Thread by @gloefflmann

100 billion Euros for the Bundeswehr. But what does Germany actually plan to buy with all that money? Well, let’s take a look at procurement projects for the armed forces, some fairly certain, some moderately certain, and some speculative. Let’s go shopping. A 🧵/1

Pretty high up on the wish list is a replacement for the Luftwaffe’s ageing fleet of Tornado fighter bombers. Its main mission profile includes SEAD/EW, RECCE, and crucially the ability to deliver US tactical nuclear warheads under NATO’s nuclear sharing agreement /2

Between 20-40 tactical nuclear bombs B61-4 are stored in Germany under US command & control. Should the US President authorise their use, fighter bombers of Tactical Luftwaffe Squadron 33 would be tasked with delivering them on target. The bomb’s payload can be modulated /2

between 0.43 and 45 Kilotons. The existing bombs are currently being modernised and scheduled to be replaced with the B61-12 standard. Now, originally the German Ministry of Defense had suggested a twin solution, purchasing 40 additional Eurofighter /3

in the conventional fighter bomber role (Interdiction, CAS) with an option for 15 additional units, 30 F/A-18F Super Hornets in the nuclear sharing role and 15 EA-18G Growler for EW/SEAD. Problem with this solution is that the F/A18 although a capable and reliable fighter is /4

coming toward the end of its service period and it lacks stealth capabilities. After the announcement of Scholz about additional funds for the Bundeswehr it looks like the F/A-18 is now off the table and the Luftwaffe will receive the F-35 in the nuclear sharing role, a true /5

5. generation fighter whose stealth capabilities, advanced avionics and sensor network integration will allow Luftwaffe pilots to penetrate AA/AD networks while linking up with NATO/EU allies, many of which have opted for the F-35 as well (UK, ITA, DEN, FIN, CH, NW, NL, BE). /6

Together with purchases of additional Eurofighter in the fighter-bomber role and the development of an EW-version of the Eurofighter, Tornado replacement alone will cost about 15 billion Euros, or about 15% of the envisioned fund. All this pales however in comparison to FCAS /7

the Future Combat Air System, Germany is in the early stages of developing with France and Spain, consisting of a future 6. generation fighter, wingman drones and a combat cloud system set to become operational in the 2040s with a projected program costs of 100 billion. /8

Next up is Germany's heavy-lift transport helicopters, where we are currently living in that 70s show, operating the CH-53G that was first introduced in July 1972. Although continuously modernized and used heavily in AFG with the badass call-sign 'Nazgûl', the CH-53 is clearly /9

at the end of their service life and a shortage of spare parts and long and costly maintenance cycles make replacement a top priority. Contenders for replacement are two off-the-shelf US models, Sikorsky's CH-53K King Stallion operated by the USMC and Boeing's CH-47 Chinook /10

in service with the US Army and many NATO and EU partner militaries. After the German ministry of defense had to withdraw its original tender because the cost for the offered models was twice the projected sum of 5 billion Euros, a foreign-militar-sales deal now seems likely. /11

The next big-ticket item is ammunition. Everything from air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, to artillery shells, PGM, mortar rounds, small arms ammunition, and of course replacement for what Germany has sent and will send to Ukraine. Refilling depleted stocks and bringing /12

Bundeswehr depots back to a level where they can logistically sustain combat operations across the spectrum of land, air, and naval warfare against a peer rival will cost a whopping 20 billions Euros, or 20% of the announced special investment fund. Berlin needs more bang. /13

Now, something for @KampfmitKette. Germany originally only purchased 350 of the new Puma Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) to replace the 1970s-era Marder IFV as the main weapon system of the Panzergrenadiere. To save cost, the Pumas were only delivered with a severely limited /14

@KampfmitKette Initial operating capability (IOC), in other words they were not delivered combat-ready. In an emergency initiative 40+ Puma IFV had to be retrofitted to be brought up to the VJTF-standard so they could serve as part of Germany's contribution to NATO's Very High Readiness /15

this included integration of the Spile ATG-missile and improved digital communications between the vehicles and dismounted infantry equipped with the Infanterist der Zukunft (IdZ) system. With the announced investment fund a 2nd batch of Puma IFV could be ordered to fully /16

modernize all remaining 9 Panzergrenadier battalions and bring the complete fleet of Puma IFV onto the VJTF-standard. The cost for a 2nd batch of 230 additional Puma would be roughly 3.7 billion EUR. /17

