Thread by @tribunaltweets

Good morning and welcome to DAY 10, the FINAL day of #ForstaterTribunal, the case of Maya Forstater Vs CGD.

This is @Wommando live tweeting, and today we're expecting Ben Cooper QC to give his closing submissions.

Catch up here:
threadreaderapp.com/thread/1506265…

Abbreviations:
BC = Ben Cooper QC, counsel for
MF = Maya Forstater - Claimant
AP = Anya Palmer, assisting BC
OD = Olivia Dobbie, counsel for the respondents
EJ = Employment judge, leading the panel
Panel = any one of the 3 members

Respondents:
LE = Luke Easley, Director of Finance
AG: Amanda Glassman, Chief Operating officer
MP: Mark Plant, Director of Development
MA: Masood Ahmed, President of CGD

Others:
EM = Ellen Mackenzie
OB = Owen Barder
CH = Cindy Huang
RS = Ruth Szabo
IM = Ian Mitchell
HS = Holly Shulman
VJ = Vijaya Ramachandran

Further abbrevs:

QI = Quantum Impact
VF = Visiting Fellow
WORIADS = Worthy of Respect In A Democratic Society

We begin.
The clerk reminds the court of ground rules and what to do should connection issues arise. Requests people mute themselves and this hearing should not be recorded in any way.

EJ: I reiterate the request to mute mics and also remind everyone there is a Restricted Reporting Order in place in force and it's a criminal offence to name individuals who referred to as complainants 1-4.

BC: start by saying a few things about claimants protected belief. The EAT judgement conclusion and summarise the claimants belief. We extracted a few aspects of that in our subs.

You'll see that we identify part of the claimants belief of biological sex and it is reality...and GI cannot change biological sex. Its not recognised by witnesses this is an important core protected belief. Sex matters and sometime should take presidence

BC (cont): it's a core and protecteded part of claimants belief and may be upsetting for some males who identify as women. It may be upsetting to ae ppl to be told not to use female spaces that's not a reason to compromise women's safety

BC: there's not a statement in EAt that to make that statement is ignited or transphobic or inappropriate.

BC: you must consider belief in their entirety and whether a part. Whether statement is a manifestation of belief or objectively offensive or transphobuc. You need to have those beliefs in mind.

BC: OD had a tendency to say 'holding' a belief, in EA 2010, a ref to a person with a partic PC, ref of a person 'OF' a belief. Q determined on authorities whether PC and gow far it extends to a manifestation or expression. Not limited to holding, it is OF the belief

BC: the PC of GC, first two points, 1, GC are not inherrantly offensive or transphobic, they do not involve paying moral judgement of trans people or denying their feelings. They're based know different held value judgements about sex and gender

BC: 2nd point is as there is a misunderstanding of GC belief, they are a vulnerable group easily stigmatised and at risk of unjustified complaint who are offended by views

BC: [cites case Miller - reading ] the judge says the topic Mr Miller was tweeting and plainly public matter of interest...where it falls into that category it requires strong protection.

BC: Dame Sharp identifies opposing views of the balance of harms that I put to a number of witnesses. She expressly says these are matters of public interest and in NO way that saying Self ID is risk to a women is fearmongering

BC: many women supported Mr Millers claim. This shows the pressure on Kathleen Stock and cancel culture and fear of expressing views. The claimant said in reposnse to QI report there is climate of fear and shut down of the debate

BC: Stocks describes that twitter is stifling debate...some involved in debate label those with different views as transphobic which they are NOT

BC: speaks of Kathleen's stocks she points, one being misgendering, note the Claimant says she will not misgender. Stock describes utterances as observable facts.

BC reads Kathleen stock and Stonewalls descriptions. DAme Sharp is adopting and her citation of SW definition indicates SW itself, defines transphobia in a way that would encompass the NON transphobic propositions by Prof Stock

BC: I invite you to consider tweets under consideration in Miller case, described as opaque but nevertheless help by court of appeal and endorsed. I'd ask you to contrast claimants tweets next to Mr Miller.

BC: Prof stock evidence demonstrated how some ppl in debate who quick to judge others as transphobic, when they are not, and simply hold a different view.

