1/7 Li Keqiang: “All these measures amount to a large injection of government funding to support enterprises’ innovation endeavours.” As always Beijing is proposing a new round of supply-side measures to support the manufacturing sector. scmp.com/economy/china-… via @scmpnews
2/7 While at first subsides for manufacturing, research and logistics, along with tax cuts and easier access to credit, might seem the most obvious and effective ways to boost productive investment by the business sector, in fact they depend on the underlying constraints.
3/7 A supply-side approach implicitly assumes that businesses are eager to expand production but are constrained by scarce savings, a high cost of capital, supply and logistical bottlenecks, and perhaps high start-up costs.
4/7 A demand-side approach, on the other hand, assumes that the main constraints for businesses are excess capacity and weak expected demand, and so would focus on ways of directly or indirectly boosting demand, including through higher wages and household transfers.
5/7 In the next few years we will see which of these assumptions better describe current conditions. If Chinese businesses are mostly facing supply-side constraints, the policies proposed by Premier Li should result...
6/7 in a surge in business investment, accelerating productivity growth, and an expansion in the private-sector share of the economy. Growth in domestic consumer and business demand, in that case, would keep pace with growth in production.
7/7 If the constraint are mostly demand-side, however, they should result in a continued expansion of the state share of the domestic economy, a rising debt-to-GDP ratio, and the need for high trade surpluses and rising infrastructure investment to balance growth in domestic GDP.
The article adds: "Self-reliance has been a top government priority this year but the reports released on Saturday made no mention of 'dual circulation', a national strategy putting greater economic focus on the domestic market."
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1/5 While the Russian sanctions will certainly increase the desire of some countries to have an alternative to the dollar, it wasn't insufficient desire that prevented the emergence of the RMB or some other currency in the past as a safe haven alternative. ft.com/content/d5346d…
2/5 It was the basic conditions of global currency status. For the RMB to become an alternative to the dollar it isn't enough that once, during a period of turmoil, it retained its value. This is just the minimum necessity for a safe haven currency, and very far from sufficient.
3/5 For the RMB to be a major alternative to the dollar, not only must it remain stable during every crisis, but, more importantly, China must completely open its capital account, remove any interference on inflows and outflows, and liberalize its financial system.
1/6 The decline in India's unemployment rate is clearly bad for the economy, as is the reversal of urbanization, but this isn't necessarily the case for a rise in income inequality, which tends to boost the domestic savings rate. ft.com/content/b99a43…
2/6 In advanced economies – and some developing economies like China – where savings are too plentiful and demand weak, the main constraint on business investment is weak demand.
3/6 In that case conditions which raise ex ante savings (i.e. by lowering consumption) tend to suppress growth in productive investment, especially private-sector investment.
1/9 A lot of analysts and Chinese policymakers are worried about slowing export growth and are suggesting that Beijing may need to take steps to boost exports, but I think that not only is this interpretation a mistake, it is a dangerous mistake. wsj.com/articles/china… via @WSJ
2/9 It's true that exports in the first two months of the year were "only" 16% higher than in the same period last year, less that the 21% year-on-year growth in December and November, but last year saw truly extraordinary export growth in China.
3/9 The dollar value of exports during the year grew by 30%, which is roughly twice the dollar value of nominal GDP growth. This means that China's overreliance on the export sector – rare for large economies – grew last year when it really should be shrinking.
1/6 Just as I expected, China's GDP growth target for the year was announced this morning at the Two Sessions meeting to be 5.5%, on the high side of the consensus within China and much higher than IMF and World Bank expectations for the year. caixinglobal.com/2022-03-05/chi…
2/6 Beijing set such a high target mainly because this is a politically important year and because of unemployment concerns. A lot of analysts doubt they can achieve it, but I think Beijing still has the debt capacity to achieve GDP growth rates of over 6% if they wanted.
3/6 But this wouldn't be "high quality" growth (i.e. consumption, the trade surplus, and business investment) which, I suspect, will contribute 3-4 percentage points of growth, much less than last year but higher than average.
1/9 Another interesting piece by Adam Tooze in which among other things he notes Russia's intensively conservative monetary policy: "Under Finance Minister Siluanov, Russia pursued a regime of severe austerity, coupled with... @adam_toozeadamtooze.substack.com/p/chartbook-91…
2/9 a free floating exchange rate and an increasing shift to a domestic bond market - the classic trifecta of the Wall Street consensus (Daniela Gabor)."
3/9 He then asks, in the context of MMT, "why should Russia not use its monetary and fiscal sovereignty, reinforced by the new regime of exchange controls, to launch a stimulus program and, in so doing, negate a large part of the impact of sanctions?"
1/5 This is interesting. According to ANZ, official Russian entities may together account for one quarter of total foreign ownership of China's onshore bonds, or $140 billion, probably mainly in the form of government bonds. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
2/5 It's always hard to get the data to reconcile, but according to ChinaBond, foreigners hold just under $400 billion (roughly 11%) of Chinese government bonds, which comprise the bulk of foreign bond holding in China's onshore markets. bloomberg.com/news/articles/….
3/5 This suggests to me that if ANZ's data are correct, official Russian entities own closer to one-third the total foreign ownership. Either way, they hold a large amount.