TLDR 90% of raised liq -> .98 - 1 concentrated liq range -> thrown into boxFEE backing wen fully in x (boxETH), whilst boxETH minters utilize this deep liq to generate their own ranges (prob above respective boxETH resolve price, 1), while the other 10% -> .9 - 1 range as POL
🧵

https://twitter.com/catinaboxfi/status/1628789439097872394

As such, the effective boxFEE “backing” @ t(0) will be a min of .88 - .89 assuming boxETH = 1 ETH (depending on net div loss from concentrated LP)

Naturally, protocol fees to boxFEE hodlers (resolve fees, % of stETH yield, POL, etc) will accrue in the form of boxETH backing

Ayy looks like the $cvxCRV/CRV pool is finally migrating to v2 lfg

https://twitter.com/convexfinance/status/1609719315317637122

This makes me wonder — wat feed have money mkts/CDPs (Rari/Abra iirc) been using to price $cvxCRV all this time?

LETS GOOO AJ BROWN Was literally abt to tweet how bad the Eagles offense looks w.o Hurts (still may be the case but we good now)

Oke last time I talk abt UwUlend for a while, tho imo there’s systemic risk w the bLUSD mkt given oracle price = floor price

In the event that bLUSD mkt premium >10% (90% LTV for stables on UwU), users can borrow bLUSD -> swap thru LP -> val of debt net worth more than collat
🧵 So, for example, say bLUSD floor = 1.1 & mkt price = 1.3.

User deposits 1000 USDC -> borrows 818.18 bLUSD (90% LTV) -> swaps 818.18 bLUSD for 1063 USDC (not including swap/gas costs) -> runs away with debt and/or repeats process

Incredibly overhyped

The premise is to essentially JIT their own LP rebalances (thereby saving on slip), however (once again), for JIT to be net profitable, fees accrued > LP position delta change + flashloan cost if applicable + batched txn gas cost…
popsiclefinance.medium.com/popsicle-jit-e…
🧵

https://twitter.com/sr_eth/status/1608179906437087233

In the event that a respective “JIT rebalance” is realized to be net profitable amongst the MEV/JIT community - congrats, you’ve got competition (2-3% of fees atm)

If not, and they’re JITing for the sole purpose of net lower rebalancing costs at the expense of unprofitable JIT…

If u thought Sifu FULLY controlling the $SIFU oracle & borrowing w 70% LTV was bad…

Turns out there’s another yet-to-launch “placeholder” Sifu-native tkn called SifuM, of which Sifu HARDCODED TO $10 WHILST CONTROLLING 500k TKNS -> used as collat to borrow USDT w 70% LTV LMFAOO

https://twitter.com/barryfried1/status/1601856243546595329

Btw if u wanna see some hilariously brainwashed ppl, check out the uWuLend discord
discord.com/invite/sBCmVSe…

Utter word salad from Daniele

What he fails to realize is that MEV bots CURRENTLY perform JIT on stable-stable V3 pools whenever economical (ie if fees accrued > LP position delta change + batched txn gas cost)

Given majority of V3 stable volume flows thru .01% pools…
🧵👇 If he/Popsicle were to enter the JIT game rn in an attempt to siphon fees off stable LPers -> disincentivize V3 liquidity provision -> Curve stableswap mkt share⬆️, they’d be in the same position as other MEV bots rn (JIT wen economical) — nothing to FURTHER increase JIT

Wake up babe, new Daniele comeback arc pump just dropped Wen frog nation reunion

Umm…what??

Vires Finance has a 40% liq fee/bonus & 75% liq threshold for ETH + 50% liq fee/bonus & 65% liq threshold for BTC…😭

Doesn’t this make liquidations w ETH/BTC as collat impossible, given the net amnt of debt repayed vs collat lost results in LTV above threshold??
🧵 For example, say we have $100 of ETH collat & >$75 of x debt, thus position eligible for liquidation (liq threshold = 75%)

Given max 50% of the debt within an account can be repayed (like Aave), say a liquidator payed off $37.5 worth of debt (50%)

Lotta good yield opps w @Balancer weighted multi-tkn LPs atm, so thought it would be a gud idea to breakdown how impermanent loss (IL)/rebalancing *actually* occurs within a specific pool

(Math below + IL calc @ end of thread)🧵👇 First of all, unlike traditional x*y=k AMMs (where there‘s obvs only two (ever-rebalancing) assets in the pool), we calculate the invariant V by multiplying LP asset balances relative to their weight in the LP, according to the function below:

Can’t we j accept UniV3 LPing as a new financial primitive that provides customizable, ever-accruing amplified short gamma & long IV properties (as well as potential avg-out limit orders whilst earning fees/not paying slip & fees) + concentrated swap liq for traders? When ppl say “UniV3 LPers consistently lose money”, u need to understand that (assuming no rebalancing, which yes, I agree is a grey area) LPs have a “permanent”payoff according to their tick range.

