A tweet thread on why we are almost certainly overestimating the amount of strength the Russian Army has on hand, and the amount they can actually get to Ukraine when their first force losses get so high that it starts becoming combat ineffective. Yes, its logistics. @BoringWar
The Russian Army, like the Soviet Army before it, has manifested significant logistics problems for decades, and if anything the preliminary evidence is that the problem might be worse than expected. You can start with this report. apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/…
Basically Soviet logistics as shown in Afghanistan were too rigid, top heavy and wedded to doctrine. What it means is that when things went wrong, there was signficant problem adjusting. The way Soviet logistics was so road centric (and weak for that) is telling
Since the end of the Cold War, the Russians have undertaken nothing at all close to their deployment to attack Ukraine, which would be a challenge to any force. But is probably doubly for them as their logistical development also seems not to have progressed much.
Indeed the Russian Army now seems to have fallen prey to one of the great temptations of many militaries created by dictators--lots of flashy weapons but little consideration about how to deliver them (few trucks).
Indeed looking at this @WarOnTheRocks estimate, they Russians will struggle at 90 miles from working railheads. And they still suffer from the inflexibility mentioned by earlier reports at Afghanistan. warontherocks.com/2021/11/feedin…
Here is another article highlighting the significant truck problem faced by the Russians (and their reliance on civilians to keep going--which will be a real handicap in any protracted war in Ukraine). forbes.com/sites/davidaxe…
If anything, early indications in Ukraine are that the Soviet Logistics problems are worse than expected. There are the basic problems of tire maintenance that has doomed some of the most expensive equipment Russia possesses. See @TrentTelenko for a few great threads
There is indications that basic rations have not been kept up to scratch, with soldiers given food seven years out of date, and at the same time running out of food already and having to loot from Ukrainian civilian supplies. inews.co.uk/news/ukraine-r…
Clearly there is Ukrainian understanding of these weaknesses, which has led to their very effective and constant efforts to attack Russian convoys--and guess what they are doing. Destroying large numbers of precious Russian trucks.
And if Ukrainian claims are anywhere near the truth, they are destroying some of the most important--fuel trucks. As of today, the Ukrainians have claimed to destroy 60 Russian fuel carriers--which would be a significant blow. aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukra….
One of the reasons the famous 40-mile convoy is such a disaster is that much of it is valuable trucks--which are not probably out of fuel, with dead batteries, stuck in the mud and not salvageable. You can scan the convoy here.
Why does this all matter--it reveals that almost certainly that Russian combat strength started significantly below the stated levels, and is dropping fast as damaged but not destroyed equipment still in Russian hands cant be repaired and resupplied.
And all of this will get worse as Russia's weak link of trucks further wastes away. It is impossible to calculate how far below stated levels of strength Russian forces are because of these logistic difficulties. A very conservative guess would be around 25%
Iam getting that figure from my own calculations in How the War was Won on WWII logistics for the Luftwaffe. Regularly one quarter of Luftwaffe aircraft were out of commission because of basic logistical problems. As the war went on, it was much higher than 25%.
btw, logistic difficulties might also help explain the incredibly deficient performance of the Russian Air Force. Both seeming to have insufficient supplies of directed munitions (thus having to use large numbers of dumb bombs), which means they have to fly low and be shot down.
Also might explain how relatively few Russian planes overall they can maintain in operations. Much fewer in number than expected before the invasion started.
So, we give a very false idea of the realities of war when we talk about number of troops, AFVs, planes that the Russians deployed for the invasion. They started with fewer in combat conditions than we know, and it looks like Russian truck support is suffering hugely.
Logistics, as it always does, will play a significant role in determining this war, right now the signs are not good for Russia, but people are mostly ignoring it and talking, as always, about tanks and planes....
Retweeted this but probably should have put this here. This should terrify the Russians if it means what it could mean. They are already running out of trucks.
Ukrainian path to victory is clear. Go for every Russian truck they can see, particularly fuel trucks. Russian Army will freeze in its tracks.
Btw. Replacing military grade trucks with civilian ones is catastrophic on many levels. You have to stick to better roads, they are less robust and you can’t stock spare parts for all the different models
We might be about to witness a logistic collapse
Well, was not expecting this kind of reaction, a little overwhelmed that there is so much interest in logistics. To give you an example of how logistics worked in WWII, I wrote this chapter for the Cambridge History of the Second World War. cambridge.org/core/books/abs…
The same basic issues are at work in Ukraine. The key link is between the large railhead depots at the lauching off point and the forward forces--and the only way to connect them is trucks. It is the single most important limiting factor in operations.
