1/ My new piece in on Russian nuclear decision making is out in @WarOnTheRocks In it, I argue that Russian idiosyncrasies are useful to discuss potential Russian nuclear employment in Ukraine. Thread 1/7 warontherocks.com/2022/03/unders…
2/ This probably remains a local war in the Russian lexicon, one “with a few states pursuing limited political-military objectives”. The nuclear signaling we have seen so far is all oriented to deterring it from moving to the next level: a regional war.
3/ A regional war is one which would implicate for example NATO. In such wars, nuclear weapons use would be much more likely, as they may quickly become existential to Russia. This explains why Russia is now doing what it can to deter NATO from intervening.
4/ One uncertainty is whether Putin believes the potent Western economic, political, and military response could become existential threats. As of now, seemingly not. But the question is how desperate Putin will get amid domestic and international pressure.
5/ In the event that he would move toward the nuclear option, he would likely be forced to consult with his Defense Minister or Chief of General Staff. This is my estimate, but @russianforces have weighed in on this too
6/ What would they tell him? IMO they would not advice nuclear use now: it would leave Russia with few options left for further escalation. Other analysts such as @mikekofman have also hinted to Russians likely reserving capabilities for such scenarios
7/ Finally, useful to delineate two analytically distinct scenarios for nuclear employment: in Ukraine and nuclear escalation if this turns into a direct NATO-Russia confrontation (much more likely). This is not clearly delineated in many pieces out there.
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