The formation of corps for Ukrainian land forces and national guard formations (subject to official confirmation) will be interesting to watch. There will be a few challenges however, and how Ukraine addresses these will indicate just how effective these new corps might be. 1/7 🧵🇺🇦 2/ First, good Corps have Corps level units and formations that shape the battlespace, weight main efforts, reinforce success, and enable the various elements of the current fight. In the current environment, this includes EW, engineers, fires, info ops, logistics, ISR and drones. Will the new Corps have these?

In my latest piece, I conduct a quick assessment of the potential military implications of the release of DeepSeek-R1. There are a few. 1/7 🧵 2/ Implication 1: Every Military Will Want It. I expect that there will be a rush by military and intelligence agencies across the western world to download and testing it extensively.

This is a useful assessment of the situation on the ground in eastern #Ukraine, from the Ukrainian perspective, by @pravda_eng. A number of issues, some specified & some implied, are apparent. 1/8 🧵🇺🇦
pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2… 2/ First, the issues specified in the article. Shortfalls in infantry numbers and training, deficiencies in brigade C2, ammunition quality issues, and false reporting about the situation. None of these are particularly new issues. Any one would be concerning. The combination is alarming.

This week, I published a two-part article that reviewed the seven key elements of the war in #Ukraine that are likely to have the most influence on the trajectory of the war in 2025. 1/5 🧵🇺🇦 (Image: @DefenceU) 2/ The 7 key endeavours are:
- The Ground War.
- The Strategic Strike and Air Defence War.
- The Mobilization War.
- The Economic War.
- The Robot and Algorithm War.
- The War of Narratives.
- The Learning and Adaptation War.

A useful update from @IAPonomarenko. In 2025, the West must not rush to force #Ukraine into an unjust peace with a brutal regime that began an unnecessary war, fought it poorly, used its military to rape, loot, torture and murder its way across a neighbour, and is unlikely to abide by any ceasefire agreement. 1/7 🧵 2/ 20th century politicians (eventually) came to understand that the rise of fascist, aggressive regimes like contemporary Russia (and Nazi Germany) had only one solution: defeat of their physical and ideological means of aggression against their neighbours.

In the past 48 hours, reports have emerged of a Ukrainian attack on Russian positions near the village of Lyptsi in the Kharkiv region. The attack utilised dozens of uncrewed ground combat vehicles (UGV). 1/5 🧵🇺🇦 2/ The UGVs were apparently supported throughout the activity by FPV drones. While this doesn’t make the attack fully autonomous – the vehicles need human operators – it is one of the more significant examples of drone combat in this war.

This week, I provided the latest assessment on the relevance of Ukraine lessons to the Pacific at a seminar in Jakarta. I have expanded on this for a new article. 1/5 🧵 2/ First, I explored the key lessons from the war in #Ukraine since the Russian large-scale invasion in 2022. I proposed 7 major lessons, although time & more analysis will produce others. These include meshed civ-mil intelligence collection / analysis, drone warfare, leadership and the adaptation battle.

A quick, strategic assessment of Putin's use of the Oreshnik missile in a strike against #Ukraine. In short, this was a political strike not a military one. 1/10 🧵 2/ Putin used this missile as a direct response to recent U.S. administration decisions to allow Ukraine to use U.S.-supplied ATACMs missiles against a wider range of targets inside Russia, particularly targets related to the Ukrainian campaign in Kursk. He notes this in his speech.

Today, the war in #Ukraine – or at least the time since the large-scale Russian invasion of 2022 – reaches the 1000-day mark. Besides reflecting on the tremendous sacrifices of the Ukrainian people since February 2022, the 1000-day point permits taking stock of the situation. 1/8 🧵 🇺🇦 2/ Even though the situation for #Ukraine at the 1000-day mark is forbidding, the trajectory of this war is not cast in steel. To prevent continued Russian gains on the battlefield, and to stop any attempt at forcing Ukraine to the negotiate under unfavourable terms, what changes might be required?

In the past few days, speculation about a potential ‘Ukraine solution’ from the incoming Trump administration has accelerated. Here, I examine possible components of this, or other, 'peace plans' for #Ukraine. 1/10 🧵🇺🇦 2/ A report in The Telegraph describes an evolved plan that includes a buffer zone, freezing the conflict, Russia retaining currently held territory, ‘pumping Ukraine full of US weapons’ to deter Russia and deferring Ukraine’s NATO membership for years.

It has become increasingly likely that North Korean combat troops will appear in #Ukraine soon. While there remain many unknowns on this subject, the deployment of North Korean troops raises many different potential issues for Russia, Ukraine and NATO. 1/10 🧵🇺🇦 2/ On 13 October, President Zelenskyy announced the anticipated deployment of North Korea troops’ to Ukraine. In the past 48 hours, the head of NATO, Mark Rutte, described how “North Korea sending troops to fight alongside Russia in Ukraine would mark a significant escalation.”

