Dray Agha Profile picture
Mar 9, 2022 19 tweets 10 min read Read on X
As a security investigator, what are your thoughts when you see this result in your SIEM? 🚨

Bad, right?

Let’s discuss how we can conclude something is a false positive, and what we can do with that information🧵
When drafting some internal docs the other morning, I wanted a screenshot of an Elastic search.

Without intending to start any drama, I searched for a string associated with Impacket's lateral movement tools :

*\\\\127.0.0.1\\ADMIN*

github.com/SecureAuthCorp…
I expected some internal test data, or even results from previously identified activity.

So you can imagine my surprise when I saw results that were from a handful of hours ago
Evidence of lateral movement?! In front of my very eyes!!

So I honed in the host machine in question. The aim here was to contextualise the activity, and identify what other facets of the adversarial campaign were visible

But the results were complicated....
@HuskyHacksMK later commented on this with the exact mix of emotions I was feeling.
An executable - nddc.exe - was directly associated with this lateral movement-like activity.

Instead of MORE malicious evidence, the existing 'malicious' evidence was brought into question.

For comparison, I have included what Impacket's WMIExec would look like in the SIEM
My next step was to go the host itself. Initially, I was going to reverse engineer the executable under the assumption it was malicious.

But something felt 'off' about treating it like malware.

It seemed too legit in it's directory placement
Some like to turn to Google straight away. This is a valid approach

Before I go down search tunnels, I let the 'data speak'. This means I do not impose a hypothesis or conclusion but let the evidence guide me.

Google will add context, but it will not let YOUR data speak. 📢
Instead, I leveraged global prevalence as @MaxRogers5 would advise.

If a significant number of machines display the same behaviour, this is an informative finding.

And we got back fascinating results: other machines in other domains are also displaying this behaviour, uniformly
Drilling down further on a machine, we can see that this weird NDDC.exe activity also has a ‘beaconing’ pattern, which suggests it is scheduled with precise regularity
Once I've saturated the raw data and it can't tell me any more, I turn to google to fill in the gaps.

My initial searches were just to ascertain what NDDC is.

I find out its Network Detective Data Collector, a Kaseya-related tool.

This by itself doesn't absolve the activity.
Reading the docs justifies why Network Detective (nddc.exe) behaves this way with SMB shares during a network audit.

It doesn't really explain HOW though.

rapidfiretools.com/nd/RapidFire_N…
The hypothesis and objectives you start with in an investigation may morph as time goes on 🥼⏳

Our investigation changed from focusing on activity that looked like Impacket's WMIexec to focusing on Network Detective's auditing practices.
Others had run malware analysis on nddc.exe, but no one had yet documented this false positive.

Remember I mentioned how I don't turn to Google first?
This isn't to flex.

It's just that I know for obscure and weird shit, Google won't help me as much as the raw data will.
Network Detective's activity was a false positive; similar to Impacket’s lateral movement but not malicious

Lets document and share our novel findings about this false positive.

@mttaggart's WTFBins is an excellent resource we can contribute to: wtfbins.wtf
Contributing was frictionless and the response from @mttaggart and @HuskyHacksMK was great!
And the end result of our investigation was to contribute to an awesome, growing repo of false positive behaviours.
The efforts of our investigation on Network Detective mean the infosec community may not have to go to these lengths next time.

Instead, they can benefit from our findings! 🤝

This is what it's all about: contributing back to the community that we all borrow tools and tips from
In conclusion, we pulled on a suspicious thread that we ultimately unraveled as legitimate (but weird), and shared our findings with our peers via WTFbins.

I hope this thread proves useful!

I can't wait to see @mttaggart's WTFbins grow!

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More from @Purp1eW0lf

Dec 5, 2022
Think hiring is slowing down??

@HuntressLabs is hiring remote a Threat Operations Analyst 🇬🇧. UK citizenship is non-negotiable

You'll be working with myself, @xorJosh, @PonchoSec, and the rest of the squad!

I have some tips for those applying 🧵

boards.greenhouse.io/huntress/jobs/…
I don't care about about degrees 📜

I barely care about certs.

