Nine days since the Russian conquest of Ukraine began. The potential encirclement of Kyiv is the focus of my 9th daily thread. 1/25 (Image via @Osinttechnical)
4/25 Kyiv is an industrial, cultural and political centre for Ukraine. It is a transportation hub and a city of historic value.
5/25 At the same time, both the Russians and Ukrainians have assigned significant political value to Kyiv. As @spencerguard & @JaysonGeroux have written “while a city may have no initial military value, it becomes so when political value is assigned to it" mwi.usma.edu/urban-warfare-…
6/25 The ongoing defence of Kyiv is a major psychological boost for Ukraine’s soldiers and civilians. It also acts to catalyse international support for Ukraine. (Image - @IAPonomarenko).
7/25 Denying Kyiv to the Russians frustrates them in achieving their key military and political objective in war. Holding it also buys the Ukrainians time for provision of international support to continue building up.
8/25 How does an encirclement, and possibly the capture, of Kyiv play out?
(Image - Google Earth)
9/25 First, the Russians need to physically cut the city off on the ground. This will be an enormous undertaking. The city measures about 25km east to west and 35km north to south. Roughly, the Russians will need to create (at least) a 90km long cordon around the city.
10/25 In defensive operations, a battalion sized organization (what the Russians call a BTG) occupies a ‘frontage’ of about 1000 metres. This means that an effective encirclement of the city would take up the vast majority of Russian forces in Ukraine. This probably isn’t viable.
11/25 The Russians might opt for a looser cordon around the city. But this would allow the Ukrainians to resupply the defenders, prolonging any siege by providing reinforcements to defend the city in the event of a Russian assault.
12/25 The Russians will seek to cut the city in half by destroying the Dnieper River bridges. This makes coordination and internal reinforcement difficult for the defenders. The Russians might also conduct riverine operations to prevent defenders from crossing the river.
13/25 The Russians will need to cut the city off to prevent defenders and others from leaving. This will be the mission of the ‘inner cordon’ of any Russian encirclement.
14/25 The Russians will also need an ‘outer cordon’ to prevent supplies and reinforcements getting into the city. This is what the US Army calls a ‘perimeter defence’. It requires an integrated force of infantry, armour, engineers, artillery, air defence, EW, and logistics.
15/25 The Russians will also want to prevent journalists entering the city to report on the Russian tactics needed to secure the city. They will want to deny the world pictures of the starving citizens that a Russian siege would produce. (Image - @CNN)
16/25 And they will not want international aid organisations getting into the city either.
17/25 The Russians will also attempt to cut off power to the city. This has a major impact on civilian morale. It prevents long term storage of food. It also restricts the kinds of communications systems that might be used.
18/25 The Russians will be desperate to destroy communications networks. This is to break down the command and control of defenders in the city. It also prevents the defenders communicating with outside military forces to coordinate resupply and reinforcements.
19/25 Importantly, if the Russians destroy the terrestrial & cellular networks in Kyiv, they may stop the Ukrainian President talking to & rallying in his people. This would have a major strategic impact for the people of Ukraine, & for the coordination of international support.
20/25 Concurrently, the Russians will be using artillery, rockets and air dropped dumb bombs to kill defenders and break down C2. They will also hope to harass the city’s inhabitants into leaving the city so there are fewer potential defenders in the city. Image- @IAPonomarenko
21/25 Finally they will want to deny Ukrainian air power over the city, including stopping aerial resupply. But the Russians have failed to far to dominate the skies. A Pentagon brief today notes briefed that “Ukraine has a significant majority of its aircraft still available”
22/25 Indeed, some are speculating about whether the Russian air force is capable of what is required of it in Ukraine: rusi.org/explore-our-re…
23/25 All of this is what we could call ‘shaping operations’ by the Russians. These are the activities that are required to provide a foundation for their subsequent assault on the city. There are several different ways the Russians might do this.
24/25 How this assault might play out will be the subject of my thread tomorrow. A warning – it will be very grim. We already know that the Russian way of war has embraced the destruction of cities in Chechnya & Syria. They are using this playbook in Mariupol & other cities.