BC: particular contact of miller's case was police action and analysing risk and impact for ppl with GC beliefs. 'Mr Miller belong to a group easily stigmatised, member of a class of people affected by this

BC: GC views are not inherrantly offensive and those with PC of GC belief at risk because of prejudice and stigmatisation that misunderstands their belief as being transphobic. That is the nature of belief in question.

VC: in light of subs yesterday I need to go back to acceptance and tolerance. The prohibitions on harassment in EA are concerned with quality of treatment. They require employers NOT to pick and choose on any PCs in the act.

BC: the reason for this [ashers case cited] Baroness Hail judgement. (Reads) 'it is deeply humiliating to deny someone a service or employment because of race, gender, etc'.

BC: the prohibitions in EA are concerned with PCs as to treat differently is humiliating and affront to dignity. There is nor hierarchy of pCs and must what's applied must work for all. Its not a PC we must tolerate while holding our noses,no less valuable than the colour of skin

BC: the fact some are prejudice of GC and are too ready to take offence is all more reason to enforce protection more rigorously and not to pander. Ca you imagine a sub been made, like OD, that CGD should have a right not to associate with a person with a skincolour...

BC: and etc, the submission is exactly the same as this. The reason the sun is flawed as it would set to one side the core concept of tolerance. We have EA because people are prejudice.

BC: EA tries to prevent differential treatment, the principle of tolerance is at the heart of EA. Particularly refs to Miller...which emphasis the properistions that is a Democratic Society, diversity of belief and view is essential

BC: the role of the state is NOT to facilitate the exclusion of ppl with different beliefs but require them to tolerate each other.

BC: in Azhers case its about enforcing tolerance not pandering to prejudice. An employer has a right NOT to be compelled to associate with beliefs of which they are uncomfortable.

BC: That's a pretty dangerous sub for respondents. Involves premise the reason to dissociate wad beliefs of claimant not the manner they were expressed. It was a complete misreading of Ashers.

Bc: stated in the case, 'actively participate'. 'It is not a right to eliminate an association with a person who expresses belief' and employers have a right to do that.

BC: Any belief the employer doesn't like, employer can say this and faced with keeping all beliefs to themselves ...(distraction online)
Pick up Ashers again.

BC: Hale reviews the prudence in compelled speech (reads) and refers to [case cited] and refer to [case cited]. I emphasise this phrase ' this was sufficiently active participation.

BC: All of these involve 'active participation' and the question of compelled speech as to whether it is 'active'.

BC: (reading case) the fact a Baker provides a cake for witches doesn't mean baker support witches. OD suggests mere Association is enough.

Someone being compelled to speak, others might understand they don't support the msg. Point she is considering is not nebulous Association, she is saying someone has been compelled to speak and Q is whether it matters they might NOT to support it

BC: the fact that ppl would think of that association...is by the way...what matters is by being required to produce cake they were required to produce msg they disagreed.

BC: Ashers DOES NOT say mere Association with ppl expressing belief amounts to compelled speech. It says ppl can be required to actively participate in the expression of manifestation if belief. It has absolutely NO relevance to this case.

BC: OD can list as many as she likes but there is no refusal to adopt Claimant's belief, to publish blogs...the claim is all about the treatment of the claimant, the discrimination and nothing in Ashers is relevant

BC: we've proposed a structure and suggest that you start as an ordinary direct discrimination case, not the nuances of article 10 and 8.
It's our case that if you approach this on ordinary direct disc principles you can both start and finish your analysis.

BC: these will be familiar with you as they are the ordinary principles. The evidence supports an inference that all detriment complained... were collective decisions by core group of MA MP EM AG and LE.

BC: They were influenced by prejudice in Miller. Substantive GC beliefs were transphibic. Evidence supports significant and primary part.

BC: The detriment to which claimant complains were all part of a reaction to her beliefs on this subject and less favourable that Respondents would treat any other belief.

BC: you can't choose just to treat the things you like in the same way. Our primary case, the comparator is someone expressing a different belief in same forums and equivalent rone and manner.

BC: that the respondents did not rreat any other belief in this way is clear, whether they would, I would highlight in particular the culture, OB talking of vasectomy. Clearly would not treat views of sexual conduct in same way they did the Claimant

BC: OB talking of circumcision being child abuse is another example. Robust term 'child abuse'. Another example, the report called 'fake news'...plainly robust and one might say ridiculing language on twitter and attacking others in the field

BC: OB publically criticises claimants views on manels..clearly they don't view their behaviour as they did the claimants. If you look at they're more sensible phase, early on, AG looked issue...