Another interesting visual example of what the Ukrainians seem to be doing (though we need to be careful not to read too much into the pictures we get).
Can anyone vouch for the accuracy of this video? If it is, and the Russians are already having to scrape up what looks like old Soviet era fuel trucks (see around 20 seconds in), their situation may be more dire than imagined.
The rest of the trucks do not inspire confidence either.
Heck if this continues, Russia might request a NATO no-fly zone to protect their army as it pulls out of Ukraine.
There have been so many questions posed in all the tweets in this thread, that I cant possibly keep track. Can I ask people who have questions on the thread that they want asked to put them in this tweet? I will try to work through them. Tks! I appreciate your interest, really.
Not a bad summary of some of the logistical challenges Russia is facing. Its interesting that more and more this is being discussed.
This is the exact kind of thing the Ukrainians are doing to devastate Russian movement. The vehicles waiting for this fuel will have no ability to move for much longer and the Russians have fewer vital fuel trucks.
Hi Everyone, just sent out my weekend update (free as always). Just wanted to start with a word of thanks. Woke up today and discovered that my s-stak now has more than 50000 subscribers, which is rather astonishing. So thank you!
Subscribers come from all but 10 countries in the world (if anyone can get someone from Greenland to sign up). It has a truly international reach, with more than 1000 subscribers from India and approaching 500 from Nigeria for instance. Darkness of red is number of subscribers
As for the update. It starts with the big decision this week to allow Ukraine to make ranged strikes into Russia with US and EUropean systems--which while desperately needed, looks to be rather limited so far. On the other hand, Putin threats on the subject have once again seemed to lose some to loose their minds.
Which calls have I gotten wrong on the war @Dominic2306 ? You were the one who wanted to sacrifice Ukraine to Russia in 2022 as it had no chance. I will take you through my positions.
1) In January 2022 I wrote that a Russian invasion of Ukraine would be a catastrophe, would not be over soon and that Ukraine would fight and Russia was an overrated power. thecritic.co.uk/the-new-appeas…
Then, when Russia did invade, and it did go wrong, I said exactly that, that Russian maximalist war aims were a failure and by that standard they cannot win the war (and they are not winning the war by that standard). Btw, you were the one who was arguing Ukraine had no chance.
Good Morning Everyone in North America. Today is the day that The Strategists (my latest book) is released--and you can start reading it now. Its the story of how Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, Mussolini and Hitler were formed as strategists, and from that how they fought WWII. penguinrandomhouse.com/books/623808/t…
Its been widely and positively reviewed (with more to come) with my favorite endorsement from Margaret Atwood. If you want to get a flavor of the book, I was able to release a 3000 word excerpt on Churchill's experiences on the Western Front in 1915-16 phillipspobrien.substack.com/p/the-strategi…
I really hope you enjoy it! And though the book has only been available for a few hours in the USA, it already has 2 5-star reviews on Amazon. My family has been up early!
Worth noting that President Zelensky said openly last night that one of the Ukrainian strategic aims was to create a buffer zone inside Russia to provide protection to Ukraine (and also inevitably to draw Russian forces to it). It shows how the early analysis of this offensive was dreadful. edition.cnn.com/2024/08/18/eur…
This offensive was passed of as a wasteful raid--but so far the Ukrainians have achieved a number of strategic aims, and are well on their way to establishing a large buffer, as Ive bee saying for ten days. I described it in my last two weekend updates.
In this podcast which @MBielieskov and I recorded 10 days ago, the idea of creating a salient was discussed in detail. open.substack.com/pub/phillipspo…
The @CSIS Interpret China resource has assembled a number of very interesting sources on how the Chinese state is thinking about and reacting to the Russo-Ukraine War. It is a really helpful one-stop shop that anyone interested in the subject should examine.interpret.csis.org
One report. by a leading Chinese scholar, talks about how Russia is trying to recalibrate its global relationships, and how the Chinese-Russian alliance, while strong, is no longer the "limitless" partnerships that was proclaimed before the invasion. interpret.csis.org/translations/t…
Another really interesting Chinese analysis looks at 2024, and argues that after the US election, there might be a push for a peace deal. Also tries to think about the future development of warfare, and how China can adjust to a battlefield full of masses of cheap UAVs interpret.csis.org/translations/a…