If you think $FTM fud is over (imo it is), this is definitely an underrated farming opportunity. Supply $USDC- $FTM on @SpookySwap and earn almost 50% APR!
Look at this! 125% APR for a $NEAR- $mSOL pool on @Aldrin_Exchange! Such a great opportunity to earn yield if you’re just holding these two in your wallet!
Last but not least, my current favorite play. If you’re holding $KSM, supply it into this stable pool on @Solarbeamio on Moonriver! (Thread on Moonriver coming soon⏱) You’ll earn 62% APR with no Impermanent loss!
TLDR 90% of raised liq -> .98 - 1 concentrated liq range -> thrown into boxFEE backing wen fully in x (boxETH), whilst boxETH minters utilize this deep liq to generate their own ranges (prob above respective boxETH resolve price, 1), while the other 10% -> .9 - 1 range as POL
🧵
As such, the effective boxFEE “backing” @ t(0) will be a min of .88 - .89 assuming boxETH = 1 ETH (depending on net div loss from concentrated LP)
Naturally, protocol fees to boxFEE hodlers (resolve fees, % of stETH yield, POL, etc) will accrue in the form of boxETH backing
In addition, no one’s gonna mint 1 boxETH:1boxFEE bc dilution/exit liq for presalers (who got in @ .1) + permissionless boxFEE v3 LP (will be able to buy at a relative mkt price thru LP) — thus net boxFEE in circ literally cannot go up wen <1 boxETH backing…
Oke last time I talk abt UwUlend for a while, tho imo there’s systemic risk w the bLUSD mkt given oracle price = floor price
In the event that bLUSD mkt premium >10% (90% LTV for stables on UwU), users can borrow bLUSD -> swap thru LP -> val of debt net worth more than collat
🧵
So, for example, say bLUSD floor = 1.1 & mkt price = 1.3.
User deposits 1000 USDC -> borrows 818.18 bLUSD (90% LTV) -> swaps 818.18 bLUSD for 1063 USDC (not including swap/gas costs) -> runs away with debt and/or repeats process
However, AFAIK there’s no way to solely manipulate the mkt price of bLUSD to the upside for this attack w.o being net unprofitable (regardless of bLUSD in UwU mkt/LP ratio) unless the attacker had alrdy planned on buying & hodling a bunch of bLUSD thru the LP to begin with
The premise is to essentially JIT their own LP rebalances (thereby saving on slip), however (once again), for JIT to be net profitable, fees accrued > LP position delta change + flashloan cost if applicable + batched txn gas cost… popsiclefinance.medium.com/popsicle-jit-e…
🧵
In the event that a respective “JIT rebalance” is realized to be net profitable amongst the MEV/JIT community - congrats, you’ve got competition (2-3% of fees atm)
If not, and they’re JITing for the sole purpose of net lower rebalancing costs at the expense of unprofitable JIT…
… they may have saved on rebalancing slip costs, however they’re naturally taking a loss within this process, thus “any profits will go back to the protocol” will simply be a loss kek
If u thought Sifu FULLY controlling the $SIFU oracle & borrowing w 70% LTV was bad…
Turns out there’s another yet-to-launch “placeholder” Sifu-native tkn called SifuM, of which Sifu HARDCODED TO $10 WHILST CONTROLLING 500k TKNS -> used as collat to borrow USDT w 70% LTV LMFAOO
Btw if u wanna see some hilariously brainwashed ppl, check out the uWuLend discord discord.com/invite/sBCmVSe…
BUT WAIT, there’s more
Sifu & Co have proposed to “turn Wonderland into an org that serves its tkn holders”, aka turn it into a 2 & 10 authoritarian structured fund, bc “there is a high risk of malicious actors carrying out governance attacks in an effort to totalize the system”