BC: AG said she was concerned about interfering with twitter...what they're doing with claimant is singling her out and less favourable to her because of her beliefs. If we look at core principles that is the end of this case.

BC: I emphasis a fact finding exercise which focuses carefully on respondents reasons for doing things, in light of material they considering at that stage, OD had a magpie like tendency to highlight claimants words to stitch together a picture she wanted to paint.

Bc: it needs to be carefully considered exercise. I will focus on what I suggest 4 keys that unlock core issues in this case 1st, meeting between claimant and MP.

BC: that meeting it was common ground she would not be taken in as employee and reasons given cast light backwards as why indication changed. Cast light forwards about the reliability and credibility of respondents

BC: the claimant pleaded in terms the meeting MP told her they'd changed their minds and proposed consultancy on the gates. MP made it clear was about tweets.

BC: In grounds of resistance, the respondents denied in terms which I have established are not true despite the witness dislike of that characterisation.

BC: evidence you now have is claimants account which is consistent with what she was telling other ppl when she was emailing about this topic.

BC: then you have MP on day 9 he can't recall one way or another whether he said what claimant said he said to her.

BC: you are all but bound to accept claimant on that meeting. You then see later MP briefing RS, 'the controversy surrounding her position had no bearing'

BC: once you've accepted MP decision not to make employee, then the conclusion is inevitable this briefing on repositioning, it follows what follows is spin and deliberately misleading

BC: casting light backwards, we have glimpses from docs of what was going on. If you didn't have this key to unlock it you could just about stitch that together, but from the meeting on 1st...

BC: the only sensible reading of that material given the secret way its address is there was deliverate effort to redirect funding away from claimant to provide pretext for abandoning relationship

BC: why would she be told it was because of tweets when said that wasn't the controversy. Bear in mind MP in Nov has said relationships are broken because of tweets. What hope had she of being a fellow or further work?

BC: what was the point of the whole process and what effect did MF have on decisions. We knew in Nov the relationships were irrecoverable broken so all the other stuff is not what this is about.

BC: This all about principle knee jerkreaction of Washington office that found MF unacceptable.

I asked MP which ppl were offended by MF, I asked if EM had involvement and MP could not remember. Look for what MF said and how she said it none you will find.

BC: They've taken a decision NOT to cl her. The absence of EM evidence is v important. Mp confirmed that one person said 'you can't say that'. Inconsistency between MP and AH, MP gives us a clearer reaction that was expressed at SPG meetings.

BC: MA spun most of this and was forced to abandon his distinction. Then you have MP on day 10 saying the action taken against MF was driven by misunderstanding in Washington office of her beliefs.

BC: second key of MP evidence and gives the lie to spin they now seek to put in case, it was the manner and expression of MF tweets.

BC: third key is express reasons as to why claimant wasn't given fair opportunity to respond to specific concerns of language. You always had QI report for deliberately not putting specifics to MF.

BC: But MP said expressly on day 9, he didn't want MF explaining herself in response to concerns as it would aggravate Washington.

BC: Putting together QI and MP is C was deliberately denied ability to respond about language and tweets because A) entrenched prejudice in Washington b) because wad thought nothing she could say could defend without aggravating.

BC: Essentially that is the no debate position identified in Miller. Anything she might say would be offensive and should NOt be given opp to say it. The 4th key is collection of emails form MP

BC: (missed) by far the best and contemporous evidence and explicitly it was the claimant's offence.

BC: the real reason is the only thing the aiming change was her views and not consistent to CGD...these emails make my case that the reasons were the claimant's beliefs.

BC: There was a less detrimental way of managing open to respondents and their intransigence meant that line was not taken. Shall we break there?
EJ: yes we resume at 11.30

This @wommando signing off and passing over to my esteemed colleague @goodyactually who will take us to the end of the hearing today.

Thank you @wommando!

This is Jenny Smith @GoodyActually - after the break Ben Cooper will complete his closing arguments. A reminder that Olivia Dobbie for the respondents yesterday reserved some time in case she wished to speak further after that.

[We resume]

BC: Will now address "separability" - the way the Equality Act is to be applied in the context of the HR Convention. This may not be entirely familiar to the Tribunal.

