Thirteen days since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. Today I examine reports that Russia has committed 100% of forces assembled before the invasion, including what it means for their campaign. War, among other things, is also about maths. 1/25 (Image - @ForeignPolicy)
3/25 There is a relationship between resourcing military operations (personnel numbers) and campaign design.
4/25 Campaign design is an important component of military professionalism. Through good campaign design, commanders and their staffs’ sequence and orchestrate tactical goals and actions.
5/25 A vital aspect of campaign design is the prioritization for allocation of forces, logistic support, intelligence, transport, and inter-service collaboration. At least in theory, campaigns should be largely joint rather than service oriented.
6/25 The Russian Campaign in Ukraine should (in theory) also act as the interface between the tactical battle and activities on the ground, and the achievement of Russian strategic end states.
7/25 The Russians, who have previously demonstrated high competence in campaigning and operational art, seem to have forgotten many of its fundamentals in their design and execution of the invasion of Ukraine. Force size and commitment is just part of the evidence for this.
8/25 Today, in his daily Pentagon briefing highlights, @danlamothe reports there has been “no appreciable change in combat power Russia has put in the fight. They are still at nearly 100 percent of the combat forces they had arrayed at the border before the invasion.”
9/25 Most sources agree Russia arrayed up to 190K troops around Ukraine before the invasion. Open sources note that the size of the Russian ground forces sits at 340K (incl paratroops). Therefore, Russian committed around 55% of their total ground forces to Ukraine.
10/25 In comparison, at the peak in November 2007, the US Army and US Marines had 170K soldiers and marines in Iraq. US Army total force size was 519K and US Marines was 184K. This represents around 24% of their total regular force deployed in Iraq. sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R40…
11/25 The size of the Russian deployment means that it has taken a major strategic risk in deploying such a significant percentage of its ground combat power on a single mission. It also means that it probably did not expect to use it.
12/25 This can be traced back to Putin’s flawed strategy, which assumed that the Ukrainians would not resist. And if they did resist, they could be quickly overwhelmed by Russian forces. thehill.com/opinion/intern…
13/25 Committing this percentage of combat power as its first echelon in on a single mission presents a significant strategic challenge for Russia. Responsible military institutions always plan for worst case. If you deploy it, you need to assume you might use it.
14/25 In military operations, casualties & fatigue, as well as equipment losses, wear & tear, will decrease force strength over time. Rotation of forces is necessary for any missions of even medium length duration. Humans can only fight for so long before becoming non-effective.
15/25 Russian also had to adapt its campaign design. The first days saw attempts to use light forces & rapid strikes to achieve objectives, including the capture of Kyiv. It has now changed this to a methodical campaign of attrition. These are logistically expense and complex.
16/25 At the same time, the Ukrainians have the advantages of operating on interior lines. This enables the more rapid redeployment and reinforcement of forces. It also simplifies command and control as well as logistic. tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…
17/25 The Russians are operating on exterior lines. They seek to advance on multiple axes from different parts of Belarus, Crimea, Russia & Donbas. This is complex, and in war, the more complex a plan is, the more likely it is to run into problems. We have seen these manifest.
18/25 Russia now finds itself in a situation where it has not achieved key military objectives in the north, east & south. It has concurrent offensives in different, disconnected parts of Ukraine. It has committed all the military forces it had for Ukraine on these missions.
19/25 There is little prospect of a quick resolution, so fighting we continue for at least weeks and perhaps months. All of this time will see the Russians and Ukrainians lose more personnel and equipment, which on both sides will be hard to replace.
20/25 The Russians will need to find solutions to this ‘100% committed’ problem soon. There are three key problems that they must solve.
21/25 First, they need a theatre level reserve in the north if they are to complete encirclement of Kyiv & follow-on attack on the city. The size of Russian forces currently in the north is likely to be insufficient for both tasks. They may have to pause other ops to do so.
22/25 Second, the Russians more broadly may need to start planning for more reinforcements and rotating forces. Both humans and equipment need breaks in combat to retain effectiveness over the medium and longer term. And Russian losses have probably been higher than anticipated.
23/25 Third, Russia must look at other military commitments both within & beyond its borders. Does the importance of their strategic goals in Ukraine justify stripping more Russian troops from other missions and garrisons to reinforce a combat weary and degraded force in Ukraine?
