1/6 Just as I expected, China's GDP growth target for the year was announced this morning at the Two Sessions meeting to be 5.5%, on the high side of the consensus within China and much higher than IMF and World Bank expectations for the year. caixinglobal.com/2022-03-05/chi…
2/6 Beijing set such a high target mainly because this is a politically important year and because of unemployment concerns. A lot of analysts doubt they can achieve it, but I think Beijing still has the debt capacity to achieve GDP growth rates of over 6% if they wanted.
3/6 But this wouldn't be "high quality" growth (i.e. consumption, the trade surplus, and business investment) which, I suspect, will contribute 3-4 percentage points of growth, much less than last year but higher than average.
4/6 The rest of the growth in economic activity, as always, will be generated by investment in property and infrastructure, much of which will not boost the economy's real capacity to produce goods and services in any meaningful way.
5/6 The special-purpose bond quota for local government spending in infrastructure was set at RMB 3.65 trillion, the same as last year and a little below the record of RMB 3.75 trillion set in 2020. To give a sense of how high this is, the quota was RMB 2.15 trillion in 2019.
6/6 Add other expected spending on local-government infrastructure, expansion in the national rail and transportation systems, and a partial revival of the property sector, and China's debt-to-GDP this year will rise by at least 3-5 percentage points and probably more.
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1/7 Li Keqiang: “All these measures amount to a large injection of government funding to support enterprises’ innovation endeavours.” As always Beijing is proposing a new round of supply-side measures to support the manufacturing sector. scmp.com/economy/china-… via @SCMPNews
2/7 While at first subsides for manufacturing, research and logistics, along with tax cuts and easier access to credit, might seem the most obvious and effective ways to boost productive investment by the business sector, in fact they depend on the underlying constraints.
3/7 A supply-side approach implicitly assumes that businesses are eager to expand production but are constrained by scarce savings, a high cost of capital, supply and logistical bottlenecks, and perhaps high start-up costs.
1/9 Another interesting piece by Adam Tooze in which among other things he notes Russia's intensively conservative monetary policy: "Under Finance Minister Siluanov, Russia pursued a regime of severe austerity, coupled with... @adam_toozeadamtooze.substack.com/p/chartbook-91…
2/9 a free floating exchange rate and an increasing shift to a domestic bond market - the classic trifecta of the Wall Street consensus (Daniela Gabor)."
3/9 He then asks, in the context of MMT, "why should Russia not use its monetary and fiscal sovereignty, reinforced by the new regime of exchange controls, to launch a stimulus program and, in so doing, negate a large part of the impact of sanctions?"
1/5 This is interesting. According to ANZ, official Russian entities may together account for one quarter of total foreign ownership of China's onshore bonds, or $140 billion, probably mainly in the form of government bonds. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
2/5 It's always hard to get the data to reconcile, but according to ChinaBond, foreigners hold just under $400 billion (roughly 11%) of Chinese government bonds, which comprise the bulk of foreign bond holding in China's onshore markets. bloomberg.com/news/articles/….
3/5 This suggests to me that if ANZ's data are correct, official Russian entities own closer to one-third the total foreign ownership. Either way, they hold a large amount.
1/4 SCMP points out that private-sector firms have struggled in the past year relative to state-owned firms. They claim that this is the result of common prosperity-related regulatory crackdowns and strict pandemic-control policies. scmp.com/economy/china-… via @scmpnews
2/4 These may have had some effect, but I'd argue that the strengthening of SOEs relative to the private sector has been going on for many years in China, and is more of a structural problem than the consequence of regulatory and political preferences.
3/4 As long as Beijing sets GDP growth targets above the growth rate of the productive part of the economy, the economy must migrate from sectors that operate under hard-budget constraints to those that operate under soft-budget constraints. ft.com/content/907740…
1/5 Many events in recent years that have been described as "turning points" were not so much turning points, in my opinion, as accelerations of existing trends, and I suspect the sanctions on Russia are more of the same. wsj.com/articles/russi… via @WSJ
2/5 As the world becomes increasingly dissatisfied with some of the consequences of mobile finance and over-extended value chains, particularly as geopolitical tensions rise, the trend towards a reversal of globalization will become deeper, I think, and harder to dislodge.
3/5 The irony, as we have seen often enough in history, is that the rise in domestic and geopolitical tensions that is undermining globalization is itself a consequence of the kind of financial globalization that we embraced after the 1970s and 1980s.
1/4 China's commerce minister is warning that trade and consumption are going to perform badly this year, and cautions that Beijing must "do everything possible" this year to spur domestic consumption. reuters.com/markets/asia/c…
2/4 In the past, spurring domestic consumption has always meant doing so indirectly, by expanding investment in infrastructure and increasing subsidies to manufacturing. The result has usually been, ironically, deeper demand imbalances and bigger trade surpluses.
3/4 This will probably happen again. Already the industry minister promised yesterday that Beijing would "ramp up efforts to ensure stable industrial operations by beefing up policy support for key sectors and encouraging investment in manufacturing." global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202203/01/WS…