Thirteen days since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. Today I examine reports that Russia has committed 100% of forces assembled before the invasion, including what it means for their campaign. War, among other things, is also about maths. 1/25 (Image - @ForeignPolicy)
3/25 There is a relationship between resourcing military operations (personnel numbers) and campaign design.
4/25 Campaign design is an important component of military professionalism. Through good campaign design, commanders and their staffs’ sequence and orchestrate tactical goals and actions.
5/25 A vital aspect of campaign design is the prioritization for allocation of forces, logistic support, intelligence, transport, and inter-service collaboration. At least in theory, campaigns should be largely joint rather than service oriented.
6/25 The Russian Campaign in Ukraine should (in theory) also act as the interface between the tactical battle and activities on the ground, and the achievement of Russian strategic end states.
7/25 The Russians, who have previously demonstrated high competence in campaigning and operational art, seem to have forgotten many of its fundamentals in their design and execution of the invasion of Ukraine. Force size and commitment is just part of the evidence for this.
8/25 Today, in his daily Pentagon briefing highlights, @danlamothe reports there has been “no appreciable change in combat power Russia has put in the fight. They are still at nearly 100 percent of the combat forces they had arrayed at the border before the invasion.”
9/25 Most sources agree Russia arrayed up to 190K troops around Ukraine before the invasion. Open sources note that the size of the Russian ground forces sits at 340K (incl paratroops). Therefore, Russian committed around 55% of their total ground forces to Ukraine.
10/25 In comparison, at the peak in November 2007, the US Army and US Marines had 170K soldiers and marines in Iraq. US Army total force size was 519K and US Marines was 184K. This represents around 24% of their total regular force deployed in Iraq. sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R40…
11/25 The size of the Russian deployment means that it has taken a major strategic risk in deploying such a significant percentage of its ground combat power on a single mission. It also means that it probably did not expect to use it.
12/25 This can be traced back to Putin’s flawed strategy, which assumed that the Ukrainians would not resist. And if they did resist, they could be quickly overwhelmed by Russian forces. thehill.com/opinion/intern…
13/25 Committing this percentage of combat power as its first echelon in on a single mission presents a significant strategic challenge for Russia. Responsible military institutions always plan for worst case. If you deploy it, you need to assume you might use it.
14/25 In military operations, casualties & fatigue, as well as equipment losses, wear & tear, will decrease force strength over time. Rotation of forces is necessary for any missions of even medium length duration. Humans can only fight for so long before becoming non-effective.
15/25 Russian also had to adapt its campaign design. The first days saw attempts to use light forces & rapid strikes to achieve objectives, including the capture of Kyiv. It has now changed this to a methodical campaign of attrition. These are logistically expense and complex.
16/25 At the same time, the Ukrainians have the advantages of operating on interior lines. This enables the more rapid redeployment and reinforcement of forces. It also simplifies command and control as well as logistic. tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…
17/25 The Russians are operating on exterior lines. They seek to advance on multiple axes from different parts of Belarus, Crimea, Russia & Donbas. This is complex, and in war, the more complex a plan is, the more likely it is to run into problems. We have seen these manifest.
18/25 Russia now finds itself in a situation where it has not achieved key military objectives in the north, east & south. It has concurrent offensives in different, disconnected parts of Ukraine. It has committed all the military forces it had for Ukraine on these missions.
19/25 There is little prospect of a quick resolution, so fighting we continue for at least weeks and perhaps months. All of this time will see the Russians and Ukrainians lose more personnel and equipment, which on both sides will be hard to replace.
20/25 The Russians will need to find solutions to this ‘100% committed’ problem soon. There are three key problems that they must solve.
21/25 First, they need a theatre level reserve in the north if they are to complete encirclement of Kyiv & follow-on attack on the city. The size of Russian forces currently in the north is likely to be insufficient for both tasks. They may have to pause other ops to do so.
22/25 Second, the Russians more broadly may need to start planning for more reinforcements and rotating forces. Both humans and equipment need breaks in combat to retain effectiveness over the medium and longer term. And Russian losses have probably been higher than anticipated.
23/25 Third, Russia must look at other military commitments both within & beyond its borders. Does the importance of their strategic goals in Ukraine justify stripping more Russian troops from other missions and garrisons to reinforce a combat weary and degraded force in Ukraine?
24/25 The Russian campaign design for Ukraine is flawed. It sets too many operational objectives for a Russian ground force that is not large enough to secure them. They will seek other methods – more airpower, artillery, rockets – to prevent a stalemate setting in.