President Zelenskyy has presented his Victory Plan to the Ukrainian parliament. It has 5 elements: Ukraine to join NATO; defense, including long-range strikes; deterring Russian aggression; economic development; and, and post-war security structures. 1/5 🧵 🇺🇦
kyivindependent.com/zelensky-victo… 2/ Apparently there are also three classified elements of the Victory Plan. These will be briefed separately to lawmakers. They were probably briefed to foreign leaders during Zelenskyy’s recent trip to the UK, France, Italy and Germany.

China has commenced #JointSword2024B. In the past day, 153 PLA aircraft & 14 PLAN ships operated around Taiwan. 111 aircraft entered Taiwan’s ADIZ. This is a record high in PLA activity. What might the People’s Liberation Army be seeking to achieve, and what might Western intelligence agencies might learn? 1/8 🧵 2/ Just last week, Taiwan celebrated its national day. Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te gave an address on 10 October that included a statement that China "has no right to represent Taiwan" and that his mission as president would be to "resist annexation or encroachment upon our sovereignty."

The Australian senate recently released a report into support for #Ukraine. Overall, this is a quality report that describes many of Ukraine’s needs as well as Australia’s capacity to assist. 1/7 🧵 🇺🇦 2/ Support in the Australian community for Ukraine remains very high. As the 2024 Lowy Poll found:

“Australian public support for assisting Ukraine remains high. The vast majority of Australians (86%) continue to support ‘keeping strict sanctions on Russia’, steady from 2023. Eight in ten (80%) support ‘admitting Ukrainian refugees into Australia’, down four points from last year. Three-quarters (74%) support ‘providing military aid to Ukraine’, steady on last year.”

poll.lowyinstitute.org/report/2024/se…

This week’s strikes on Russian munitions storage facilities are part of the maturing Ukrainian strategic strike campaign. Long-range strike has been an important strategic adaptation for the Ukrainians since 2022. There is much other nations can learn from this. 1/17 🧵 2/ To inform this exploration of lessons, we need to understand the components and functions of the Ukrainian strike complex.

In the past 24 hours, it has been reported that the Biden administration has finally submitted a strategy for supporting #Ukraine to the U.S. Congress. What is the current U.S. strategy for Ukraine, what might the new strategy look like and will it influence on the trajectory of the war? 1/19 🧵 2/ Currently, there is no published U.S. strategy specifically for the war in #Ukraine. After 31 months, the Biden administration is still using crisis management, speeches and slogans such as ‘for as long as it takes’ rather than developing and executed a clear, well resourced strategy for Ukraine.

I have posted my weekly update with events in #Ukraine, Russia, and the Pacific theatre, as well as my recommended readings. Some key points in the thread below. (Image: @DefenceU) 1/11 🧵 2/ In Russia, Ukraine’s Kursk campaign continues although advances in the past week have been fewer than in the initial part of their post-break through exploitation operations. Russia’s response has gathered momentum.

The Ukrainian attack into #Kursk, now into its 3rd week, was a tactical & operational surprise for the Russians. But the Ukrainians also surprised their supporters in the West. And part of the reason is that many Western nations can’t conceive of such audacity in the modern world. 1/14 🧵engelsbergideas.com/notebook/ukrai… 2/ Ukraine also surprised their supporters in the West in large part because #Ukraine deliberately withheld details of the #Kursk attack to preserve operational security, avoid second guessing by talkative bureaucrats in the West, and avoid the inflated expectations of the build up to their failed 2023 counteroffensive.

Throughout the #Ukraine war, adaptation has been a critical national & battlefield function for #Ukraine, and for the Russians. This is a process that pulses & pauses, and is distributed unevenly throughout combat units & the bureaucratic institutions of state. What observations about strategic adaptation might be made of the #Kursk offensive? 1/16 🧵🇺🇦 2/ The capacity to learn and adapt is crucial to generating advantage in wartime. Given the pace of contemporary military operations, when advantage is generated, it can be quite transitory or rapidly overtaken by enemy counter adaption. Therefore, learning and adaptation must be an ongoing endeavour. One of the most important levels of learning in war is that which takes place at the strategic level.

This provides further disturbing evidence (on top of the tens of thousands of Russian war crimes) that unnecessary cruelty is a systemic part of Russia’s invasion of #Ukraine and not isolated, individual acts. There are institutional incentives for the Russians to behave this way (medals, etc). Putin and Gerasimov are ultimately culpable. 1/6 🧵🇺🇦 2/ This is vastly different from the conduct of the Ukrainian military through the war. As I examine in my new book, The War for Ukraine, fighting a ‘just war’ is a key element of Ukraine’s war #strategy. As Zelenskyy noted last week, in #Kursk “we must fight by the rules.”

https://twitter.com/zelenskyyua/status/1823779258981908493

Ukrainian objectives for the #Kursk operation have gained some recent clarity with statements by the Ukrainian President, as well as other Ukrainian officials. What are these objectives, and what are the Russian options to respond to the Ukrainian Kursk campaign? 1/24 🧵🇺🇦 2/ The first Ukrainian objective is political. Zelenskyy has described how "we’ve already expanded and will continue to expand the circle of those who support a just end to this war. It's essential that Ukraine enters this fall even stronger than before." Ukraine must be stronger as the year tapers off into Winter & it must also be seen as such by its supporters and those who support Russia.