BC: Headlines are: this question of separability between belief and expression. It engages articles 9 and 10. It is about expanding the scope of the EA2010 protections re 9 and 10, not about limiting them.

BC: If we get to this point, you will have found that the detriments were not to do with the belief but were consequences of expression. But you cannot even so do the exercise OD suggested, of picking out snippets.

BC: Any analysis of separability has to be about whether anything complained of can actually be separated from the belief.

BC: Will only look at one case here but full authorities in bundle.
BC: Argument here is that action taken against a claimant is not dissociable from the belief. Judge is clear that separability is different from indissociability.

BC: If you were to find that CGD's only reason for actions against claimant was offence taken by their employees and that offense was itself discriminatory, this is where we would rely on indissociability, but that's not the same as separability

BC: I said articles 9 and 10 engaged. Authority here: re submission that article 10 not engaged; Judge says not sure it's as clear as that, and does not resolve question. But clear judge is *not* saying Art10 has no relevance.

BC: Art9 very clearly protects expressions closely linked and integral to a protected belief

BC: gives example of belief in traditional family and points to manifestations in Q as being closely linked. Including direct statements of belief

BC: Art10 much wider protection for freedom of speech. Q is how far can EA2010 be stretched to encompass Art9 and Art10 rights.

BC: [another case] It is necessary in discrimination to ascertain reason for actions. This is the case here. In cases of protected belief - judge draws manifestation/belief distinction but says it may not be possible to separate

BC: Analogy - if was protected characteristic of race, could include colour of skin, birthplace, parents' birthplace. With belief it's the same - what is and is not included as part of the category. [Case] identifies manifestations that are under Arts9&10 as being within category

BC: Court will have to decide whether distinction belief/manifestation can in fact be made.

BC: Essential finding in [case] is that someone had not been acted against bcs belief nor bcs he had expressed them but bcs he had gone on TV to do so after being asked not to

BC: Key distinction is between absolute right to hold belief and qualified right to manifest it. Point is to give Art9 & Art10 rights

BC: So that is the "separability" distinction. So. If you were to reject my primary analysis, the Q is *why* respondent acted as they did, and was the action justified in context of qualified manifestation right

BC: There are some reasons that would not be good enough. Return to case of person going on TV to criticise same sex relationships.

BC: Court then found that he had legitimate-debate reasons for expressing his views, compare context of GRA-reform consultation.

BC: Court notes that action vs him was not about his views or reputational damage, it was about danger that gay people might not feel safe at the Trust. Different from this case, where no such risk.

BC: Court notes that offence by public or vague idea of reputational damage would not be enough in itself to justify action vs the claimant in that case

BC: Compare and contrast fact that MF was willing to modify / limit expression, did all that was asked.

BC: [another case] My submission is that this case is to all intents and purposes same as this one.

BC: Case was re student expression of religious views inc disapproval of homosexuality on social media, and whether dismissal of student from course was justified

BC: there's discussion of freedom of belief, of the limits of manifestation being qualified. Court notes that at no point did university tell student it was the vocabulary, including religious terms, was the problem.

BC: Court notes polarisation of views.

BC: Court notes that student's "intransigence" was natural reaction to being told he could never express his religious views.

BC: Implication of university's submission is that religious beliefs can never be expressed if it's possible to identify the author. Court says such a blanket ban cannot be proportionate.

BC: Court very clear on that. Blanket ban cannot be proportionate. Especially when no engagement with individual to guide how expression could be made.

BC: In this case. It was only perceived offence and putatative reputational damage CGD rely on. They did not engage with MF on how she could express. They did in effect impose blanket ban.

BC: If we look at email from Luke Easley. It says not asking MF to agree with CGD position but need to set ground rules - but we never see what those were, and it is later clear blanket ban in place.

BC: LE says CGD not trying to limit belief but sets that against "comfort" of other staff. Privileging that comfort over the belief

BC: LE says "it goes both ways" but when he wrote this he knew C1 had described MF as bigoted, anti-trans. But MF does not know this, because nobody every told her.

BC: LE can see from QI report that it makes same judgement, the belief is fundamentally wrong and offensive, but he simply adopts it, and when MF criticises he calls it intransigence.

BC: "Goes both ways" is fine words but it's not what happened in practice.