25/25 That ends update 13. Russian campaign design, and their ability to achieve campaign outcomes on the ground, has been found wanting. With all their theatre forces committed, the Russians will become increasingly desperate to achieve their aims. Image - @UAWeapons
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I have just published my latest weekly update on the war in #Ukraine, and the competition/confrontation with China in the Pacific. This week: Xi and Putin's are 'Friends of Steel', the back and forth of Ukraine peace negotiations, Russia's declining returns on its massive casualties. 1/6 🧵🇺🇦 (Image: @DefenceU)
2/ Peace negotiations continue, without much progress. European leaders visited Ukraine this week and endorsed along with @ZelenskyyUa a 30 day ceasefire in the war. Trump has also called for a 30 day ceasefire.
3/ Putin on the other hand has proposed direct Ukraine-Russia talks in Istanbul in the coming week. Putin did not offer to extend his three-day truce (the parade is over and Xi is heading home).
It is the night before Russia's Victory Day parade, and all through Moscow, air defenders are stirring. There has been a lot of discussion about the potential for a Ukrainian attack during the parade, so I thought I would explore this issue in more detail. 1/5 🧵🇺🇦
2/ The head of Ukrainian military intelligence General Budanov intimated in his own way that the Russians should “bring ear plugs”. But what might be the strategic rationale for a Ukrainian attack against the 9 May Victory Day parade in Moscow?
3/ To answer this, there are 4 key issues that need to be resolved. 1. Can Ukraine penetrate Russia's air defence & get its drones to Red Square? 2. What might be the advantages of an attack? 3. What would be the downsides of an attack? 4. Is this just a big deception plan?
There has been a lot of coverage about the Ukrainian uncrewed vessel shooting down at least one, possibly two Russian fighter bombers recently. It is a significant moment in 21st century war. But military institutions have much to do to exploit such capabilities. 1/5 🧵🇺🇦
(Image: Naval News)
2/ Over the last year, there have been multiple events where uncrewed systems have launched other uncrewed systems and weapons to attack Russian forces. This has occured at sea and on land. It represents next generation robotic warfare.
3/ It is transforming the character of war. But to fully exploit this capability, military institutions must make tough decisions about the balance of crewed and uncrewed systems, as well as the balance between exquisite and cheap, massed systems.
I have just published my latest weekly update on the war in Ukraine, and the competition/confrontation with China in the Pacific. This week I explore Russia's '3-day peace' proposal, Russian casualties, the minerals deal, and the North Koreans learn and adapt. 1/5 🧵🇺🇦 (Image: @DefenceU)
2/ The minerals deal is interesting. In 2017 Trump agreed with the President of Afghanistan that the US would help Afghanistan with its minerals. Trump then went behind Ghani’s back to negotiate an exit from Afghanistan with the Taliban. We should not expect too much from the U.S.-Ukraine agreement.
3/ Russia's monthly casualties have crept up this year to 40K per month.The maps in my update provide an indication of just how expensive each kilometre of Ukrainian territory has become for Russian forces, and what a poor return on their investment this has been for the Russian military. (Graph: @DefenceHQ)
An Easter truce has been declared by Putin. Not only is this a cynical act of someone who has sustained his aim to subjugate #Ukraine, it has huge practical challenges. So why has Putin done this and what does it mean for the war? 1/10 🧵 politico.eu/article/putin-…
2/ The truce is a short one - about a day. It is a truce that Putin has called unilaterally, so it is not binding on the Ukrainians in any way. That Putin has done this shows that he still believes that he has the upper hand in the war, and can dictate its tempo.
3/ But war is an interactive endeavour, and does not work like that. The Ukrainians and Russians are engaged along a nearly 1000 kilometre front line. The Russians have recently stepped up the tempo of attacks, and this momentum can’t just be turned off like a spigot.
Over the past three years, both sides in the #Ukraine war have learned and adapted. Battlefield, strategic and international collaboration and adaptation are accelerating and intensifying, resulting in a global Adaptation War. 1/7 🧵🇺🇦
2/ In my latest piece, I examine how Ukraine and Russia have both 'learned to learn better' since the Russian full-scale invasion in 2022. I also look at their key battlefield and strategic adaptations.
3/ I also explore the emerging collaboration and adaptation between authoritarians. Russia's war in Ukraine and the war in the Middle East have spawned a rapid expansion in the sharing of insights between Russia, Iran, China and North Korea.