And we can simply execute with : `.\SrumECmd.exe -f .\SRUDB.dat --csv .`
You should get a bunch of CSV files
I tend to prioritise the following ones:
- SrumECmd_NetworkUsages_Output.csv
- SrumECmd_AppResourceUseInfo_Output.csv
- SrumECmd_Unknown*_Output.csv (occasionally)
But maybe you'll find use from the others?
Let's take a look at the results. I'll be using Excel because (again) I am a bad person.
SRUM seems to write once an hour and at shutdown, so don’t trust the timestamps as complete gospel.
This one is a real mixed bag. Sometimes it’s gold, other times trash. It will show runtime with okayish accuracy
I tend to sort by shortest runtime when looking here.
U͟s͟i͟n͟g͟ I͟R͟L͟
I had a case where an alert claimed some kind of process injection.
But I couldn’t find any other evidence to triangulate that finding. Maybe SRUM can help?
From SRUM's CSV formatted data, let's zero in on that window of time from the alert (23:52)
ScreenConnect - a remote management tool - appeared during our window of time.
I graphed out all of the ScreenConnect data SRUM held, with a focused on bytes in and out.
And look at the that wild spike in network communication?!
Drilling into the specific ScreenConnect spike, we can see it’s recorded 𝘢𝘯 𝘩𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘳 than our initial alert time
I considered this suspicious nonetheless for three reasons:
1. When baselined, that colossal byte in/out was anomalous compared to previous activity
2.
We already contextualised this window of time as suspicious, from the initial alert.
3. We know that SRUM timestamps are not always accurate. Neither are alerts sometimes! An hour's flexibility is more than satisfactory to connect the potential sus activity.
I then initiated a ScreenConnect investigation, to see if anything here would contextualise the initial process inject alert
But that's for another day!
I hope this thread has brought SRUM to your attention, and equipped you with a foundation to explore SRUM's data yourself 💪
For cyber security investigations, internal silos will make or break your efforts 🧱🧱🧱
I'll show you the power from a LACK of siloing, with a piping hot, fresh @HuntressLabs case @xorJosh and I worked
🧵🧶
What are 'silos'.
@keydet89 educated me on the industry problem where departments cannot easily share findings; a threat intel department doesn't have a way to share findings with DFIR department, for example.
IMO, Silos occur when data & people cannot be circulated easily
We aren't perfect by any means at @HuntressLabs, but it's a testament to our founders, engineers, devs (etc) that our infrastructure sets us up for success.
It's difficult for analysts NOT to share reports and data by default; our infrastructure & culture doesn't foster silos
I wanted to share some findings about RDP, Network Layer Authentication, LogonTypes and brute forcing 🔭
Recently, we perused some EventID 4625s (login failures) originating from public IPv4s brute forcing...
🧵
I kept finding LogonType 3s (network)
However only RDP was externally exposed on the machine, which usually records LogonType 10....
When this has happened before, I usually just assume its Windows jank and continue with my investigation 🤷♂️
But this time, I wanted to know WHY
The wise @DaveKleinatland suggested Network Layer Authentication (NLA) would explain this:
"
NLA takes place before the session is started... without NLA things can be exposed before any sort of authentication.... like domain name, usernames, last logged on user, etc
"
- Dave 🧙♂️
In a recent intrusion, we identified a threat actor had compromised the Windows login process, and siphoned cleartext credentials - using a technique known as NPPSPY
@0gtweet’s NPPSPY was fascinating to dissect and remediate.
Our article couldn’t show what this cleartext credential gathering looked like on the compromised machine, but we recreated the electrifying end product
IOCs and Behavior
- T1003
- Values under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\NetworkProvider\Order
◦For our case: logincontroll
- Unexplained entries in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<here>\NetworkProvider
◦For our case: logincontroll
Let's chat about how to unravel Cobalt Strike and deny the adversary further access
As ALWAYS, I am showing you data so fresh out the kitchen it hasn't even been cleared by ThreatOps Director @MaxRogers5 👀🧑🍳 🧵
Cobalt Strike can often trigger AMSI alerts in Defender. The frustrating thing about AMSI alerts is that they don't tell you what the offending activity WAS.
The alert here was PowerShell based....so let's dig a lil deeper
Go collect C:\System32\winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell%4Operational.evtx , and go get my favourite tool - Chainsaw.