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The Bazaar of War Profile picture
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Mar 5 • 5 tweets • 5 min read
Finding good commentary on Ukraine: IMO the three best are @SamoBurja, @KofmanMichael, and @RALee85.

-I agree most with Samo, although he does not cover as much of the day-to-day.
-I disagree with much of Michael's interpretation, although I largely agree with many of the....
@SamoBurja @KofmanMichael @RALee85 ...conclusions he draws. He's an expert on the Russian military and one of the best-informed observers.

-Rob is one of the best compilers of news out there and has been paying attention to this issue for a long time. While I strongly disagree with much of his analysis...
@SamoBurja @KofmanMichael @RALee85 ...he has a valuable perspective. This thread from December is a good example: obviously wrong, but very good discussion of possible objectives and considerations.
@SamoBurja @KofmanMichael @RALee85 The trouble with most analysis, including the above, is that it is very overconfident in assessing Russia's military and political:
-objectives
-planning assumptions
-risk tolerance
-branch plans

Good conclusions can't be drawn without considering a broad range of possibilities.
@SamoBurja @KofmanMichael @RALee85 With that in mind, read broadly and keep a sharp eye out for any assumptions in the analysis, hidden or otherwise.

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More from @bazaarofwar

The Bazaar of War Profile picture
Mar 5
It's important to understand that there's no natural end to the military side of the war, barring the extremely unlikely conquest of the entire country.

Past a certain point the Ukrainian Army might cease to exist as a cohesive organization, but this does not mean that...
...armed resistance won't continue in the cities—that was the entire point of the West sending ATGMs to Ukraine over the past few months.

The real question is how far Putin wants to go and what NATO is willing to accept. Kiev would be extremely difficult to take, and Putin is...
...unlikely to try unless he means to keep it. But that would basically mean no deal to end sanctions, which would make it far more costly than it's likely worth. Which is why I maintain he's likely going to encircle it before starting negotiations.
Read 4 tweets
The Bazaar of War Profile picture
Mar 5
The situation is very loosely comparable: the Russians are suffering tactically, but they have still have the weight of numbers plus excellent operational designs.

The question remains, as it has from the beginning, what will happen in the cities, 3 in particular...
1) Kiev. Do they have the strength to take it? How long would that require? Is this even there intention, or do they just want a siege?

2) Kharkov. Does this bleed them enough to weaken them elsewhere, or allow a counterattack to relieve the encirclement of the Donbas?
3) Odessa. This is an important strategic objective for Russia, but it will be fiercely contested. After the effort of the first two, plus the maneuvers against the field army, will this remain an objective by the time peace talks start?
Read 4 tweets
The Bazaar of War Profile picture
Mar 5
Updated side-by-side scaled comparison of the 9th day of Iraq & Ukraine (R map by @TheStudyofWar).

By this point, the Army's V Corps had made it ~600 km along the Euphrates and were attacking Karbala; 1st Marine Division had crossed the river at Nasiriyah and progressed >200 km.
@TheStudyofWar The closest comparison to the Marines' progress is the fighting at Kherson—like Nasiriyah, it guarded the crossing of a major river.

Kherson took 6 days to fall, Nasiriyah ~10. In both cases, other elements pushed ahead beforehand, but the Russians have only progressed ~80km...
@TheStudyofWar In the Russian case, they had to secure another river crossing, at Mykolaiv on the Southern Bug (Pivdenny Buh).

They have also begun probing a second crossing at Voznesensk (map from militaryland.net), >200 km over the Dnieper.
Read 11 tweets
The Bazaar of War Profile picture
Mar 2
Logistics has to be looked at different levels, from national stockpiles down to tactical units.

When we hear about Russian logistical difficulties, those are smaller units—battalion-sized or smaller, pushed far in advance of the rest of the army. But Russia was clearly....
...planning on a multi-week campaign and has been stockpiling materiel for the past year. The supplies are bound to last for the active period of the campaign and account for an occupation period of at least several more weeks (likely months).
This isn't to say there won't be continued supply disruptions from attacks on convoys, but security problems tend to be worked out with time (this is just as much a problem of executing the basics as it is Ukrainian action), and as more supplies are brought forward to the...
Read 4 tweets
The Bazaar of War Profile picture
Mar 2
It's a hard point to understand from just looking at a map, it's worth going into what an encirclement entails....

Here's the picture, for reference:
For comparison's sake, here's what the road system in that area looks like. At the operational level, any modern army is going to be entirely road-bound—especially in muddy conditions like we're seeing.
This really limits the extent of an army's dispositions in the first place. It also means that "encircling" them requires occupying a relatively limited number of areas in force, with patrols in between.
Read 7 tweets
The Bazaar of War Profile picture
Mar 1
Thread on reading a signal amidst the noise

Russia's apparently bizarre actions in Ukraine have confused many, especially their alleged failures of preparation. But these are surprising only in extent, not in type—they follow from two characteristics of the Russian army...
1. Top-down C2: subordinates are usually given—and expected to take—a lot less initiative than in NATO armies. This extends all the way down to junior officers and NCOs. In Afghanistan, the Mujahideen knew the best way to halt a Soviet attack was by killing the battalion CO.
A corollary to this:

2. Much more emphasis on the operational level, where Russian arms excel. WWII offensives were often shambolic and costly at the divisional level, but the combined effect was crushing.
Read 9 tweets

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