Since 2018 Russian officials have claimed over 60 false flag chemical attacks are being prepared by Syrian opposition groups and their allies, with zero of them actually happening. Russia says shit like this all the time, all it means is they're shameless liars.
One thing you have to understand is Russian officials lie constantly, but there's rarely any grand strategy behind it, they're just winging it, and you're only noticing them now because, unlike Syria, this is a conflict a lot of people are engaged.
So when you see a Russian official lying, it's not some clever ploy, its just they're so full to the brim with shit it spilling out their mouths. It looks gross, but you're only noticing because you're actually looking this time round.
That's not to say it won't happen, but it would be the exception, not the rule.
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So how would we verify or debunk this claim? Well @mod_russia has lied about the location of aerial footage before, so we need to first geolocate it. Here's an example of them lying about the location of aerial imagery from Syria bellingcat.com/news/mena/2015…
The Russian MoD makes some pretty specific claims, without really explaining how they can make them based on grainy drone footage. So after geolocation we can look for imagery from the same day at the same location. Maybe local authorities posted on social media about it.
This is a good piece, but there's one big piece of the jigsaw that I think a lot of people covering the role of the open source community in the coverage of Ukraine are missing...
I've been doing open source investigation for over a decade now, starting with arguing with people on Internet forums about the Arab Spring to collecting evidence of war crimes in Ukraine for international accountability purposes, and things have changed dramatically.
Back then, the community was just a handful of people from places like Storyful, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and me and my blog, and no-one outside of that group had a clue what open source investigation or things like geolocation was.
Many of you will have spent the week viewing massive amounts of potentially traumatic imagery. Bellingcat published a guide on minimising harm from viewing such imagery bellingcat.com/resources/how-…
Vicarious trauma is a serious issue for researchers working on open source imagery from conflict. Self care is important, and with a conflict with a constant flow of intense, graphic imagery it's sometimes difficult to switch off, but please give yourself a day off.
I've never seen so much of the accountability community mobilise around any topic, particularly around open source material, so that horrific video you're watching is going to be found and preserved, its not down to you to share it and make the world aware.
Bellingcat and partners are currently working long hours to get our collection, verification and archiving process running efficiently for content coming from Ukraine for future use in accountability processes. Once that's sorted expect a lot more website content.
We're already getting through a lot of content, but we want our process working as efficiently as possible so we can expand our work and feed it into our own investigations.
Thanks to everyone who has donated to Bellingcat, that's going to support our Ukraine work, and also thanks to everyone geolocating images on Twitter, that saves us a lot for time and means we can update our database of geolocated imagery a lot more rapidly.
We're seeing a lot of images of cluster munitions being used in Ukraine, so there's a few things I want to highlight to assist with reporting of the incidents. There's two types of rockets, fired by BM-27 and BM-30 multiple rocket launchers.
These things are big, this is a reconstruction of one from when they first started being used in Syria, and the diagram on the right gives you a sense of the position of the cluster munitions at the front of the rocket, and the rocket motor behind them.
Generally when these munitions deploy their submunitions in the air the rocket motor and cluster munition section separate, and land in the ground, just like in this video from Ukraine, showing the cluster section impacting the ground.
The actual difference now is unlike 10 years ago, when the Arab Spring was being documented through social media, journalists are more open to using social media because the open source community has become more established and trusted, and verifies social media rapidly.
The current conflict in Ukraine is so well documented because of the widespread use of social media, the pre-established open source investigation community who followed events in Ukraine from 2014 onwards, and there's more journalists seeking out that kind of information.
Back in 2011 open source investigation seemed like a magic trick performed by a bunch of outsiders. It's taken a decade to get to the point where it's seen as a reliable field of expertise, not just one weird trick to document conflict.