Guardiola set his team up in their familiar 4-3-3, against United’s 4-4-2 block. City focused on building through the inside channels. De Bruyne and Silva received in between the United winger and central midfielder, before connecting with the wide attacker and full-back... 🧐🧵
Walker held his position at right-back, acting as cover against any United counter-attacks, while Cancelo combined with Silva and Grealish on the left. Foden’s supporting movements to that side led to multiple quick combinations that broke through United’s deeper block... 🧐🧵
United tried to cover the inside channels in the second half. This meant Silva was more effectively screened, but Cancelo had more licence to push forward. It also gave Grealish the chance to drift inside in which he could receive and connect with the front line... 🧐🧵
To play through the first two defensive lines, City often looked to form a box in midfield. Grealish continued to move inside, Silva dropped to support Rodri in what looked much like a double pivot, while De Bruyne moved across to complete the midfield quartet... 🧐🧵
Rangnick set up in a 4-4-2 with Pogba and Fernandes acting as the forward pairing, supported by Sancho and Elanga. The wingers looked to pin the City full-backs, which gave Pogba and Fernandes the chance to drift into the inside channels and connect with the back line... 🧐🧵
Fernandes and Pogba acted as a number 9 and 10 pairing, with one dropping short into the inside channels, and the other running beyond to stretch the City back line. In the first half these movements helped United break through the hosts’ block via the inside channels... 🧐🧵
United’s attacking output was restricted to counter-attacks in the second half. Whenever they did manage to regain the ball high, or centrally, they targeted the space in behind City’s high and wide full-backs and often looked for the significantly narrowed far-side winger...🧐🧵
Manchester City dominated the ball in the second half, but whenever United did enjoy any possession the hosts counter-pressed aggressively and with intent, committing numbers around the ball immediately upon losing it... 🧐🧵
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Manchester City’s 4-3-3 started on the front foot as Arsenal initially attempted to press into the host’s half, in a 4-4-2 shape. Arsenal went player-oriented in the wide areas, with Declan Rice and Thomas Partey tracking Bernardo Silva and Ilkay Gündogan’s forward runs. However, Silva’s wide runs to City’s right-side created space for Savinho to drive inside, penetrating against the aggressive jumping of Arsenal’s left-back, Calafiori. This helped disrupt and stretch Arsenal’s back line in the early stages, including when Haaland was slid in-behind to calmly open the scoring... 🧐🧵
It wasn’t long before Arsenal formed a low block, while City responded with a 3-1-5-1 shape. Josko Gvardiol moved into a left-side number eight role from full-back, with Gündogan as the central option underneath Haaland. Rodri – soon to be replaced by Kovacic – acted as the single pivot. Still, it was City’s right side that proved most potent, with Silva’s wider positioning supporting Savinho’s direct movements and dribbles against Calafiori... 🧐🧵
Stemming from tweaks to the 4-4-2 formation, and initially most popular in Spain, the 4-2-3-1 grew in popularity from the 2000s onwards. It has since been used with success by many prominent coaches, including Pep Guardiola, Arne Slot and Erik ten Hag... 4️⃣2️⃣3️⃣1️⃣🧵
Central protection...
The 4-2-3-1 requires defensive midfielders who can duel, tackle and intercept in individual battles. These midfielders must be alert enough to land on any second balls. They must have good acceleration and deceleration to help with this... 4️⃣2️⃣3️⃣1️⃣🧵
Spain used a 4-3-3 structure and built play patiently from the back, despite Germany pressing aggressively from their 4-2-3-1. They moved the ball around the back line to isolate Thomas Müller, before a centre-back stepped out with the ball into midfield... 🧐🧵
Olmo continued to move inside and Asensio dropped deep, in the process pulling Süle out of his position in Germany’s back line. This helped Spain to build out from the back and get around Germany’s increasingly effective high press... 🧐🧵
Traditionally, full-backs are the widest players in a back four, and as a result they attack and defend mostly in the wide areas. However, full-backs who move inside into central spaces are known as ‘inverted full-backs’. This movement adds an extra presence centrally... ↩️🧐
Although Pep Guardiola is the coach most associated with the inverted full-back, Johan Cruyff used them with Barcelona many years before. Then, he often converted the 4-3-3 into a 3-4-3 diamond, with one full-back inverting into central midfield... ↩️🧐
Manchester United were set up in a 4-2-3-1 shape, but Fred pushed forward from the double pivot to become a number 8 and give them a stronger attacking presence in central midfield. Bruno Fernandes then adapted his positioning, moving into the left inside channel... 🧐🧵
The hosts eventually pushed both full-backs higher, primarily working around the outside of Tottenham’s wing-backs. United’s wingers then came inside, with the freedom to rotate with Fred and Fernandes, as long as both inside channels were always occupied... 🧐🧵