The Mathematics of Occupation
Let’s play a game. Lets look at a potential scenario where Ukraine falls into the hands of Russian soldiers, after giving an earnest and commendable fight – one for the ages, and we move into the counterinsurgency arena. (1/12)
Let’s play a game. Lets look at a potential scenario where Ukraine falls into the hands of Russian soldiers, after giving an earnest and commendable fight – one for the ages, and we move into the counterinsurgency arena. (1/12)
The reality is that NATO countries won’t intervene in this situation. The umbrella of Article 5 comes with a commensurate inability to go in and help unilaterally, especially given Russia on the other side of it. So lets take a look at some occupations through history. (2/12)
A good starting point is Steven Budiansky’s 2004 article in the WAPost
washingtonpost.com/archive/opinio…
It turns out that for an extremely belligerent opponent, post-Nazi Germany, a ratio of 2.5 soldiers to every 100 citizens of German was needed. That’s a lot. (3/12)
washingtonpost.com/archive/opinio…
It turns out that for an extremely belligerent opponent, post-Nazi Germany, a ratio of 2.5 soldiers to every 100 citizens of German was needed. That’s a lot. (3/12)
Last time NATO got it’s boots muddy, Kosovo, the ratio of 40 to 1 was again roughly what they went with. 50,000 people for an area covering 2 million. However, this is predicated on an assumption of low resistance – a beaten opponent. (4/12)
That article was a while ago, but fortunately Russia gives us some more recent material to work with. In 2021, reports were that after nearly a decade and a half of being there, 20% of the Georgia was occupied by approximately 10,000 Russian soldiers. (5/12)
The mathematically inclined will observe that the staffing ratio for the occupation wasn’t great – but does play into the other dynamic – local support. In the Donbas, Russia can get away with those figures – however Lyiv, Kyiv will very much be actively resisting. (6/12)
It doesn’t always work this way. France in World War 2, a nation of 42 million with nationals and colonial citizens numbering over 100 million were controlled, with various degrees of success with a force of just 300,000 Germans. (7/12).
The practical problem was that France was not prepared for the new generation of war, and men with bayonets and horses were quickly bypassed by the new form of Blitzkrieg warfare. The German army leveraged technical asymmetry to project their force more effectively. (8/12)
So finally, we’re back to Ukraine. There’s its pure size on size – the forces are in many cases using the same equipment, Ukraine has home-field advantage on it, and so when this goes to street-to-street, 40 to 1 will likely seem a dream to aspire to. (9/12)
Even if you assume Russia will take the place, they’re not going to hold it. Their manpower advantage is, in a very measurable sense, insufficient to effectively occupy. The entire model seems to have been to try and party like it was 1939. Who knows what’s next? (10/12).
Between tyres, mud and failed assassinations, we’re now in unknown territory. The gambit for the Ukrainian people now is whether to resist and overcome, or cut the losses at Donbas and Crimea. (11/12)
@threadreaderapp unroll please.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