But the Heer (army) is also considering additional Boxer APCs in particular for its heavy Jäger infantry companies. Currently, these are equipped with the Wiesel tankette with a MK 20mm auto-canon or TOW ATGM. The Boxers would be equipped with a MK 30mm auto-cannon and /18

Spike ATGM providing a level of firepower equivalent to the Panzergrendier units' Pumas. Initially, these new Boxer units were primarily considered for Germany's 'Division 2027', the plan to have a fully digitized war-fighting division that possesses armour, armoured /19

infantry, brigade and division-level artillery, reconnaissance, maintenance, C3ISTAR, engineer, and logistics units that allow it to operate independently and prevail in a high-intensity combat environment. This would also include a dedicated detachment of attack helicopters. /20

Here the Bundeswehr and Ministry of Defence must decide if they join France and Spain in the Tiger's MkIII midlife upgrade programme, or if they phase out the Tiger and replace a model notorious for low readiness levels and high maintenance requirements with the battle-proven /21

Apache attack helicopter that unlike the Bundeswehr's Tiger, which was originally only designed for anti-tank warfare, also possesses a chin-mounted auto-canon and can carry a greater payload. Apparently, Berlin has requested information about the latest model of the Apache /21

from the US-government. Now, let's talk artillery, or the lack thereof. As I wrote in a previous thread, the loss of conventional combat power between the Cold War-era Bundeswehr and today's is quite dramatic. Nowhere is this more evident as in the number of artillery units /22

Where the German Army in 2000 still possessed 30 artillery battalions that were roughly supporting twice that number of combat units (armour, armoured infantry, infantry), that figure had dwindled to all of 4 (!) artillery battalions since 2011, supporting 3 army divisions. /23

With 38 Mars II MLRS multiple rocket launchers and 121 Panzerhaubitze 2000 SPGs the Bundeswehr was able to provide artillery support for missions like AFG and back-up a battalion as in Lithuania, but the ability for combined arms warfare on division and brigade level had been /24

lost. As part of the reorientation towards territorial and alliance defence, a renaissance of Bundewsehr artillery seems very likely. In particular, there will need to be a reintegration of artillery units at brigade level and additional artillery units at division level. /25

One plan envisions an increase towards 14 artillery battalions for two equally equipped heavy divisions and one light division and a mix of existing systems (PzH2000, MARS II) and new units, most likely the wheel-based Boxer 155mm artillery system. If the war in Ukraine has /26

led to a rethink towards tracked systems is unclear. Next on the list is mobile air defense units of which Germany has none, or to be precise almost none. After the Roland and Gepard systems were phased out in 2005 and 2010 respectively, the sum total of Germany's capability /27

was a couple of Ozelot systems with Stinger missiles on the Wiesel tankette that were transferred from the army's airborne units to the Luftwaffe, which would assume sole responsibility for air defence tasks, ranging from interception to ABM, RAM and SHORRAD. To this day no /28

adequate solution to protect German ground units on the move from aerial attacks (drones, ballistic missiles, helicopters, fast attack jets) has been found. The cost to develop and introduce a new system plus modernization of the Patriot SAM system are ca. 1-2 billion /29

Break time, more tomorrow. Things to come: helmets, boots, rain jackets, underwear, and the Germany Navy. Stay tuned.

Right where were we, so far we spent 20 billion on rebuilding ammunition stocks, 15 billion on new fighter bombers, 5 billion on heavy transport helicopters, 3,7 billion on a 2nd batch of Puma IFV, and 1-2 billion on ground-based air defense systems, plus some new Boxer APCs /30

Now the real whoppers, however, are going to be FCAS and the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS), which will replace the Leopard 2 and Leclerc MBTs and are set to introduce a new family of armoured vehicles for high-intensity ground combat. Unofficially known as the Leopard 3, /31

the new Euopean MBT will need to match or ideally surpass the Russian T-14 Armata, potentially with a 130mm canon and the ability to work in tandem with armed drones. Deliveries are scheduled to start by 2035, with IOC expected in 2040. Development costs are 1.5 billion EUR. /32

In total FCAS, MGCS and the new Eurodrone together with other major multi-national armament projects, such as the submarine cooperation with Norway (4 U212CD for NW 2 for GER) will probably consume defence expenditures in the vicinity of 30 bill. EUR over the next ten years. /33