Woah, Aave lowkey freezing a whole bunch of V2 Mainnet mkts in a few mins, most notably CRV, sUSD, LUSD & GUSD

https://twitter.com/napgener/status/1596932768885518338

(No, Aave isn’t a “worthless protocol that’ll go to zero” lmao)

Continuously borrow substantial amnts of CRV w USDC collat, pushing U up + high LTV -> dump borrowed CRV, pushing price down -> attempt to liquidate whale @ .26/CRV, whom currently makes up 90% of CRV supplied -> bad debt accrual/CRV damps further -> Avraham profit??

https://twitter.com/lookonchain/status/1594940438204411904

@avi_eisen this u

The new & improved @sentimentxyz lend/borrow rate model + 80% origination fee reduction is now live!

Some (v lowkey) juicy arb/yield opps have spawned👀

Let’s take a mathematical dive into the new rate model, as well as uncover some potential lucrative current yield strats 🧵👇 Oke…so what did the rate model look like before?
Y r borrow rates so cheap atm?

Well, you see, rates used to follow a pretty hefty non-linear model, thus causing most (currently available) yield strategies to be uneconomical w the slightest bit of mkt utilization…

Beautiful $43 $GUSD arb with $563k 🤓
etherscan.io/tx/0xf6ca05901… I swear this shit gonna be at like 1000% later today lmao (esp if ppl keep pulling liq)

Amazing how many low IQ takes are coming from this, so let me break it down for u:

1945 = the year Hitler was found/blew himself up/end of Holocaust & WW2

Hitler = piece of shit
Hitler = vegetarian

SBF = also a piece of shit
SBF = also a vegetarian

https://twitter.com/vitalikbuterin/status/1592454899434147841

In other words, what he’s (obvs) implying is that SBF/Hitler being vegetarians (or any extremely irrelevant “belief” for that matter) had absolutely nothing to do with the underlying motive/outcome, thus we shouldn’t group it as such (drugs are obvs a diff story)

Uhhh HOLY SHIT

https://twitter.com/barryfried1/status/1589854274758258690

The culprit

Fun fact - users w 8:1 risk:hedge ratio in @y2kfinance $MIM vaults are automatically receiving a positive ROI regardless of depeg — w.o including $y2k IFO rewards accrued during the deposit period!

If no depeg -> 1.02% ROI = 53.04% APR
If depeg -> 7.73% ROI = 401.96% APR
🧵👇 Note: assuming current price/ETH + the illiquid $y2k IFO price of $2.5

So what does the math look like?

TVL of MIM vaults = 192.42 ETH/hedge ($305k) & 1751.85 ETH/risk ($2.78m)

Personal $$ deposited = 1 ETH/hedge & 8 ETH/risk

% of vault(s) TVL = .519%/hedge & .456%/risk

> Price/ETH = 2k

> User A sets V3 tick range btwn 1.5k & 2.5k

> Price moves up/down within set range, earning LP fees

> After x extended period of time, price/ETH once again = 2k

> profit (hOw iS tHaT pOsSibLe?)

Apparently being short gamma is inherently unprofitable 🤦‍♂️
🧵👇

https://twitter.com/Bob_Baxley/status/1589073808136474624

Here’s a diff example:

User B wants to take profits thru setting a “DCA out limit order” whilst earning LP fees & avoiding paying fees/slippage (i.e concentrated tick range j above current mkt price, or even gradually thru a wider range)

https://twitter.com/barryfried1/status/1570046616756797440

Great news @y2kfinance IFO enjoyooors — @dex_chen_V and I built a Δ Neutral $Y2K farming/overall ROI calc relative to personal hedge/risk vault exposure! (vs total ratio)

Pls note that “probability of depeg” is a rough estimate, NFA :)
docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d… Edit:

Red Inputs -> personal exposure to vaults/overall ratio

Price/ETH -> gauging $Y2K farming APRs vs total USD value of ETH btwn both vaults

“Epoch 1” M7 & F7 -> edit this no. Epoch (between 1 & 4) to automatically update $Y2K rewards according to the epoch at hand

Hmm

Current $MIM price = $.9967

Current MIM3CRV pool ratio = 85/15%

@y2kfinance $MIM strike = $.975

MIM3CRV pool ratio needed to hit $.975 = 96.6/3.4% (per equation below, due to 2000 A)

Arbi CL MIM deviation/heartbeat = .5%/24hrs

Current Risk:Hedge ratio = 83/17% In other words, w current Risk:Hedge ratio, Risk depositors will earn 16.15% ROI if MIM3CRV ratio doesn’t drop drastically btwn Nov 7-14th (ofc there’s other MIM liq, tho Mainnet Curve is the main source) + 22k $Y2K per risk vault (IFO) * $2.5/tkn = share of $55k (154% APR atm)