Strategist, Leader & Author | Retd Army Major General | Senior Fellow for Military Studies @LowyInstitute | @CSIS | Futura Doctrina substack | #BannedInRussia
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2/ The 7 key endeavours are:
2/ The UGVs were apparently supported throughout the activity by FPV drones. While this doesn’t make the attack fully autonomous – the vehicles need human operators – it is one of the more significant examples of drone combat in this war.
2/ First, I explored the key lessons from the war in #Ukraine since the Russian large-scale invasion in 2022. I proposed 7 major lessons, although time & more analysis will produce others. These include meshed civ-mil intelligence collection / analysis, drone warfare, leadership and the adaptation battle.
2/ Putin used this missile as a direct response to recent U.S. administration decisions to allow Ukraine to use U.S.-supplied ATACMs missiles against a wider range of targets inside Russia, particularly targets related to the Ukrainian campaign in Kursk. He notes this in his speech.
2/ Even though the situation for #Ukraine at the 1000-day mark is forbidding, the trajectory of this war is not cast in steel. To prevent continued Russian gains on the battlefield, and to stop any attempt at forcing Ukraine to the negotiate under unfavourable terms, what changes might be required?
2/ A report in The Telegraph describes an evolved plan that includes a buffer zone, freezing the conflict, Russia retaining currently held territory, ‘pumping Ukraine full of US weapons’ to deter Russia and deferring Ukraine’s NATO membership for years.
2/ On 13 October, President Zelenskyy announced the anticipated deployment of North Korea troops’ to Ukraine. In the past 48 hours, the head of NATO, Mark Rutte, described how “North Korea sending troops to fight alongside Russia in Ukraine would mark a significant escalation.”
2/ Apparently there are also three classified elements of the Victory Plan. These will be briefed separately to lawmakers. They were probably briefed to foreign leaders during Zelenskyy’s recent trip to the UK, France, Italy and Germany.
2/ Just last week, Taiwan celebrated its national day. Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te gave an address on 10 October that included a statement that China "has no right to represent Taiwan" and that his mission as president would be to "resist annexation or encroachment upon our sovereignty."
2/ Support in the Australian community for Ukraine remains very high. As the 2024 Lowy Poll found:
2/ To inform this exploration of lessons, we need to understand the components and functions of the Ukrainian strike complex.
2/ Currently, there is no published U.S. strategy specifically for the war in #Ukraine. After 31 months, the Biden administration is still using crisis management, speeches and slogans such as ‘for as long as it takes’ rather than developing and executed a clear, well resourced strategy for Ukraine.
2/ In Russia, Ukraine’s Kursk campaign continues although advances in the past week have been fewer than in the initial part of their post-break through exploitation operations. Russia’s response has gathered momentum.
2/ The capacity to learn and adapt is crucial to generating advantage in wartime. Given the pace of contemporary military operations, when advantage is generated, it can be quite transitory or rapidly overtaken by enemy counter adaption. Therefore, learning and adaptation must be an ongoing endeavour. One of the most important levels of learning in war is that which takes place at the strategic level.
2/ The first Ukrainian objective is political. Zelenskyy has described how "we’ve already expanded and will continue to expand the circle of those who support a just end to this war. It's essential that Ukraine enters this fall even stronger than before." Ukraine must be stronger as the year tapers off into Winter & it must also be seen as such by its supporters and those who support Russia.
2/ Both sides are moving forward while at the same time sustaining terrible damage elsewhere. The remainder of this year, and possibly the trajectory of the war, will be determined by who blinks first and decides that focussing on the losses they are sustaining is more important than the gains they are making elsewhere. This is the ultimate expression of Clausewitz’s battle of wills.
2/ Like all military operations, this will have been planned as a multiphase operation, including the prelude shaping operations. These would have included intelligence collection, force preparation, deception, operational security, logistics and other aspects necessary to prepare the Ukrainian force for battle.
2/ Surprising the opponent is an important method of seizing the initiative on the battlefield or at the strategic level. But the impacts of surprise are transient. As such, exploitation must be executed quickly against surprised – and shocked – enemy forces before they can regain coherency in their command and control and respond effectively.