Now for the less fancy stuff, Bundeswehr units still operate 1980s radio sets that don't allow for digital communication, are a severe risk for operational security and increasingly impede international cooperation with EU and NATO-allies. Modernizing Bundeswehr communication /34

will cost another 3 bill. EUR. The systematic underfunding and dysfunction of the German procurement process is illustrated by the fact that @BaainBw recently re-ordered a batch of those same SEM 80/90 radio sets for vehicles and individual soldiers to maintain mission comms /35

Another perennial problem is the lack of modern personal equipment of Bundeswehr soldiers, ranging from thermal underwear, to combat boots, half-cut helmets, water-proof gear, winter jackets, body armour, and the infamous Lochkoppel carrying system. The often antiquated /36

equipment officially supplied by the Bundeswehr resulted in many soldiers, in particular in infantry units to spend thousands of Euros of their own money to acquire modern kit, like magazine pouches, gloves, helmets, rucksacks, etc. Fully modernizing soldiers' personal kit /37

would probably be another 1.5-2 bill. EUR. A first step in the right direction seems to have been made and the Bundeswehr has ordered 176.000 „Batlskin Viper“ helmets directly from Rheinmetall without a public tender as a high-priority measure. /38

Now, let's go Navy. According to the 2018 capability profile of the Bundeswehr, @deutschemarine plans to have 15 warships available for operations ranging from embargo enforcement and counter-piracy missions to ASuW and ASW. Currently, the German Navy operates 4 F-125 class /39

frigates optimized for low-intensity stability operations, 3 F-124 frigates theatre air defence with limited ABM capabilities, and 4 F-123 multi-purpose/ASW frigates, the last F-122 Bremen class frigate is scheduled to be decommissioned this year, but for now it's headed for /39

the Baltic Sea, together with a couple of German Navy minehunter and minesweeper vessels of which Germany has 10 and 2 respectively. The German submarine fleet has a grand total of 6 Type 212, whose advanced AIP system, however, gives them considerable stealth and endurance /40

for non-nuclear powered submarines. As part of a deal with Norway the German U-boat fleet is set to grow to 8 with two additional U212CD. Delivery of the two boats for the German Navy is scheduled for 2032 and 2034 and the cost is ca. 2 billion EUR. The submarines will be /41

based on the original U212 design, but be nearly twice the size of the current Type 212A class and will feature a new stealth design to deflect emissions by active sonars. In addition, Germany operates 5 K-130 corvettes optimized for littoral waters, in particular useful in /42

the shallow waters of the Baltic Sea. Currently a second batch of 5 additional vessels is being build at a cost of 2 bill. EUR, which will bring the total fleet up to 10. However, the first batch is already in need of modernization, and there is a debate to retire it and /43

instead replace it with a 3rd batch that would be in line with the specs for the 2nd batch and cost another 2 bill. EUR. The next big-ticket item is the F-126 (formerly MKS), of which currently 4 units are on order with a price tag of approximately 4 bill. EUR. Unlike the /44

F-125, which at 7200t is basically a glorified gunboat to scare off Somali pirates, this new model will be a real war-fighter capable of ASW, ASuW and AA with a weapons array and sensor suite to match. Germany has the option for an order of two additional F-126, which given /45

the dramatic change in the strategic situation and the turnaround announced in German security and defence policy might now actually happen. Germany also needs to replace its fleet of P-3 Orion maritime reconnaissance planes, which are basically falling apart mid-air with the /46

successor model for now being the P-8A Poseidon, 5 of which will be purchased directly from the US via a foreign military sales (FMS) process at a cost of ca. 1,1 billion EUR. The P-8A will likely be used in tracking Russian surface ships and submarines in the North Sea /47

the Baltic Sea, and the North Atlantic. So, to recap, we have 1.1 bill. for maritime recon planes, 2 bill. for new corvettes, 2 bill. for new submarines, 2-4bill. for new frigates, plus another 2 bill. for 3 new vessels for naval intelligence (class 424), and 2 new tankers /48

