1) This letter, calling for a "Limited No-Fly Zone" in Ukraine is shocking, given who has signed it. Former generals & ambassadors, current heads or members of think tanks or foundations. People who understand that this would mean war with Russia. politico.com/f/?id=0000017f…
2) Enforcing a no-fly zone would not only require shooting down Russian aircraft, but also targeting Russian ground units - surface to air missiles, antiaircraft batteries, radars... Some of this equipment would be based in Russia, as some systems extend out hundreds of miles.
3) There has been a lot of talk about "air superiority" - a term which is casually bandied about but poorly understood. If you want to enforce a no fly zone, you need to ensure Russian aircraft cannot fly, and that Russian SAMs, AA, radars, etc. can shoot down your planes.
4) If you want to set the nuclear war doomsday clock to 11:59pm, by all means, go ahead and advocate for a no-fly zone, limited or otherwise.
* correction: "... cannot shoot down your planes."
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1) On urban warfare. This in no way should be interpreted as a defense of Russian-inflicted civilian casualties (it will anyway), which I condemn. The harsh reality is that when you decide to defend cities, you will incur civilian casualties & damage to civilian infrastructure.
2) Both sides chose to fight in an urban setting. From Mayor Vitali Klitschko: "Kyiv has been transformed into a fortress. Every street, every building, every checkpoint has been fortified." bbc.com/news/live/worl…
3) There are numerous photographs & videos from the capital and other cities that show armed checkpoints and defensive positions in or around civilian buildings & areas. I've seen video of Ukrainian troops firing anti-tank missiles from apartment building rooftops.
1) On Russian generals dying in battle. This is going to be perceived as a "pro Russian" threat, but it isn't. Ukraine is claiming that it has killed the 2nd Russian general , this is being touted as evidence of a defeated Russian military. It isn't. thehill.com/policy/interna…
2) The Russians are having problems among its front line units. When this happens, senior officers should move to the front to deal with it. This can often fix things. It appears this is what the Russians are going.
3) Leading from the front isn't something a cowardly or incompetent commander does. Leading from the front means you risk dying at the front.
10) ... it makes sense the Russians will hold a line stretching south from the west of of Kiev down to somewhere along the Moldavian border (Transnistria). Or west of a line along the M05 highway. This would completely cut off Ukraine from the Black Sea, a strategic objective.
11) The M05 highway runs north-south from Kiev to Odesa. Again this is an operation that would take weeks or months to develop. But if Kiev falls this changes the timeline calculus.
12) Kiev is without a doubt a strategic objective for the Russians but by no means the only objective. A look at the RUSMIL offensive shows this operation was not launched in haste because Kiev didn't fall and Zelensky didn't capitulate on day 2.
1) A look at the military situation in eastern and central Ukraine, & around the capital of Kiev. This will use several maps, from @nytimes & @Bcc. First the overall picture, using map from @nytimes. The strategic situation for Ukrainian force in Kiev & to the east is not good.
@nytimes@Bcc 2) There hasn't been a lot of movement by the Russians overall (compared to the first week that is), however it appears the Russians are consolidating their positions, preparing/positioning, and moving with the goal of the encirclement of several key regions.
@nytimes@Bcc 3) Russian forces are moving to cut off the far eastern areas close to the Donbas region, both northeast of Mariupol, and east of Izyum.
1) From @caleb_weiss7's excellent report: "... the French military reports that the jihadist originally joined the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria in 1994 before continuing the jihad with the GIA’s splinter group the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in 1998."
@caleb_weiss7 2) If you listen to Generation Jihad, you have heard this before. The important jihadists don't retire. They die of old age or in battle/raids. Abu Ammar al Jaza’iri was 2 years short of having 3 decades of front line experience.
@caleb_weiss7 3) There are plenty of "Abu Ammar al Jaza’iris" out there which we know nothing about. I recall reading one of Osama bin Laden's personnel files from circa 2006 which named up and coming leaders. Half of them became public figures, the other half were unknown to us.
1) The Pentagon's assessment of the Russian offensive, which mirrors that of the Ukrainian military, is that it has "stalled." Given just how badly the Pentagon got Afghanistan and the Taliban, tell me again why the press should take the Pentagon accounts uncritically?
2) The Pentagon failed to assess the Taliban's intent for well over a decade. It failed to understand that the Taliban had a religious motivation to fight.
3) As the Taliban offensive unfolded, Military leaders, including @CENTCOM commander Gen. McKenzie and CJCS Gen. Milley had no understanding of what was happening on the ground (or, they lied to us, neither is good). They whitewashed the Afghan government's failures.