25/25 My observations, part 9, ends. Thank you to the many followers, old and new, who have been reading and sharing these posts. I hope they have provided useful insights.
(Image - @IAPonomarenko)
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The formation of corps for Ukrainian land forces and national guard formations (subject to official confirmation) will be interesting to watch. There will be a few challenges however, and how Ukraine addresses these will indicate just how effective these new corps might be. 1/7 🧵🇺🇦
2/ First, good Corps have Corps level units and formations that shape the battlespace, weight main efforts, reinforce success, and enable the various elements of the current fight. In the current environment, this includes EW, engineers, fires, info ops, logistics, ISR and drones. Will the new Corps have these?
3/ Second, Corps need the right staff to plan future ops, integrate and run current ops, sustain formations and coordinate up and down the chain of command. Corps level planning is not just ‘big brigade’ planning, it is a discreet and highly sought after skill set. Will the Corps HQ have these staffs and who will be training them?
In my latest piece, I conduct a quick assessment of the potential military implications of the release of DeepSeek-R1. There are a few. 1/7 🧵
2/ Implication 1: Every Military Will Want It. I expect that there will be a rush by military and intelligence agencies across the western world to download and testing it extensively.
3/ Implication 2: Lowering the Cost of AI to the Edge. Might AI LLM that use the same approach as DeekSeek-R1 mean military organisations can do everything they want to do with AI, at the levels they want to do it, in a much quicker timescale than imagined?
This is a useful assessment of the situation on the ground in eastern #Ukraine, from the Ukrainian perspective, by @pravda_eng. A number of issues, some specified & some implied, are apparent. 1/8 🧵🇺🇦 pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2…
2/ First, the issues specified in the article. Shortfalls in infantry numbers and training, deficiencies in brigade C2, ammunition quality issues, and false reporting about the situation. None of these are particularly new issues. Any one would be concerning. The combination is alarming.
3/ Now to the implied problems, which are as concerning as those specifically covered in the article.
This week, I published a two-part article that reviewed the seven key elements of the war in #Ukraine that are likely to have the most influence on the trajectory of the war in 2025. 1/5 🧵🇺🇦 (Image: @DefenceU)
2/ The 7 key endeavours are:
- The Ground War.
- The Strategic Strike and Air Defence War.
- The Mobilization War.
- The Economic War.
- The Robot and Algorithm War.
- The War of Narratives.
- The Learning and Adaptation War.
3/ I also examined where the key asymmetries in the war are at the moment, such as manpower, air defence and innovation. Understanding these can help Ukraine target Russian critical vulnerabilities, build capacity to minimise its weaknesses, and inform the conduct of any ceasefire negotiations.
A useful update from @IAPonomarenko. In 2025, the West must not rush to force #Ukraine into an unjust peace with a brutal regime that began an unnecessary war, fought it poorly, used its military to rape, loot, torture and murder its way across a neighbour, and is unlikely to abide by any ceasefire agreement. 1/7 🧵
2/ 20th century politicians (eventually) came to understand that the rise of fascist, aggressive regimes like contemporary Russia (and Nazi Germany) had only one solution: defeat of their physical and ideological means of aggression against their neighbours.
3/ The big words from 21st century politicians, accompanied by tiny portions of national wealth dedicated to defence and support for countries like Ukraine and Taiwan, is not deterring Russian or Chinese aggression. It is actually helping their rise and increasing their power.
In the past 48 hours, reports have emerged of a Ukrainian attack on Russian positions near the village of Lyptsi in the Kharkiv region. The attack utilised dozens of uncrewed ground combat vehicles (UGV). 1/5 🧵🇺🇦
2/ The UGVs were apparently supported throughout the activity by FPV drones. While this doesn’t make the attack fully autonomous – the vehicles need human operators – it is one of the more significant examples of drone combat in this war.
3/ The Battle of Lyptsi is an important step in the transformation of the character of war from a purely human endeavour to something quite different in the 21st century. But none of the battlefield functions envisioned for uncrewed systems will be effective without the transformation of military institutions that wish to use them. This includes armies but also the civilian bureaucracies that support them.