Nine days since the Russian conquest of Ukraine began. The potential encirclement of Kyiv is the focus of my 9th daily thread. 1/25 (Image via @Osinttechnical)
4/25 Kyiv is an industrial, cultural and political centre for Ukraine. It is a transportation hub and a city of historic value.
5/25 At the same time, both the Russians and Ukrainians have assigned significant political value to Kyiv. As @spencerguard & @JaysonGeroux have written “while a city may have no initial military value, it becomes so when political value is assigned to it" mwi.usma.edu/urban-warfare-…
6/25 The ongoing defence of Kyiv is a major psychological boost for Ukraine’s soldiers and civilians. It also acts to catalyse international support for Ukraine. (Image - @IAPonomarenko).
7/25 Denying Kyiv to the Russians frustrates them in achieving their key military and political objective in war. Holding it also buys the Ukrainians time for provision of international support to continue building up.
8/25 How does an encirclement, and possibly the capture, of Kyiv play out?
(Image - Google Earth)
9/25 First, the Russians need to physically cut the city off on the ground. This will be an enormous undertaking. The city measures about 25km east to west and 35km north to south. Roughly, the Russians will need to create (at least) a 90km long cordon around the city.
10/25 In defensive operations, a battalion sized organization (what the Russians call a BTG) occupies a ‘frontage’ of about 1000 metres. This means that an effective encirclement of the city would take up the vast majority of Russian forces in Ukraine. This probably isn’t viable.
11/25 The Russians might opt for a looser cordon around the city. But this would allow the Ukrainians to resupply the defenders, prolonging any siege by providing reinforcements to defend the city in the event of a Russian assault.
12/25 The Russians will seek to cut the city in half by destroying the Dnieper River bridges. This makes coordination and internal reinforcement difficult for the defenders. The Russians might also conduct riverine operations to prevent defenders from crossing the river.
13/25 The Russians will need to cut the city off to prevent defenders and others from leaving. This will be the mission of the ‘inner cordon’ of any Russian encirclement.
14/25 The Russians will also need an ‘outer cordon’ to prevent supplies and reinforcements getting into the city. This is what the US Army calls a ‘perimeter defence’. It requires an integrated force of infantry, armour, engineers, artillery, air defence, EW, and logistics.
15/25 The Russians will also want to prevent journalists entering the city to report on the Russian tactics needed to secure the city. They will want to deny the world pictures of the starving citizens that a Russian siege would produce. (Image - @CNN)
16/25 And they will not want international aid organisations getting into the city either.
17/25 The Russians will also attempt to cut off power to the city. This has a major impact on civilian morale. It prevents long term storage of food. It also restricts the kinds of communications systems that might be used.
18/25 The Russians will be desperate to destroy communications networks. This is to break down the command and control of defenders in the city. It also prevents the defenders communicating with outside military forces to coordinate resupply and reinforcements.
19/25 Importantly, if the Russians destroy the terrestrial & cellular networks in Kyiv, they may stop the Ukrainian President talking to & rallying in his people. This would have a major strategic impact for the people of Ukraine, & for the coordination of international support.
20/25 Concurrently, the Russians will be using artillery, rockets and air dropped dumb bombs to kill defenders and break down C2. They will also hope to harass the city’s inhabitants into leaving the city so there are fewer potential defenders in the city. Image- @IAPonomarenko
21/25 Finally they will want to deny Ukrainian air power over the city, including stopping aerial resupply. But the Russians have failed to far to dominate the skies. A Pentagon brief today notes briefed that “Ukraine has a significant majority of its aircraft still available”
22/25 Indeed, some are speculating about whether the Russian air force is capable of what is required of it in Ukraine: rusi.org/explore-our-re…
23/25 All of this is what we could call ‘shaping operations’ by the Russians. These are the activities that are required to provide a foundation for their subsequent assault on the city. There are several different ways the Russians might do this.
24/25 How this assault might play out will be the subject of my thread tomorrow. A warning – it will be very grim. We already know that the Russian way of war has embraced the destruction of cities in Chechnya & Syria. They are using this playbook in Mariupol & other cities.