24/25 The Russian campaign design for Ukraine is flawed. It sets too many operational objectives for a Russian ground force that is not large enough to secure them. They will seek other methods – more airpower, artillery, rockets – to prevent a stalemate setting in.
25/25 That ends update 13. Russian campaign design, and their ability to achieve campaign outcomes on the ground, has been found wanting. With all their theatre forces committed, the Russians will become increasingly desperate to achieve their aims. Image - @UAWeapons
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In my latest piece, I conduct a quick assessment of the potential military implications of the release of DeepSeek-R1. There are a few. 1/7 🧵
2/ Implication 1: Every Military Will Want It. I expect that there will be a rush by military and intelligence agencies across the western world to download and testing it extensively.
3/ Implication 2: Lowering the Cost of AI to the Edge. Might AI LLM that use the same approach as DeekSeek-R1 mean military organisations can do everything they want to do with AI, at the levels they want to do it, in a much quicker timescale than imagined?
This is a useful assessment of the situation on the ground in eastern #Ukraine, from the Ukrainian perspective, by @pravda_eng. A number of issues, some specified & some implied, are apparent. 1/8 🧵🇺🇦 pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2…
2/ First, the issues specified in the article. Shortfalls in infantry numbers and training, deficiencies in brigade C2, ammunition quality issues, and false reporting about the situation. None of these are particularly new issues. Any one would be concerning. The combination is alarming.
3/ Now to the implied problems, which are as concerning as those specifically covered in the article.
This week, I published a two-part article that reviewed the seven key elements of the war in #Ukraine that are likely to have the most influence on the trajectory of the war in 2025. 1/5 🧵🇺🇦 (Image: @DefenceU)
2/ The 7 key endeavours are:
- The Ground War.
- The Strategic Strike and Air Defence War.
- The Mobilization War.
- The Economic War.
- The Robot and Algorithm War.
- The War of Narratives.
- The Learning and Adaptation War.
3/ I also examined where the key asymmetries in the war are at the moment, such as manpower, air defence and innovation. Understanding these can help Ukraine target Russian critical vulnerabilities, build capacity to minimise its weaknesses, and inform the conduct of any ceasefire negotiations.
A useful update from @IAPonomarenko. In 2025, the West must not rush to force #Ukraine into an unjust peace with a brutal regime that began an unnecessary war, fought it poorly, used its military to rape, loot, torture and murder its way across a neighbour, and is unlikely to abide by any ceasefire agreement. 1/7 🧵
2/ 20th century politicians (eventually) came to understand that the rise of fascist, aggressive regimes like contemporary Russia (and Nazi Germany) had only one solution: defeat of their physical and ideological means of aggression against their neighbours.
3/ The big words from 21st century politicians, accompanied by tiny portions of national wealth dedicated to defence and support for countries like Ukraine and Taiwan, is not deterring Russian or Chinese aggression. It is actually helping their rise and increasing their power.
In the past 48 hours, reports have emerged of a Ukrainian attack on Russian positions near the village of Lyptsi in the Kharkiv region. The attack utilised dozens of uncrewed ground combat vehicles (UGV). 1/5 🧵🇺🇦
2/ The UGVs were apparently supported throughout the activity by FPV drones. While this doesn’t make the attack fully autonomous – the vehicles need human operators – it is one of the more significant examples of drone combat in this war.
3/ The Battle of Lyptsi is an important step in the transformation of the character of war from a purely human endeavour to something quite different in the 21st century. But none of the battlefield functions envisioned for uncrewed systems will be effective without the transformation of military institutions that wish to use them. This includes armies but also the civilian bureaucracies that support them.
This week, I provided the latest assessment on the relevance of Ukraine lessons to the Pacific at a seminar in Jakarta. I have expanded on this for a new article. 1/5 🧵
2/ First, I explored the key lessons from the war in #Ukraine since the Russian large-scale invasion in 2022. I proposed 7 major lessons, although time & more analysis will produce others. These include meshed civ-mil intelligence collection / analysis, drone warfare, leadership and the adaptation battle.
3/ Next, I explored the key ‘filters’ that might be used in translating lessons from #Ukraine so that are more relevant for the prevailing circumstances in the Pacific. Key filers include geography, weather, civil infrastructure and the capabilities of potential adversaries.