That reason is more visible with this still from an earlier video @RALee85 posted.
The majority of the Russian truck's cargo bed is made of wood planks.
This truck was hit by a small mortar shell that blew apart the wood. twisted down & severed the steel frame holding them. 2/
The choice of a wooden truck bed was one made for cost reasons.
Wood is cheaper than steel.
Plus if your industrial quality tolerances are bad, it is easier to cut a wood plank to match than make another steel frame with the right fit. 3/
The US Army builds it trucks and trailers with sheet steel beds for durability, world wide deployability and long, usable, life-cycle reasons.
The US Army uses its trucks a lot in lieu of the Railways.
So it puts them to really hard use over a 20 year service life. 4/
This emphasis on durability at a higher costs per truck means things in combat, good things for the crew & US Army.
Wood shatters and becomes high velocity fragments when subjected to blast effects.
Steel doesn't. It bends. 5/
The trucks Russian uses generally operate at colder northern latitudes where wood is a good cost-design trade off.
America covers more north-south latitudes than Russia & the US Army has no clue where a President will send them next. So metal truck beds are the design choice 6/
Vehicle design is always a trade off of performance features for unit cost.
Vehicles appropriate for one nation's military won't be for another.
The problem for Russian conscripts in Ukraine is the cheaper Russian truck bed design choice is helping to kill them.
7/end
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There is so much to object to here that I'm going to restate some basic design observations on the FP-5 to clarify how the Russian reflexive control data fed AI slop that is polluting public discussions of the FP-5.
1. The FP-5 Flamingo is about four times the launch weight of a BGM-109 Tomahawk (i.e. ~13,200 lb), and 2-3 times the range (i.e. ~1,620 nmi) while carrying twice the warhead mass (i.e. ~2,000 lb).
2/
2. The FP-5 design concept is modelled on the USAF MGM-13 Mace GLCM as Fire Point told Ukrainian military analysts - but designed with modern technology to be extremely cheap to make (claimed 1/6 the cost of a Tomahawk - likely not counting the engine cost).
The first thing that needs to be pointed out is that in 2026 Ukraine has not only replicated, but likely exceeded, the 2018 capabilities of the USAF's Stand-off Munitions Activity Center (SMAC) at at Barksdale AFB.
Electronic warfare is always a "saving throw" with an expiration date for the defense.
Plus no one in the world, since 1989, has invested in enough mobile guns for robust AA-combined arms to screw up the simple arithmetic of a saturation drone/missile attacks.
2/
Russia burned out Ukraine's considerable stocks of 5V55 SAMs (~3,300 rounds), 9M83 SAMs (~1,000) and 9M38 SAMs (~800) by repeat saturation attacks.
Ukraine returns the favor. This is not that difficult to grasp.
Saturation attacks were central to legacy Soviet doctrine.
3/
We have just seen over Moscow today - with Ukrainian drones - the Russo-Ukrainian War's version of the RAF’s first 1,000-bomber raid of World War II, codenamed Operation Millennium, which took place on the night of May 30–31, 1942.
Operation Millennium, marked the first tactical deployment of the RAF "bomber stream".
That is, the tactic of flying a dense, tightly timed formation along a narrow corridor to overwhelm German radar networks and anti-aircraft defenses of the Kammhuber line. 2/3
When I look at the design of the air defense rings around Moscow.🧐⬇️
I can't help but think Ukraine used a 2026 "Drone Stream' to saturate one sector of these ring defenses like the RAF did to the Kammhuber line.
The Soviets built their industrial plants to minimize transportation impact on its railway system, and later, it's trucking.
This 2013 time stamped Jon Parshall presentation on WW2 US vs German Vs Soviet tank industries underlines this Soviet reality
2/
In the 1950's and 1960's the CIA and Strategic Air Command (SAC) Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) targeting planners discovered this quirk of the Soviet centralized economy.
Via a question to @grok of Cities of 500K(+) in OWA Drone range:
"Distances are approximate great-circle (straight-line/air) from Havana or central Cuba; actual drone paths could vary due to routing, wind, altitude, & launch site (e.g., closer to Florida from western Cuba) 2/
All listed cities are well under 2,700 km.Florida and Southeast (easiest reach)
Miami, FL (~370 km / 230 miles) — Well within range.
Jacksonville, FL (~1,000–1,100 km) — Within range.
Tampa/St. Petersburg area (metro >500k in cities/urban) — ~400–500 km.