How Diego @Simeone’s #AtleticoMadrid knocked Manchester United out of the Champions League through attacking in a 3-5-2 and left-sided counter-attacks... 🧐🧵
United were set up in a 4-2-3-1, up against Atlético’s 5-3-2 defensive block. The hosts built around Atlético’s front two and progressed down the flanks. A strong spell in the first half came as a result of Ronaldo dropping out to combine between a full-back and winger... 🧐🧵
When Ronaldo drifted out to the left, left-back Alex Telles was more aggressive with his positioning. He overlapped to support Jadon Sancho, who made direct runs in behind, especially after moving into the inside channel... 🧐🧵
Despite United progressing forwards they lacked a presence in the penalty area. Even when their wide build-up managed to pull one of Atlético’s centre-backs across, creating significant gaps in the back line, United had little to offer in the way of movements in behind... 🧐🧵
After their changes, the home side moved to a 4-4-2, with Cavani joining Ronaldo up front. Pogba and Matic made up the midfield two, with Sancho and Rashford supported by Telles and Dalot. Atlético dropped into a 5-4-1 block which further crowded the centre of the pitch... 🧐🧵
To limit Atlético’s wide progress, United forced the ball out to the away side’s wing-back, locked the ball along the touchline, and covered the passing options back inside. To begin with, at least, they did this very well... 🧐🧵
Once Atlético pushed their wing-backs higher, United’s wider press was less effective, with significant gaps appearing between the hosts’ wingers and full-backs. The home side then defended with a 4-4-2 block, while Atlético attacked in a 3-5-2 shape... 🧐🧵
Atleti had a 3v2 midfield overload, and this was enhanced when Griezmann dropped deep, which gave Maguire a decision to make: follow Griezmann into midfield or leave the Frenchman free to turn? He chose to stay tight, and in doing so left a gap in the right inside channel... 🧐🧵
As Atlético used a low block for longer periods in the second half, they focused on incisive counter-attacks when they regained possession. They attempted to target the wide areas, with Félix and Griezmann dropping to connect into the overlapping wing-backs... 🧐🧵
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Spain used a 4-3-3 structure and built play patiently from the back, despite Germany pressing aggressively from their 4-2-3-1. They moved the ball around the back line to isolate Thomas Müller, before a centre-back stepped out with the ball into midfield... 🧐🧵
Olmo continued to move inside and Asensio dropped deep, in the process pulling Süle out of his position in Germany’s back line. This helped Spain to build out from the back and get around Germany’s increasingly effective high press... 🧐🧵
Traditionally, full-backs are the widest players in a back four, and as a result they attack and defend mostly in the wide areas. However, full-backs who move inside into central spaces are known as ‘inverted full-backs’. This movement adds an extra presence centrally... ↩️🧐
Although Pep Guardiola is the coach most associated with the inverted full-back, Johan Cruyff used them with Barcelona many years before. Then, he often converted the 4-3-3 into a 3-4-3 diamond, with one full-back inverting into central midfield... ↩️🧐
Manchester United were set up in a 4-2-3-1 shape, but Fred pushed forward from the double pivot to become a number 8 and give them a stronger attacking presence in central midfield. Bruno Fernandes then adapted his positioning, moving into the left inside channel... 🧐🧵
The hosts eventually pushed both full-backs higher, primarily working around the outside of Tottenham’s wing-backs. United’s wingers then came inside, with the freedom to rotate with Fred and Fernandes, as long as both inside channels were always occupied... 🧐🧵
Barcelona were set up in a 4-3-3, against a Madrid 4-4-2 defensive block. Torres moved inside to support centre-forward Aubameyang. De Jong and Pedri widened to support through the inside channels, with Busquets left as the single pivot ahead of the two centre-backs... 🧐🧵
Busquets dropped into defence to draw one of Madrid’s central midfielders up, and Pedri drifted wider to drag the other out. This often left De Jong as the free man to receive in the inside channel when Barcelona’s back line could access him... 🧐🧵
4-4-2 is made up of three distinct lines. The back four including two centre-backs and two full-backs. Ahead of them, a midfield four features two players in the middle and one on each side. Then the front two in attack who provide both height and goalscoring threat... 4️⃣4️⃣2️⃣🧵
In the 1950s, Viktor Maslov developed another variation of the 4-2-4, in which the two wingers dropped back alongside the two central midfielders. So originated the 4-4-2, which worked to overload opposition midfields with traditionally fewer numbers... 4️⃣4️⃣2️⃣🧵