My previous tweet went viral because it resonated with what most people want today - Putin out of Ukraine (and hopefully in The Hague). Many saw a sign of an off-ramp. Unfortunately, I don't think it is. Some context about how these propagandists shows work in Russia (14).
1/ In the past decade, and especially after 2014, numerous political propagandist talk shows appeared on state television in Russia. They are used to deliver pro-regime narratives to audiences. They focus on criticism of NATO, Ukraine, praising Putin, etc.
2/ But they also represent an innovation in genre. Vera Tolz and Yuriy Teper has come up with the term “agitainment” for it - a mix of ideological messaging and entertaining formats to enhance the effect on the viewer.
3/ As anywhere else, Russian citizens are not attentive to dull “hard news”. This genre makes propaganda more entertaining. Experimenting with this genre, the host Artem Seynin once literally brought a bucket of shit to throw it at a person who posed as "a Ukrainian blogger".
4/ To make these shows entertaining and realistic they have been trying to create some resemblance of diversity. Some guests pose as Ukrainian / American journalists to demonstrate that the show presents a range of voices. The ultimate goal is to ridicule these people.
5/ Soloviev’s show is a different beast. This show is presented as a high-brow show with 3h long discussions on NATO, history, etc. However, it borrows some of the features of other shows - namely, there is a range of voices to make it feel a bit more realistic and diverse.
6/ It is important that all these voices do not deviate from the general frame of criticism of the West and support for the regime. The take-away message in this show is always the same: “Putin is right, the US is our enemy, Ukraine is a puppet of the US”.
7/ In addition to limited diversity, these shows also have to keep some degree of realism. Russian state channels rely on the mix of lies, facts, and skilful framing rather than lies alone. Some discrepancy between television and reality is tolerable, huge discrepancy isn't.
8/ Core Putin supporters have a strong tendency to confirm their priors, but huge discrepancy between television and reality can make even them skeptical. Therefore, it is logical to acknowledge challenges to some extent and incorporate them into the narrative.
9/ Soloviev's guests talked about three challenges which are most obvious and visible for people. The campaign has been lasting for 2w. Even for core Putin supporters it is clear that things did not go as planned. The impact of sanctions and isolation are difficult to ignore.
10/ Responding to changes on the ground has always been a part of propaganda. When issues are not enough pressing (e.g., protests), propagandists ignore them. When they are visible (e.g., Navalny poisoning), state media are forced to report, albeit in a very propagandistic way.
11/ What was unusual here is not that they voiced these opinions. It was the fact that they voiced them after 2 weeks of completely monolithic narrative supporting whatever Putin is doing in Ukraine and crusade against independent media who reported on war differently.
12/ However, they used the word "operation" rather than "war" or "invasion". They supported Putin, his decision to start it, and the goals he announced. They just suggested that it might a good time to end it because (1) costs are too hight and (2) Putin achieved his goals.
13/ This *might* inadvertently demonstrate that such views are possible to some people. Or it might be something else. But based on how Russian propaganda works, it looks like just an attempt to avoid making propaganda look completely unrealistic.
14/ However, I don't want to make any predictions based on prior knowledge after Feb 24 2022.
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