Nine days since the Russian conquest of Ukraine began. The potential encirclement of Kyiv is the focus of my 9th daily thread. 1/25 (Image via @Osinttechnical)
4/25 Kyiv is an industrial, cultural and political centre for Ukraine. It is a transportation hub and a city of historic value.
5/25 At the same time, both the Russians and Ukrainians have assigned significant political value to Kyiv. As @spencerguard & @JaysonGeroux have written “while a city may have no initial military value, it becomes so when political value is assigned to it" mwi.usma.edu/urban-warfare-…
6/25 The ongoing defence of Kyiv is a major psychological boost for Ukraine’s soldiers and civilians. It also acts to catalyse international support for Ukraine. (Image - @IAPonomarenko).
7/25 Denying Kyiv to the Russians frustrates them in achieving their key military and political objective in war. Holding it also buys the Ukrainians time for provision of international support to continue building up.
8/25 How does an encirclement, and possibly the capture, of Kyiv play out?
(Image - Google Earth)
9/25 First, the Russians need to physically cut the city off on the ground. This will be an enormous undertaking. The city measures about 25km east to west and 35km north to south. Roughly, the Russians will need to create (at least) a 90km long cordon around the city.
10/25 In defensive operations, a battalion sized organization (what the Russians call a BTG) occupies a ‘frontage’ of about 1000 metres. This means that an effective encirclement of the city would take up the vast majority of Russian forces in Ukraine. This probably isn’t viable.
11/25 The Russians might opt for a looser cordon around the city. But this would allow the Ukrainians to resupply the defenders, prolonging any siege by providing reinforcements to defend the city in the event of a Russian assault.
12/25 The Russians will seek to cut the city in half by destroying the Dnieper River bridges. This makes coordination and internal reinforcement difficult for the defenders. The Russians might also conduct riverine operations to prevent defenders from crossing the river.
13/25 The Russians will need to cut the city off to prevent defenders and others from leaving. This will be the mission of the ‘inner cordon’ of any Russian encirclement.
14/25 The Russians will also need an ‘outer cordon’ to prevent supplies and reinforcements getting into the city. This is what the US Army calls a ‘perimeter defence’. It requires an integrated force of infantry, armour, engineers, artillery, air defence, EW, and logistics.
15/25 The Russians will also want to prevent journalists entering the city to report on the Russian tactics needed to secure the city. They will want to deny the world pictures of the starving citizens that a Russian siege would produce. (Image - @CNN)
16/25 And they will not want international aid organisations getting into the city either.
17/25 The Russians will also attempt to cut off power to the city. This has a major impact on civilian morale. It prevents long term storage of food. It also restricts the kinds of communications systems that might be used.
18/25 The Russians will be desperate to destroy communications networks. This is to break down the command and control of defenders in the city. It also prevents the defenders communicating with outside military forces to coordinate resupply and reinforcements.
19/25 Importantly, if the Russians destroy the terrestrial & cellular networks in Kyiv, they may stop the Ukrainian President talking to & rallying in his people. This would have a major strategic impact for the people of Ukraine, & for the coordination of international support.
20/25 Concurrently, the Russians will be using artillery, rockets and air dropped dumb bombs to kill defenders and break down C2. They will also hope to harass the city’s inhabitants into leaving the city so there are fewer potential defenders in the city. Image- @IAPonomarenko
21/25 Finally they will want to deny Ukrainian air power over the city, including stopping aerial resupply. But the Russians have failed to far to dominate the skies. A Pentagon brief today notes briefed that “Ukraine has a significant majority of its aircraft still available”
22/25 Indeed, some are speculating about whether the Russian air force is capable of what is required of it in Ukraine: rusi.org/explore-our-re…
23/25 All of this is what we could call ‘shaping operations’ by the Russians. These are the activities that are required to provide a foundation for their subsequent assault on the city. There are several different ways the Russians might do this.
24/25 How this assault might play out will be the subject of my thread tomorrow. A warning – it will be very grim. We already know that the Russian way of war has embraced the destruction of cities in Chechnya & Syria. They are using this playbook in Mariupol & other cities.
25/25 My observations, part 9, ends. Thank you to the many followers, old and new, who have been reading and sharing these posts. I hope they have provided useful insights.
(Image - @IAPonomarenko)
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Our darker angels have returned. For a decade, influential scholars argued that major war was on an irreversible decline. Pinker's 'Better Angels' thesis became almost orthodoxy in parts of the security studies world. But, as @lawdavf has written, war has a future. 1/4 🧵
2/ Fast forward to 2024. PRIO records 61 state-based conflicts — the highest since World War II. 129,000 battle deaths. The fourth most violent year since the Cold War. The 2024 data from SIPRI and PRIO is unambiguous: a historic peak in state-based conflicts, the fourth most violent year since the Cold War, and a Russo-Ukrainian war that has now consumed an estimated 500,000 lives.
