Thread by @SamRamani2

I completed my doctoral thesis at Oxford last year on Russia's military interventions in Ukraine and Syria.

Based on that research, I am sharing some thoughts on why Russia invaded Ukraine and what Putin might do next /1

Russian military interventions are often explained by geopolitical opportunism or regime insecurity

It is intriguing that Russia would invade Ukraine when its great power status was rising and there was no immediate threat to Putin's regime /2

Geopolitical opportunism has been chronically overplayed. Russia's annexation of Crimea and Black Sea foothold was not rationally worth the cost of Western sanctions.

Even in Syria, Russia embarked on a potentially high-risk, uncertain reward mission that ended up succeeding /3

Regime insecurity has also been exaggerated as a driver of Russian aggression.

The 2011-12 protests might have influenced Russian alarmism about Euro-Maidan and the Arab Spring, but there was no serious threat of unrest diffusing from Kyiv and Cairo to Moscow /4

Putin has instead used military interventions as a tool of legacy-building and identity construction. He is focused on the long-term legitimacy of his regime and Russia's political system

Hence, he is willing to take excessive short-term risks and incur geopolitical costs /5

Putin's legacy hinges on satisfying domestic great power status aspirations

This means having a sphere of influence, effectively challenging the US-led legal order, and having a superpower-style global reach

The image of greatness matters even if Russia is actually isolated /6

Putin has also deftly framed his military interventions as a triumph against long-standing perceived internal threats

Fascism, uncontrolled unrest, Western expansionism, Islamic extremism- these narratives date back to Hungary 1956, and endured through the Soviet collapse /7

Putin has also effectively rationalized the costs of military interventions to the Russian people

Highlighting Russia's capacity for self-sacrifice as a contrast to perceived Western decadence is crucial. Hence the continuous World War II Great Patriotic War references /8

The war in Ukraine allows Putin to showcase Moscow's control over its sphere of influence, willingness to combat socially accepted threats and feeds into popular conceptions of "Russian strength"

It is an identity construction and authoritarian consolidation project /9

There are two differences between Russia's current and past actions:

The first is the extent of Russia's willingness to take risks in support of these goals

The second is Putin's reading of public opinion- he is appealing to a core base rather than the public writ large /10

Putin's conduct suggests that he will continue the war in Ukraine until he achieves a success that he frame as a legacy or identity construction win

Given his framing of the war, that likely means he will continue pursuing regime change, but not necessarily an occupation /11

Given this calculus, sanctions are unlikely to deter Putin, and diplomacy is unlikely to change his mind

Only an intra-elite schism, which poses an immediate threat to his regime, might cause him to recalibrate, and even then, most likely only temporarily /12