This is what the NPC means for China's beleaguered property sector. A🧵
TLDR: No turnaround for developers. This is about limiting the fallout of the crisis: boosting growth, supporting local govts, encouraging state-led projects, reducing systemic risks as defaults rise. 1/10
TOP LEVEL: China’s ambitious 5.5% growth target suggests more stimulus is on the way. Ultimately accommodating monetary/credit/fiscal policies are about stabilizing growth. Not reversing the clampdown on developer debt. 2/10 bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
LOCAL GOVERNMENT: Local govts are getting more cash: transfer payments to local govts will jump 18% vs last year. That'll help make up for falling land sales.
Inexpedient to allow the first default of a public LGFV bond, but don't rule it out, finances remain precarious. 3/10
INFRASTRUCTURE: Beijing's changed stance to focus on growth/stability from curbing debt is key. Last year quota for special local govt bonds – which fund public construction projects - wasn't used up because spending was heavily scrutinized. 4/10
That's likely to change. If this year + last year’s unused quota is used, it'll be easier to combat the consequences of private developments grinding to a halt – boosting infrastructure, employing construction workers, contractors/suppliers. 5/10
PROPERTY: All this will ease the fallout of the developer crisis but won’t help builders. China is setting up a financial stability fund and wants stable home prices. The focus is curbing systemic risk. More intervention won't support stressed firms. 6/10 bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
NO FRESH PRESSURES: No new clampdown measures for builders -- eg. no deets of property tax pilot. But all the usual mantras reiterated: Housing isn't for speculation, improve regulation of developers' offshore debt, prevent offshore debt risks. 7/10 washingtonpost.com/business/how-t…
CREDIT MARKETS: Is all this enough to help financial markets? Certainly not credit markets. We haven't even seen a brief bump in sentiment. Chinese junk dollar bonds -- dominated by developers -- hit a fresh low on Friday at ~65 cents on dollar. They're falling again today. 8/10
SIDE BAR: Are Chinese property bonds still investible? How can we tell if the clampdown has peaked? 9/10
EVERGRANDE: Billionaire chairman Hui Ka Yan requested 'personal leave' to miss the annual meeting of China’s top political advisory group. All eyes now on how and who will be blamed for Evergrande's collapse. (See HNA, Huarong for prior examples) 10/10 bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
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China’s developers have been rocked by at least 14 defaults since authorities began cracking down on the housing market in 2020.
Authorities are allowing selective policy relief but that’s had very little effect on credit markets. 2/5
Traders betting on better times ahead for China property are in a difficult position now that builders once shielded from the wild swings look increasingly vulnerable. (Made worse by global risk-off following the invasion of Ukraine.)
China’s property crisis is going to get much worse before it gets better. A 🧵.
The debt crunch at ‘better’ firms like Shimao is key signal of what’s to come, even now that massive uncertainties like Evergrande and Kaisa defaults are out of the way. 1/8
TLDR on China's property crisis: 2022 is not just going to be about how much property firms owe in debt – but who OWNS that debt. 2/8
As the economy slows, the property crackdown rolls on and the network of real estate trusts, weaker banks/FIs, suppliers, contractors, workers etc all suffer – there’s going to be a lot less willingness to grant property firms a break when they get behind on payments. 3/8
For debt nerds some thoughts on Evergrande's restructure:
PBOC Yi Gang’s remarks that this will be a market-oriented, creditors will be treated according to seniority isn’t new to investors. China’s been pushing for this since at least 2017 when it began allowing record defaults
The issue for Evergrande’s global bondholders won’t be about seniority -- nearly all the offshore bonds hold the same status. Instead, all eyes are on whether notes issued by different units of Evergrande will be considered pari passu when it comes to any potential haircuts
It’s not clear whether bonds issued by Evergrande’s Hong Kong-listed unit (EVERRE) or those sold by a Scenery Journey (TIANHL) that have keepwells from its main onshore property business, Hengda Real Estate, will be considered on an equal footing in a restructuring scenario
2/ China’s efforts to prevent a developer debt crisis from sparking financial contagion helped stemmed the biggest selloff in a decade.
But Xi Jinping’s government still faces a long list of challenges as it tries to maintain calm in its $13 trillion credit market in 2022.
3/ There've been seismic changes in China's credit markets this year. In 2022 watch out for:
* Surprise defaults
* Home sales
* Policy easing
* Pickier investors
Tentative signs that Chinese authorities may be relaxing some property policies policies has stemmed panic-selling in credit markets. That won’t offer much relief for many developers.
This is why 👇 THREAD 1/
2/ It looks like Beijing will use state firms to ease a historic liquidity crisis: government-linked firms may be used to acquire distressed developers triggered the first real gains for property notes since Evergrande ran into trouble. shorturl.at/tzTZ2
3/ State developers are already selling sizable bond deals in a revival of the interbank bond market. Cash could be used to buy up private developers’ assets as they try to raise cash.