ukrainian uncrewed vessel shooting down at least one, possibly two Russian fighter bombers recently. It is a significant moment in 21st century war. But military institutions have much to do to exploit such capabilities. 1/5 🧵🇺🇦
(Image: Naval News)
2/ Over the last year, there have been multiple events where uncrewed systems have launched other uncrewed systems and weapons to attack Russian forces. This has occured at sea and on land. It represents next generation robotic warfare.
3/ It is transforming the character of war. But to fully exploit this capability, military institutions must make tough decisions about the balance of crewed and uncrewed systems, as well as the balance between exquisite and cheap, massed systems.
I have just published my latest weekly update on the war in Ukraine, and the competition/confrontation with China in the Pacific. This week I explore Russia's '3-day peace' proposal, Russian casualties, the minerals deal, and the North Koreans learn and adapt. 1/5 🧵🇺🇦 (Image: @DefenceU)
2/ The minerals deal is interesting. In 2017 Trump agreed with the President of Afghanistan that the US would help Afghanistan with its minerals. Trump then went behind Ghani’s back to negotiate an exit from Afghanistan with the Taliban. We should not expect too much from the U.S.-Ukraine agreement.
3/ Russia's monthly casualties have crept up this year to 40K per month.The maps in my update provide an indication of just how expensive each kilometre of Ukrainian territory has become for Russian forces, and what a poor return on their investment this has been for the Russian military. (Graph: @DefenceHQ)
An Easter truce has been declared by Putin. Not only is this a cynical act of someone who has sustained his aim to subjugate #Ukraine, it has huge practical challenges. So why has Putin done this and what does it mean for the war? 1/10 🧵 politico.eu/article/putin-…
2/ The truce is a short one - about a day. It is a truce that Putin has called unilaterally, so it is not binding on the Ukrainians in any way. That Putin has done this shows that he still believes that he has the upper hand in the war, and can dictate its tempo.
3/ But war is an interactive endeavour, and does not work like that. The Ukrainians and Russians are engaged along a nearly 1000 kilometre front line. The Russians have recently stepped up the tempo of attacks, and this momentum can’t just be turned off like a spigot.
Over the past three years, both sides in the #Ukraine war have learned and adapted. Battlefield, strategic and international collaboration and adaptation are accelerating and intensifying, resulting in a global Adaptation War. 1/7 🧵🇺🇦
2/ In my latest piece, I examine how Ukraine and Russia have both 'learned to learn better' since the Russian full-scale invasion in 2022. I also look at their key battlefield and strategic adaptations.
3/ I also explore the emerging collaboration and adaptation between authoritarians. Russia's war in Ukraine and the war in the Middle East have spawned a rapid expansion in the sharing of insights between Russia, Iran, China and North Korea.
In short, the ‘leader of the free world’ is considering siding fully with a brutal authoritarian, endorsing its invasion of a democracy, and agreeing with forced territorial expansion. 1/7 🧵 🇺🇦 reuters.com/world/trump-en…
2/ This will legitimise and encourage the same behaviour elsewhere in Europe by Putin, who is already conducting subversion and sabotage across the continent, and preparing his military for future aggression against other nations in Eastern Europe. The current posture and signalling from the Trump administration makes future war elsewhere in Europe almost certain.
3/ The leaders in Iran, North Korea and China are watching closely. Each have aggressive designs against democratic neighbours. Each will be highly encouraged by this clownish, amateur negotiating style and demonstrated lack of interest in defending democratic nations and values.