BC: And we see as Mr Plant says that MF was being compliant, responding positively to requests etc. CGD cannot convince you that they had no other option re what to do. That is fatal to anything engaging Art9&10

BC: Just a few more points.

BC: relatively small but important Q of detriment re Gates project. Court must decide whether offer withdrawn or whether MF refused. We have in detail in written submission.

BC: If you find CGD withdrew, it's immaterial whether they actually intended to. If you find they did & meant to that's the detriment. If you find they did but did not mean to, detriment is unequal treatment.

BC: If you found that MF refused it via her farewell email, she is still entitled to compensation because she was responding to whole sequence of events - still amounts to constructive dismissal and we invite you to reach that decision.

BC: Re victimisation claim. First point is the "termination" email. Witnesses esp Mr Plant have confirmed they understood they were in belief-discrimination territory and feared litigation and the "termination" email went out as "send it and see"

BC: Second point is removal of website page. OD has not expanded on this; it is clear that this was not standard practice, and claims it was are false.

BC: And we note that it was when CGD submitted that false claim that they removed other pages. Fatal duplicity by CGD. Speaks to credibility.

BC: Many examples esp Mr Ahmed of disingenousness, spinning, duplicity. Court should add these up. When considering what likely to be true, Court should consider them all.

BC: Will not go through employment status, we have covered in opening and closing submissions, but a few points.

BC: Point of "Uber" was to start with statute and look at evidence of practice. OD's argument re MF's written contracts not valid.

BC: It's not relevant that someone does other work, or has done in the past. What matters is the status in THIS employment.

BC: MF was not challenged on her statement that she viewed CGD as main job.

BC: Not relevant that she invoiced and was not PAYE.

BC: Most important factor is integration into the organisation. Fundraising - MF was not fundraising for some separate oneperson project. She was part of team fundraising for overall CGD project. Shows integration.

BC: Overarching relationship - we emphasise [case] which says that to find if there are sufficient mutual obligations you don't have to have them spelled out, you can infer them from the full set of circumstance.

BC: CGD witnesses by and large agreed that MF's VF was based on work being available.

BC: Authorities say that contract in common law is not required but in any case clear from [cases] that mutual obligations needed to found a contract don't even have to involve a salary or pay; sufficient if obligation to work and benefit (cash or kind) present

BC: and LE agreed those were present in any VF

BC: Would like to emphasise it does not matter whether MF was employee or not other than for the period of her last contract. Because if she was, then when all this starts she was an employee

BC: Time limits. This is not a case of one off decision vs ongoing policy, it's about is there enough of a link between detriments to count as one case

BC: which they clearly do. So court does not need to consider time limits, unless you de-link the detriments and find any out of time.

BC: Termination email was 5 March 2019; thereafter she finds she may have employment rights after all; files claim ten days later. No detriment to CGD by that delay

BC [checking for any notifications of things missed] [none]

EJ: Does Miss Dobbie intend to reply, does she need time to formulate
OD: Don't need time but yes replies, hope to finish by 1

OD: Re [case] - reject BC view on this. Where there is danger of compelled speech or perception of it this case will apply. It was the icing of the cake would have been compelled speech.

OD: There are 2 separate matters - compelled to promote a campaign, and, being associated with it

OD: Re the association part. It is not the case that s/o can ONLY complain IF there is association by others.

OD: Judge says It is by the by, because it's the cake icing that is the compelled bit. But we can see that it is *part* of the equation, that perceived association cd be a problem. Fundamentally disagree with BC's take on this section.

[EJ reading it in detail]
EJ: 1 = actively promoting, 2 = associated with.
EJ: You are saying whole of that discussion is talking about second element?

OD: No, but it's saying that the associating COULD be a problem, though it was not the issue in that case itself

OD: Not being associated with is *part* of "compelled speech"

OD: [case] itself relies on the icing, but, court acknowledges association *could* be issue. Is my view and where I disagree with BC.

OD: the public aspect of any message is going to be significant. See [case] where he went on TV. If employer's name broadcast like that, there is that compelled association.

OD: re separability / indissociability. Invite court to consider the way was pleaded. See last sentence. Does *not* include importance of promulgating the belief as say Jehovah's Witnessing would.