3/ The analytical failure wasn't just academic. Governments that accepted the 'war is fading' narrative underinvested in defence, deterrence and industrial capacity. Ukraine paid some of the price. But most Western nations are still underinvested in force structure, defence industry, war stocks and most importantly, national will to resist authoritarian aggression.
China fields a military where 70-80% of soldiers are only children. Every battlefield death risks extinguishing a family line. This demographic reality shapes Xi's strategic calculus in ways Western analysis should pay more attention to. My new piece explores this. 1/5 🧵mickryan.substack.com/p/one-child-on…
2/ China's one-child policy ended in 2015. Its military consequences are only beginning. By 2015, ~70% of PLA soldiers and 80% of combat troops came from one-child households. There is almost no historical precedent for a major military force comprised almost entirely of only children.
3/ The research is sobering. Only children are measurably less trusting, less resilient, less risk-tolerant, and less competitive than those with siblings. These are not ideal traits for combat. They are increasingly the defining traits of the PLA's human capital.
Some initial thoughts on the new Australian National Defence Strategy released today in Canberra. Overall, the focus and trajectory of Australia's defence strategy remains consistent with the 2024 version. There are some notable things worth highlighting. 1/15 🧵🇦🇺
2/ The new NDS shifts more towards a true 'defence' strategy rather than just a 'military' strategy that was described in the 2024 version. There is stronger language around national civil preparedness, fuel security, and economic security. This is good. But these are also topics that should be in a National Security Strategy - if Australia had one!
3/ Spending. There is an uptick in spending. This is a positive. There is a claim that we might get 3% of GDP on defence at some point in the future. The reality is that because we are well short of this now, trying to fund both AUKUS and the ADF at the same time with current spending is challenging (nice word for not possible), and conventional military capabilities are degrading - and not modernising fast enough.
“The advantages of threatening an American ground intervention are real. The advantages of actually committing boots on the ground are also real but more limited. The disadvantages could be numerous.” My weekly update on Iran, Ukraine and the Pacific. 1/6 🧵
2/ Ukraine has achieved something significant in the south. Ukrainian attacks there have disrupted Russian offensive planning, consumed Russian reserve forces, and demonstrated that Ukrainian combined arms operations can impose genuine operational costs. But there is also a trade-off in these southern operations. Gains in the south have come at some cost to northern Donetsk, and Russian forces retain the initiative on what is Russia’s main effort on the ground: the envelopment of Ukraine’s fortress belt and the remainder of Donetsk.
3/ In Iran, the oldest lesson in strategy keeps surfacing: military success in the air and at sea does not automatically translate into political outcomes on the ground. Iran has not been beaten. The question being probably being considered in the Pentagon, Congress and the White House is whether ground forces would ensure that the military campaign achieves a decisive political outcome - or whether it would lead to a larger and more difficult American military commitment to the Middle East with uncertain results.
The latest update on drone and missile attacks on the UAE has just been released. With this as context, I thought I would share some initial insights arising from this Iranian retaliatory campaign and the overall war against #Iran. 1/9 🧵
2/ First, the battlespace is not transparent. It is highly visible but high visibility is not the same as high wisdom about what is seen. And we must not fall into the trap of assuming that we actually are seeing everything we need to see rather than what the enemy wants us to see. Finally, no tech can see into the hearts and minds of soldiers and combat leaders, especially when they are functioning under conditions of existential threat.
3/ Second, Understanding the enemy, and how resilient it is, matters. The Iranians have been preparing for this fight for decades, will have many caches of weapons and have strategised how this might play out. And assuming that a few bombs from the sky topple a regime (especially when it has never been achieved before) badly under estimated the Iranians.
"America & Iran are fighting two very different wars and have two different theories of victory. China & others in the authoritarian learning & adaptation bloc are observing closely & learning." An assessment of where we are, & who is learning from the Iran War. 1/6 🧵
2/ This assessment examines the two wars in and around Iran: the military campaign that Washington is fighting, and the economic campaign that Tehran is waging. It then asks the following question: what are the respective theories of victory, and how does that theory play out differently for each belligerent?
3/ A theory of victory is not simply a list of military objectives. It is a coherent account of how the application of military force produces a political outcome that endures. The Trump administration entered Operation Epic Fury with a theory of the means, and a range of constantly changing ends (at least in public). It might be able to use the military to win the war, but it is unclear whether it has a longer-term plan to win the peace.