Guardiola set his team up in their familiar 4-3-3, against United’s 4-4-2 block. City focused on building through the inside channels. De Bruyne and Silva received in between the United winger and central midfielder, before connecting with the wide attacker and full-back... 🧐🧵
Walker held his position at right-back, acting as cover against any United counter-attacks, while Cancelo combined with Silva and Grealish on the left. Foden’s supporting movements to that side led to multiple quick combinations that broke through United’s deeper block... 🧐🧵
United tried to cover the inside channels in the second half. This meant Silva was more effectively screened, but Cancelo had more licence to push forward. It also gave Grealish the chance to drift inside in which he could receive and connect with the front line... 🧐🧵
To play through the first two defensive lines, City often looked to form a box in midfield. Grealish continued to move inside, Silva dropped to support Rodri in what looked much like a double pivot, while De Bruyne moved across to complete the midfield quartet... 🧐🧵
Rangnick set up in a 4-4-2 with Pogba and Fernandes acting as the forward pairing, supported by Sancho and Elanga. The wingers looked to pin the City full-backs, which gave Pogba and Fernandes the chance to drift into the inside channels and connect with the back line... 🧐🧵
Fernandes and Pogba acted as a number 9 and 10 pairing, with one dropping short into the inside channels, and the other running beyond to stretch the City back line. In the first half these movements helped United break through the hosts’ block via the inside channels... 🧐🧵
United’s attacking output was restricted to counter-attacks in the second half. Whenever they did manage to regain the ball high, or centrally, they targeted the space in behind City’s high and wide full-backs and often looked for the significantly narrowed far-side winger...🧐🧵
Manchester City dominated the ball in the second half, but whenever United did enjoy any possession the hosts counter-pressed aggressively and with intent, committing numbers around the ball immediately upon losing it... 🧐🧵
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Spain used a 4-3-3 structure and built play patiently from the back, despite Germany pressing aggressively from their 4-2-3-1. They moved the ball around the back line to isolate Thomas Müller, before a centre-back stepped out with the ball into midfield... 🧐🧵
Olmo continued to move inside and Asensio dropped deep, in the process pulling Süle out of his position in Germany’s back line. This helped Spain to build out from the back and get around Germany’s increasingly effective high press... 🧐🧵
Traditionally, full-backs are the widest players in a back four, and as a result they attack and defend mostly in the wide areas. However, full-backs who move inside into central spaces are known as ‘inverted full-backs’. This movement adds an extra presence centrally... ↩️🧐
Although Pep Guardiola is the coach most associated with the inverted full-back, Johan Cruyff used them with Barcelona many years before. Then, he often converted the 4-3-3 into a 3-4-3 diamond, with one full-back inverting into central midfield... ↩️🧐
Manchester United were set up in a 4-2-3-1 shape, but Fred pushed forward from the double pivot to become a number 8 and give them a stronger attacking presence in central midfield. Bruno Fernandes then adapted his positioning, moving into the left inside channel... 🧐🧵
The hosts eventually pushed both full-backs higher, primarily working around the outside of Tottenham’s wing-backs. United’s wingers then came inside, with the freedom to rotate with Fred and Fernandes, as long as both inside channels were always occupied... 🧐🧵
Barcelona were set up in a 4-3-3, against a Madrid 4-4-2 defensive block. Torres moved inside to support centre-forward Aubameyang. De Jong and Pedri widened to support through the inside channels, with Busquets left as the single pivot ahead of the two centre-backs... 🧐🧵
Busquets dropped into defence to draw one of Madrid’s central midfielders up, and Pedri drifted wider to drag the other out. This often left De Jong as the free man to receive in the inside channel when Barcelona’s back line could access him... 🧐🧵
4-4-2 is made up of three distinct lines. The back four including two centre-backs and two full-backs. Ahead of them, a midfield four features two players in the middle and one on each side. Then the front two in attack who provide both height and goalscoring threat... 4️⃣4️⃣2️⃣🧵
In the 1950s, Viktor Maslov developed another variation of the 4-2-4, in which the two wingers dropped back alongside the two central midfielders. So originated the 4-4-2, which worked to overload opposition midfields with traditionally fewer numbers... 4️⃣4️⃣2️⃣🧵