Thirteen days since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. Today I examine reports that Russia has committed 100% of forces assembled before the invasion, including what it means for their campaign. War, among other things, is also about maths. 1/25 (Image - @ForeignPolicy)
3/25 There is a relationship between resourcing military operations (personnel numbers) and campaign design.
4/25 Campaign design is an important component of military professionalism. Through good campaign design, commanders and their staffs’ sequence and orchestrate tactical goals and actions.
5/25 A vital aspect of campaign design is the prioritization for allocation of forces, logistic support, intelligence, transport, and inter-service collaboration. At least in theory, campaigns should be largely joint rather than service oriented.
6/25 The Russian Campaign in Ukraine should (in theory) also act as the interface between the tactical battle and activities on the ground, and the achievement of Russian strategic end states.
7/25 The Russians, who have previously demonstrated high competence in campaigning and operational art, seem to have forgotten many of its fundamentals in their design and execution of the invasion of Ukraine. Force size and commitment is just part of the evidence for this.
8/25 Today, in his daily Pentagon briefing highlights, @danlamothe reports there has been “no appreciable change in combat power Russia has put in the fight. They are still at nearly 100 percent of the combat forces they had arrayed at the border before the invasion.”
9/25 Most sources agree Russia arrayed up to 190K troops around Ukraine before the invasion. Open sources note that the size of the Russian ground forces sits at 340K (incl paratroops). Therefore, Russian committed around 55% of their total ground forces to Ukraine.
10/25 In comparison, at the peak in November 2007, the US Army and US Marines had 170K soldiers and marines in Iraq. US Army total force size was 519K and US Marines was 184K. This represents around 24% of their total regular force deployed in Iraq. sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R40…
11/25 The size of the Russian deployment means that it has taken a major strategic risk in deploying such a significant percentage of its ground combat power on a single mission. It also means that it probably did not expect to use it.
12/25 This can be traced back to Putin’s flawed strategy, which assumed that the Ukrainians would not resist. And if they did resist, they could be quickly overwhelmed by Russian forces. thehill.com/opinion/intern…
13/25 Committing this percentage of combat power as its first echelon in on a single mission presents a significant strategic challenge for Russia. Responsible military institutions always plan for worst case. If you deploy it, you need to assume you might use it.
14/25 In military operations, casualties & fatigue, as well as equipment losses, wear & tear, will decrease force strength over time. Rotation of forces is necessary for any missions of even medium length duration. Humans can only fight for so long before becoming non-effective.
15/25 Russian also had to adapt its campaign design. The first days saw attempts to use light forces & rapid strikes to achieve objectives, including the capture of Kyiv. It has now changed this to a methodical campaign of attrition. These are logistically expense and complex.
16/25 At the same time, the Ukrainians have the advantages of operating on interior lines. This enables the more rapid redeployment and reinforcement of forces. It also simplifies command and control as well as logistic. tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…
17/25 The Russians are operating on exterior lines. They seek to advance on multiple axes from different parts of Belarus, Crimea, Russia & Donbas. This is complex, and in war, the more complex a plan is, the more likely it is to run into problems. We have seen these manifest.
18/25 Russia now finds itself in a situation where it has not achieved key military objectives in the north, east & south. It has concurrent offensives in different, disconnected parts of Ukraine. It has committed all the military forces it had for Ukraine on these missions.
19/25 There is little prospect of a quick resolution, so fighting we continue for at least weeks and perhaps months. All of this time will see the Russians and Ukrainians lose more personnel and equipment, which on both sides will be hard to replace.
20/25 The Russians will need to find solutions to this ‘100% committed’ problem soon. There are three key problems that they must solve.
21/25 First, they need a theatre level reserve in the north if they are to complete encirclement of Kyiv & follow-on attack on the city. The size of Russian forces currently in the north is likely to be insufficient for both tasks. They may have to pause other ops to do so.
22/25 Second, the Russians more broadly may need to start planning for more reinforcements and rotating forces. Both humans and equipment need breaks in combat to retain effectiveness over the medium and longer term. And Russian losses have probably been higher than anticipated.
23/25 Third, Russia must look at other military commitments both within & beyond its borders. Does the importance of their strategic goals in Ukraine justify stripping more Russian troops from other missions and garrisons to reinforce a combat weary and degraded force in Ukraine?
24/25 The Russian campaign design for Ukraine is flawed. It sets too many operational objectives for a Russian ground force that is not large enough to secure them. They will seek other methods – more airpower, artillery, rockets – to prevent a stalemate setting in.