I care about what your contributions have been to your community.

Do you have a github, a blog, a summary of a CTF you did ? GREAT, put the link in your resume
We're gonna teach you what you need to know in this role👨‍🎓

But I need to know from your resume, covering letter, and interview that you take extreme ownership and accountability for yourself.

Meaning, you're constantly learning and trying to execute high quality, accurate work
Read 7 tweets
Oct 11, 2022
For cyber security investigations, internal silos will make or break your efforts 🧱🧱🧱

I'll show you the power from a LACK of siloing, with a piping hot, fresh @HuntressLabs case @xorJosh and I worked

🧵🧶
What are 'silos'.

@keydet89 educated me on the industry problem where departments cannot easily share findings; a threat intel department doesn't have a way to share findings with DFIR department, for example.

IMO, Silos occur when data & people cannot be circulated easily
We aren't perfect by any means at @HuntressLabs, but it's a testament to our founders, engineers, devs (etc) that our infrastructure sets us up for success.

It's difficult for analysts NOT to share reports and data by default; our infrastructure & culture doesn't foster silos
Read 15 tweets
Sep 29, 2022
Investigating an intrusion? 🕵️🔍

Start with the security solution on the machine. DON'T work hard to timeline the adversaries' activities, work smart👩‍🔬

In a @HuntressLabs case with @nosecurething and Jordan Sexton, we leveraged ESET's data before anything forensically complex🧵 Image
This gave us a tonne of starter info
🟡 Timestamps threat actor operated in

🔴 Directories they liked to operate in, the user account they likely controlled, AND that the threat actor liked to use PwSh

🔵 Registry key they had used for persistence.

This saved us time....⏲️
..as we used these findings to pivot:

🟡 We had date/time anchor points when leveraging other data

🔴 We focused on the user, those directories, and PwSh. Found more malicious activity straight away

🔵 We eradicated persistence and identified their IPv4: 5[.]255[.]103[.]142 ImageImageImage
Read 5 tweets
Sep 8, 2022
I wanted to share some findings about RDP, Network Layer Authentication, LogonTypes and brute forcing 🔭

Recently, we perused some EventID 4625s (login failures) originating from public IPv4s brute forcing...
🧵
I kept finding LogonType 3s (network)

However only RDP was externally exposed on the machine, which usually records LogonType 10....

When this has happened before, I usually just assume its Windows jank and continue with my investigation 🤷‍♂️

But this time, I wanted to know WHY
The wise @DaveKleinatland suggested Network Layer Authentication (NLA) would explain this:

"
NLA takes place before the session is started... without NLA things can be exposed before any sort of authentication.... like domain name, usernames, last logged on user, etc
"
- Dave 🧙‍♂️
Read 10 tweets
Aug 17, 2022
In a recent intrusion, we identified a threat actor had compromised the Windows login process, and siphoned cleartext credentials - using a technique known as NPPSPY

@0gtweet’s NPPSPY was fascinating to dissect and remediate.

Huge thanks to @keydet89 for guidance and wisdom
Our article couldn’t show what this cleartext credential gathering looked like on the compromised machine, but we recreated the electrifying end product
IOCs and Behavior
- T1003

- Values under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\NetworkProvider\Order
◦For our case: logincontroll

- Unexplained entries in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<here>\NetworkProvider
◦For our case: logincontroll
Read 5 tweets
Aug 16, 2022
Cobalt Strike ain't 💩

Let's chat about how to unravel Cobalt Strike and deny the adversary further access

As ALWAYS, I am showing you data so fresh out the kitchen it hasn't even been cleared by ThreatOps Director @MaxRogers5 👀🧑‍🍳 🧵
Cobalt Strike can often trigger AMSI alerts in Defender. The frustrating thing about AMSI alerts is that they don't tell you what the offending activity WAS.

The alert here was PowerShell based....so let's dig a lil deeper
Go collect C:\System32\winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell%4Operational.evtx , and go get my favourite tool - Chainsaw.

Take note your detection time (06:43).

Point chainsaw at your PwSh log, with this time
Read 13 tweets

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