I need to stop you all from using "rational actor" here. This is going to be a small political science lecture, and I don't care if you don't want to hear it. This will be on the test. /1
"Rational actor" does not mean "an actor who is rational." It does not apply to *people* at all most of the time. It's a construct that means "treating the state as if it's a person, a unitary actor who maximizes benefit and minimizes cost."
That's all it means. /2
The reason there's a "rational actor" model in IR is because we sometimes think about large national interests rather than get bogged down in details about govts. "What would India do?" is a rational actor question: It presumes India is a single *thing*, and has interests. /3
Also, on a personal level, a "rational" leader is not one who "picks the same things I would." It means someone who is capable of having stable preferences and acting on them - even if they're not YOUR preferences. It means they're not crazy and random. /4
It means transitive preference ordering. If you prefer A>B, and B>C, you will also prefer A>C.
When people here say "rational" they mean "reasonable," a distinction Keith Payne has written very well about.
A B and C might be things you hate, but they are not "irrational."
/5
Nuclear strategy messed up the rational actor discussions, because we assume that ALL people will ALWAYS choose "not nuclear war" if it means "being alive." This is embedded in the basics of nuclear deterrence theorizing. /6
But while we use "rational actor" or "unitary actor" modeling as a cognitive shortcut, a lot of foreign policy analysis is about the LIMITS of that model. So, please stop saying "is he a rational actor" when you mean "is he a reasonable person." They're not the same thing. /7
One last thing: "Rationality" also implies "tethered to reality and capable of processing information." Many leaders who were "irrational" were irrational in this way: Hitler, Saddam. Is that Putin? I don't know. I suspect so, but that's a guess.
Lecture over.
/8
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I don't care about the people making bad-faith "why are you scared of Putin" arguments. But I think the "why not match his aggressiveness" question is a reasonable one and deserves an answer. I can only speak for myself here, obvs.
/1
I am not concerned about "provoking" Putin in the sense of pissing him off. He's already pissed off; that's his natural state now. But this is a true crisis - that is, there's a high risk of general war and an unsustainable situation. /2
The outcome of this crisis may well be that NATO will have to fight. If that happens, so be it. But a crisis is something you try to prevent from getting out of control. You do what you can to defend your interests while not letting a terrible fire become a conflagration. /3
Let me see if I can (exhaustedly) clarify something here.
I am not worried that a direct NATO-Russia confrontation instantly produces WWIII. I am worried that the chaos of war, with heightened alerts will create the space for accidents and huge miscalculations. Same outcome. /1
You're all huffing the THIS IS WORLD WAR II STOP HITLER NOW glue.
But the bigger danger, from a nuclear standpoint, is that it's World War *One*, and will end with a cataclysm that no one expected or wanted - including the Russians because of military planning and mistakes. /2
When the most powerful military alliance in the world wades in against one of the largest nuclear armed states in the world (led by a paranoid), a lot of pieces will be set in motion that a lot of you won't think about until it happens. /3
A quick response - *again* - to the people who think we should get the jump on war “because Putin’s gonna do it anyway.”
There is a world of difference between being ready for war and starting a war. /1
If Putin really wants to declare war, he will, for his own reasons. Let him declare it and be damned; he will lose. But I don’t think he will. So don’t get taken in by his “equivalent of war” bluster. He knows the difference. So does everyone else in the Kremlin. /2
In the end, if Putin wants war, he will have to come to NATO and begin it, and face 30 nations - and more. But if we go to him and shoot first, he will rally his people and army with claims of self-defense.
He may well want this, now that all his other plans are in ruins. /3
I am going to write more about this, but I want to suggest something that I only mentioned briefly on @TheLastWord.
The Russians are going to lose this war no matter what happens.
/1
@TheLastWord That's not to say that they're not going to flatten Ukrainian cities and commit more atrocities. They will. NATO could ride in there tomorrow and that will happen anyway. (Perhaps even sooner and worse if NATO comes in.)
But Putin has blundered beyond recovery now.
/2
Putin could have built the Russian nation into another superpower. He could have gotten by with a "managed" semi-democracy - I expected that. He could have rebuilt Russian military power and the economy and created a giant and powerful state with an educated and tough people. /2
I want to elaborate on something I just said on @11thHour and emphasize a point @McFaul was making as well.
Putin is going to try to hermetically seal Russia off from the world, as if it's the USSR in 1982. He doesn't want Russians to see what's happening in Ukraine. /1
@11thHour@McFaul The first time I was in the Soviet Union was 1983. Entering the USSR was like walking into an isolation chamber. No Western news. Nothing but The State, 24/7.
Putin is going to try to do that again.
He can't.
And that's why this is going to get much, much worse. /2
Putin, as Mike noted, will rely on an old, rural base for his support. (Sound familiar?) He will try to crush everyone who has a smartphone or computer who can get on the internet. He will introduce draconian measures to this end because *he doesn't know what else to do* /3
Appreciate that @MMazarr and @NGrossman81 and others are noting that Mearsheimer's problem is that his theoretical approach is, uh, problematic, but the bigger problem is that Mearsheimer is willing to punditize current events - esp in Russia - so they always fit his theory. /1
In other words, he is a proponent of a theory that a priori rejects the influence of morality and norms, and so he is willing to embrace cases that prove his case. And Russia is happy to oblige, saying "See, we're just a normal great power, like this guy says!" /2
That doesn't make Mearsheimer a stooge, but it *does* put him in the position of being an apologist, even if inadvertently, because if he does otherwise, he has to admit his theory is bunk - and that, he will never do. /3