Mick Ryan, AM Profile picture
Mar 4, 2022 25 tweets 11 min read Read on X
Nine days since the Russian conquest of Ukraine began. The potential encirclement of Kyiv is the focus of my 9th daily thread. 1/25 (Image via @Osinttechnical)
2/25 As always, a shout out to those reporting on the Russian invasion. This includes @KofmanMichael @maxseddon @IAPonomarenko @RALee85 @shashj @DanLamothe @ikhurshudyan @IanPannell @defenceHQ @thestudyofwar @OrlaGuerin @siobahn_ogrady @holmescnn among others. Please follow them.
3/25 But first, why does Kyiv matter?
4/25 Kyiv is an industrial, cultural and political centre for Ukraine. It is a transportation hub and a city of historic value.
5/25 At the same time, both the Russians and Ukrainians have assigned significant political value to Kyiv. As @spencerguard & @JaysonGeroux have written “while a city may have no initial military value, it becomes so when political value is assigned to it" mwi.usma.edu/urban-warfare-…
6/25 The ongoing defence of Kyiv is a major psychological boost for Ukraine’s soldiers and civilians. It also acts to catalyse international support for Ukraine. (Image - @IAPonomarenko).
7/25 Denying Kyiv to the Russians frustrates them in achieving their key military and political objective in war. Holding it also buys the Ukrainians time for provision of international support to continue building up.
8/25 How does an encirclement, and possibly the capture, of Kyiv play out?

(Image - Google Earth)
9/25 First, the Russians need to physically cut the city off on the ground. This will be an enormous undertaking. The city measures about 25km east to west and 35km north to south. Roughly, the Russians will need to create (at least) a 90km long cordon around the city.
10/25 In defensive operations, a battalion sized organization (what the Russians call a BTG) occupies a ‘frontage’ of about 1000 metres. This means that an effective encirclement of the city would take up the vast majority of Russian forces in Ukraine. This probably isn’t viable.
11/25 The Russians might opt for a looser cordon around the city. But this would allow the Ukrainians to resupply the defenders, prolonging any siege by providing reinforcements to defend the city in the event of a Russian assault.
12/25 The Russians will seek to cut the city in half by destroying the Dnieper River bridges. This makes coordination and internal reinforcement difficult for the defenders. The Russians might also conduct riverine operations to prevent defenders from crossing the river.
13/25 The Russians will need to cut the city off to prevent defenders and others from leaving. This will be the mission of the ‘inner cordon’ of any Russian encirclement.
14/25 The Russians will also need an ‘outer cordon’ to prevent supplies and reinforcements getting into the city. This is what the US Army calls a ‘perimeter defence’. It requires an integrated force of infantry, armour, engineers, artillery, air defence, EW, and logistics.
15/25 The Russians will also want to prevent journalists entering the city to report on the Russian tactics needed to secure the city. They will want to deny the world pictures of the starving citizens that a Russian siege would produce. (Image - @CNN)
16/25 And they will not want international aid organisations getting into the city either.

(Image - @icrc)
17/25 The Russians will also attempt to cut off power to the city. This has a major impact on civilian morale. It prevents long term storage of food. It also restricts the kinds of communications systems that might be used.
18/25 The Russians will be desperate to destroy communications networks. This is to break down the command and control of defenders in the city. It also prevents the defenders communicating with outside military forces to coordinate resupply and reinforcements.
19/25 Importantly, if the Russians destroy the terrestrial & cellular networks in Kyiv, they may stop the Ukrainian President talking to & rallying in his people. This would have a major strategic impact for the people of Ukraine, & for the coordination of international support.
20/25 Concurrently, the Russians will be using artillery, rockets and air dropped dumb bombs to kill defenders and break down C2. They will also hope to harass the city’s inhabitants into leaving the city so there are fewer potential defenders in the city. Image- @IAPonomarenko
21/25 Finally they will want to deny Ukrainian air power over the city, including stopping aerial resupply. But the Russians have failed to far to dominate the skies. A Pentagon brief today notes briefed that “Ukraine has a significant majority of its aircraft still available”
22/25 Indeed, some are speculating about whether the Russian air force is capable of what is required of it in Ukraine: rusi.org/explore-our-re…
23/25 All of this is what we could call ‘shaping operations’ by the Russians. These are the activities that are required to provide a foundation for their subsequent assault on the city. There are several different ways the Russians might do this.
24/25 How this assault might play out will be the subject of my thread tomorrow. A warning – it will be very grim. We already know that the Russian way of war has embraced the destruction of cities in Chechnya & Syria. They are using this playbook in Mariupol & other cities.
25/25 My observations, part 9, ends. Thank you to the many followers, old and new, who have been reading and sharing these posts. I hope they have provided useful insights.
(Image - @IAPonomarenko)

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More from @WarintheFuture

Dec 31, 2024
A useful update from @IAPonomarenko. In 2025, the West must not rush to force #Ukraine into an unjust peace with a brutal regime that began an unnecessary war, fought it poorly, used its military to rape, loot, torture and murder its way across a neighbour, and is unlikely to abide by any ceasefire agreement. 1/7 🧵
2/ 20th century politicians (eventually) came to understand that the rise of fascist, aggressive regimes like contemporary Russia (and Nazi Germany) had only one solution: defeat of their physical and ideological means of aggression against their neighbours.
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In the past 48 hours, reports have emerged of a Ukrainian attack on Russian positions near the village of Lyptsi in the Kharkiv region. The attack utilised dozens of uncrewed ground combat vehicles (UGV). 1/5 🧵🇺🇦 Image
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This week, I provided the latest assessment on the relevance of Ukraine lessons to the Pacific at a seminar in Jakarta. I have expanded on this for a new article. 1/5 🧵 Image
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3/ Next, I explored the key ‘filters’ that might be used in translating lessons from #Ukraine so that are more relevant for the prevailing circumstances in the Pacific. Key filers include geography, weather, civil infrastructure and the capabilities of potential adversaries.
Read 5 tweets
Nov 22, 2024
A quick, strategic assessment of Putin's use of the Oreshnik missile in a strike against #Ukraine. In short, this was a political strike not a military one. 1/10 🧵 Image
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Nov 18, 2024
Today, the war in #Ukraine – or at least the time since the large-scale Russian invasion of 2022 – reaches the 1000-day mark. Besides reflecting on the tremendous sacrifices of the Ukrainian people since February 2022, the 1000-day point permits taking stock of the situation. 1/8 🧵 🇺🇦Image
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Nov 11, 2024
In the past few days, speculation about a potential ‘Ukraine solution’ from the incoming Trump administration has accelerated. Here, I examine possible components of this, or other, 'peace plans' for #Ukraine. 1/10 🧵🇺🇦 Image
2/ A report in The Telegraph describes an evolved plan that includes a buffer zone, freezing the conflict, Russia retaining currently held territory, ‘pumping Ukraine full of US weapons’ to deter Russia and deferring Ukraine’s NATO membership for years.
3/ It is timely to examine some of the components of these plans, and the issues they might contain. We can only explore potential components because there is not yet an endorsed Trump plan for Ukraine. And, unfortunately, nor is there a U.S. strategy for #Ukraine produced by the Biden administration in the past 3 years.
Read 10 tweets

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