(class 707) for another 900 mill. So, just with existing procurement projects, the German navy is looking at investments of 10-12 billion EUR in the coming years, which for the most part will be used for the modernization of the existing fleet and only mean a moderate /49

increase in overall fleet size as the F-126, at least for now, is planned as like for like replacement of the F-123, only the option for two additional F-126 and the two new U212CD will actually grow the size of the German Navy. But the problem isn't just money, but staff /50

retention and recruitment. The German Navy is the second-smallest branch of the Bundeswehr with approx. 16.196 officers, NCOs and enlisted sailors, just ahead of the Bundeswehr's new cyber and information warfare branch (14.448). But 8-10% of positions are unfilled with /51

severe repercussions for readiness, training and the scope of operations the Navy can undertake simultaneously. Already, Germany has not enough ships and manpower to engage in embargo and anti-piracy missions in the Mediterranean and at the Horn of Africa, and provide /52

reinforcements for NATO operations in the Atlantic and the Baltic Sea. Overall, the size of the German Navy is probably too small for the range of operations it is tasked, but significantly growing the Navy poses a serious challenge given German demographics and the record /53

of recruitment efforts so far, whose results have been moderately successful at best. Nonetheless, there are also plans for a successor to the F-124 air defence frigate, the F-127, envisioned to possess full ABM capabilities with the SM3 missile, and potential increase of 4 /51

to 6 vessels. So to recap, we are looking at 20 bill. for ammunition stocks, 15 bill. for 90 new fighter bombers (F-35/Eurofighter), 5 bill. for heavy-lift transport helicopters (CH-53K/CH-47), 8-12 bill. for new frigates, corvettes and submarines, 3.7 bill. for 229 IFV /52

35 bill. for major multinational weapons projects over the nxt 10 yrs (Eurodrone/FCAS/MGCS), 5 bill. to modernise communications, 1-2 bill. for modernisation of Patriot SAM units and an initial batch of new mobile air defence systems and 1-2 bill to improve personal equipment/54.

But what about medium to long-term planning ? Given the dramatically changed threat perception, is it enough anymore to simply modernise the Bundeswehr or must Germany also consider growing the size of the armed forces, both in terms of personnel, structure and equipment, the /55

dreaded word ‘Aufrüstung’. If we apply the original Bühler memorandum and the 2018 capability profile it looks like currently the Bundeswehr has the numbers to outfit one heavy army division for high-intensity combat (Leopard2A7V/Puma/Boxer,PzH200/Mars II), but not two. So we /56

either opt for one heavy, one medium (Puma/Boxer) and one light division (Airborne/SOF), or two identical heavy ones. Germany will either need to acquire more Leopard 2A7V equipped with Trophy APS or additional Boxer in the IFV/APC configuration, probably also a RECCE version /57

to have something with a bit more punch than Fennek aka the Batmobile. This could mean another couple of hundred Boxer in various configurations and maybe also an increase in the number of Leopard 3 MBTs to something closer to 500. At the moment, the Bundeswehr has zero room /58

to offset combat losses or build strategic reserves while Ukraine has shown how quickly losses can pile up (albeit with inferior and outdated RUS designs) in an actual war-fighting scenario. This will likely cost another couple of bill. EUR with an 18-24 wait time for wheeled /59

systems and 24-26 months until new tracked systems can be delivered to day nothing of the immense challenge to boost personnel numbers above 200.000 soldiers to actually fully staff the Bundeswehr and new units (e.g. artillery/air defence/armour etc.) And then we still need /60

to talk about capabilities the Bundeswehr doesn’t have, but probably should have, like a heavy strategic airlift capacity beyond A400M, where the current lease agreement with UKR Antonov seems no longer viable. Also the ability for amphibious assault operations together with /61

the Netherland and a jointly operated 1 or 2 LHDs for that purpose, also allowing for the ability to undertake offshore evacuation and disaster relief operations and show of force ops, boosting EU power projection capabilities. All this is speculative at the moment but things /62

that sounded like a pipe dream or science fiction last week, seems now decidedly in the realm of possibility. One thing, however, seems certain, Germany’s armed forces will be bigger, more modern, more leath and overall a more credible fighting force for whatever mission /63

the German government wants to use it, from NATO deterrence in Eastern and South Eastern Europe to counter-terrorism operations and peacekeeping and foreign training and assistance missions. However, this material change will require an institutional and cultural adaptation

too, from installing a German national security council for strategic policy planning and coordination to a wider political/media/societal debate on Germany’s role in the world and what military power can contribute to this strategic vision. But that’s a 🧵 for another time. /fin