25/25 My observations, part 9, ends. Thank you to the many followers, old and new, who have been reading and sharing these posts. I hope they have provided useful insights.
(Image - @IAPonomarenko)
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“This is going to be great television…I will say that.” This is how the American president summed up the conclusion of the most fractious meeting to have occurred in front of journalists between an American president and his foreign counterpart in the modern era. An assessment of the Oval Office ambush of President Zelenskyy. 1/10🧵(Image: C-Span)
2/ The signs earlier in the week had pointed to a more productive meeting. President Trump had rolled back his narrative about Zelenskyy being a dictator, and the minerals agreement may have seen America having an enduring interest in the security of Ukraine. All that disintegrated in an explosive, unseemly exchange between Zelenskyy, Trump and Vance.
3/ What are the immediate implications of the Oval Office brawl that will be studied for years to come?
Three years ago today, the military forces of Russia launched an attack across the borders of #Ukraine on the ground and from the air. As Russian troops drove down roads in the hope of a short war and a victory parade in Kyiv, they received a mighty surprise. 1/16 🧵🇺🇦
2/ The response from the people of #Ukraine, to unite and fight whether they were soldier or civilian, inspired us all. In the Battle of #Kyiv and many other battles on the ground, at sea, in the air and in the hearts of minds of people around the world since, the innovation, resilience, courage and essential goodness of the Ukrainian people has stood out.
3/ The rallying cry of their president, who demanded ammunition and not a ride, was a decisive and historic moment. He not only rallied his own people but showed us all what physical and moral courage from national leaders can and should look like in the 21st century. We need more of this urgently.
A good graphic from @detresfa_ showing where the totally unnecessary and unprofessional Chinese live fire off Sydney was planned. Why has China done this? A short thread. 1/9 🧵
2/ The most obvious reason is to point out that if Australia conducts freedom of navigation exercises off the Chinese coast, it can reciprocate. But unlike China, Australia doesn’t have a nine dot line beyond the 12m limit where it seeks to deny international maritime traffic.
3/ They have conducted other deployments into waters adjacent to Australia with governments have kept quiet about previously. However, like they have around Taiwan, the Chinese will probably now normalise these kinds of deployments around Australia. They will want to force us to keep our ships closer to home for political as well as military reasons, which means we can’t help out our allies further north.
The formation of corps for Ukrainian land forces and national guard formations (subject to official confirmation) will be interesting to watch. There will be a few challenges however, and how Ukraine addresses these will indicate just how effective these new corps might be. 1/7 🧵🇺🇦
2/ First, good Corps have Corps level units and formations that shape the battlespace, weight main efforts, reinforce success, and enable the various elements of the current fight. In the current environment, this includes EW, engineers, fires, info ops, logistics, ISR and drones. Will the new Corps have these?
3/ Second, Corps need the right staff to plan future ops, integrate and run current ops, sustain formations and coordinate up and down the chain of command. Corps level planning is not just ‘big brigade’ planning, it is a discreet and highly sought after skill set. Will the Corps HQ have these staffs and who will be training them?
In my latest piece, I conduct a quick assessment of the potential military implications of the release of DeepSeek-R1. There are a few. 1/7 🧵
2/ Implication 1: Every Military Will Want It. I expect that there will be a rush by military and intelligence agencies across the western world to download and testing it extensively.
3/ Implication 2: Lowering the Cost of AI to the Edge. Might AI LLM that use the same approach as DeekSeek-R1 mean military organisations can do everything they want to do with AI, at the levels they want to do it, in a much quicker timescale than imagined?
This is a useful assessment of the situation on the ground in eastern #Ukraine, from the Ukrainian perspective, by @pravda_eng. A number of issues, some specified & some implied, are apparent. 1/8 🧵🇺🇦 pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2…
2/ First, the issues specified in the article. Shortfalls in infantry numbers and training, deficiencies in brigade C2, ammunition quality issues, and false reporting about the situation. None of these are particularly new issues. Any one would be concerning. The combination is alarming.
3/ Now to the implied problems, which are as concerning as those specifically covered in the article.