25/25 That ends update 13. Russian campaign design, and their ability to achieve campaign outcomes on the ground, has been found wanting. With all their theatre forces committed, the Russians will become increasingly desperate to achieve their aims. Image - @UAWeapons
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A quick, strategic assessment of Putin's use of the Oreshnik missile in a strike against #Ukraine. In short, this was a political strike not a military one. 1/10 🧵
2/ Putin used this missile as a direct response to recent U.S. administration decisions to allow Ukraine to use U.S.-supplied ATACMs missiles against a wider range of targets inside Russia, particularly targets related to the Ukrainian campaign in Kursk. He notes this in his speech.
3/ An additional driver was the permission given by U.K. and French governments for the use of their long-range air launched missiles against targets in Russia.
Today, the war in #Ukraine – or at least the time since the large-scale Russian invasion of 2022 – reaches the 1000-day mark. Besides reflecting on the tremendous sacrifices of the Ukrainian people since February 2022, the 1000-day point permits taking stock of the situation. 1/8 🧵 🇺🇦
2/ Even though the situation for #Ukraine at the 1000-day mark is forbidding, the trajectory of this war is not cast in steel. To prevent continued Russian gains on the battlefield, and to stop any attempt at forcing Ukraine to the negotiate under unfavourable terms, what changes might be required?
3/ 1st, Ukraine must conduct a ruthless re-assessment of its military strategy. In 2024, Russia seized the strategic initiative, Ukraine lost more territory & an offensive into Russia has not met key objectives. New ideas will be required for an evolved military strategy.
In the past few days, speculation about a potential ‘Ukraine solution’ from the incoming Trump administration has accelerated. Here, I examine possible components of this, or other, 'peace plans' for #Ukraine. 1/10 🧵🇺🇦
2/ A report in The Telegraph describes an evolved plan that includes a buffer zone, freezing the conflict, Russia retaining currently held territory, ‘pumping Ukraine full of US weapons’ to deter Russia and deferring Ukraine’s NATO membership for years.
3/ It is timely to examine some of the components of these plans, and the issues they might contain. We can only explore potential components because there is not yet an endorsed Trump plan for Ukraine. And, unfortunately, nor is there a U.S. strategy for #Ukraine produced by the Biden administration in the past 3 years.
It has become increasingly likely that North Korean combat troops will appear in #Ukraine soon. While there remain many unknowns on this subject, the deployment of North Korean troops raises many different potential issues for Russia, Ukraine and NATO. 1/10 🧵🇺🇦
2/ On 13 October, President Zelenskyy announced the anticipated deployment of North Korea troops’ to Ukraine. In the past 48 hours, the head of NATO, Mark Rutte, described how “North Korea sending troops to fight alongside Russia in Ukraine would mark a significant escalation.”
3/ The most obvious challenge for Russia in the deployment of North Korean troops for combat operations will be at the tactical level. There will be a communication gap between soldiers and commanders who speak two different languages. It is very unlikely that most North Korean troops speak Russian - and vice versa. While translators will be helpful, this kind of communication gap can, and will, be a problem during combat operations.
President Zelenskyy has presented his Victory Plan to the Ukrainian parliament. It has 5 elements: Ukraine to join NATO; defense, including long-range strikes; deterring Russian aggression; economic development; and, and post-war security structures. 1/5 🧵 🇺🇦 kyivindependent.com/zelensky-victo…
2/ Apparently there are also three classified elements of the Victory Plan. These will be briefed separately to lawmakers. They were probably briefed to foreign leaders during Zelenskyy’s recent trip to the UK, France, Italy and Germany.
3/ Zelenskyy has also been invited to present his Victory Plan at an EU summit this week. kyivpost.com/post/40589
China has commenced #JointSword2024B. In the past day, 153 PLA aircraft & 14 PLAN ships operated around Taiwan. 111 aircraft entered Taiwan’s ADIZ. This is a record high in PLA activity. What might the People’s Liberation Army be seeking to achieve, and what might Western intelligence agencies might learn? 1/8 🧵
2/ Just last week, Taiwan celebrated its national day. Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te gave an address on 10 October that included a statement that China "has no right to represent Taiwan" and that his mission as president would be to "resist annexation or encroachment upon our sovereignty."
3/ After the speech by the President of Taiwan, the predictable Chinese Communist Party response arrived. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Mao Ning stated that Lai had tried to “sell the fallacy of Taiwan independence,” and accused him of a “pernicious intention to escalate tensions across the Taiwan Strait for political gain.”