OD: So campaigning against reform of GRA2004, compulsion or need to tweet, compulsion or need to debate at work, compulsion or need to blog on employer's platform - plus consider particular comments re man in dress, part time crossdresser -

OD: it can't be argued that those are inseparable from the core belief as stated, in fact I say they are not even part of it.

OD: Even if you found they were manifestations, they are still subject to qualification (Article 9.2)

OD: re the VF. We know that Nov 2018 - this is after tweets, after blog, after HS' supposed intervention and EM's, and Szabo report, we see that Mr Ahmed still considering renewing.

OD: We see Mr Plant proposing renewal, EM objecting, Mr Ahmed saying "but she has only done 2 years so renewal is fine". Clear that if SPG had agreed in Dec he would have renewed.

OD: Clear MA happy to proceed.

OD: So cannot be core belief that MA based decision on. He knew what it was, he knew objections.

OD: He knew all that well before this, but, renewal still on table. *Must* be things that happened later, post-SPG, that changed his mind.

OD: It was that he decided MF would not desist, was because of risks.
OD: We know video didn't come to his attention from CH until day after the SPG

OD: MA was concerned re those messages continuing to be associated with CGD. Reputation damage. Diverting attention & time from work. People distracted.

OD: MA concerned, says in statement, that disruption etc would continue. Already 4 complaints, then the video comes up.

OD: Need for management to deal with all this.

OD: Decision making process -
BC: intervenes - right of reply should be on questions of law
OD: Did not read BC submission until after I had finished, no chance to consider on facts

EJ: convention is that right of reply is re law, but facts allowed, and this case should take the maximum information. Within reason. So we should hear whatever submissions either party wants to make

OD: So re the process, claim that EM a sort of Iago figure, contaminating with her prejudices - we can see it's clear not true, all delegated to Mr Plant. So we can see that post-SPG matter lay with MA and MP

OD: Other SPG members had little input afterwards -
EJ: interrupts to say that OD has already made this point

OD: Apologieses. Re EM. Not involved, we see MA making decision on his own part only

OD: And as point of law, re EM, [names case], found that line manager had downgraded bcs of protected disclosures & put in appraisals, which NEXT line manager relied on, whole process found unfair

OD: But you can't conclude that EM intervention was bcs discrimination
EJ: both parties appear to be relying on EM not being called ...

OD: CGD did not add her as witness bcs her role minor.
OD: Point is you can't infer that EM's interventions were bcs of views themselves. EM concerned with whole workplace

OD: Myriad other reasons for EM views, including fallout, offence to staff, reputational risk.

OD: Re BC written submission - talks of "taking on" MF - context of recruiting others - says "taking on" MF for tax and transparency work. BC says implies intention to employ. But here MA says same phrase [cites page] when clearly only for a temp contract

OD: "Taking on" just a phrase - does not suggest employee per se

OD: BC suggest all can be unlocked by looking at msg to MF 21/11 when MP said he saw no route to VF. But MA is saying same day it was still open. Undermines suggestion that MA had already taken view re claimant and looking to squeeze her out

OD: Submit that Mr Plant had genuinely misunderstood the position. MA evidence accurate around this

OD: Re the 5/3 email, and considering whether it is "termination". Must consider alongside MF farewell email. She says offer of work withdrawn then VF renewal withdrawn. She does *not* say offer of contact then also withdrawn.

OD: BC asked you to draw inference from not calling Holly Shulman. Pls note BC objected to addition of HS at late stage. We actually made application to call her.

OD: Also re the website page thing - any error in the grounds of resistance we tried to clear up - you recall the various emails re this - CGD people believed it *was* the standard practice. Did not realise till later it was not.

OD: So changing their witness statements re that was just trying to clear up confusion

[EJ intervenes to remind OD not to rerun whole case]

OD: [case] where public-facing was a matter of issue - that applies here, publicity

OD: re reliance on HR cases, cases that engage Art9 & 10 but are outside employment context. Ask court to consider those at slight remove.

OD: Art10 protections very wide - pornography, advertising. That does not mean an employer has to include them in workplace.
OD: Please don't misquote me on mumsnet as comparing MF views to pornograhy.
OD: But, must consider Art 10 within workplace context

OD: [case]: says, re religion/belief - distinction between fact that claimants holds & manifests belief and the *way* they are manifested.
OD: I read that as saying they *are* separable and therefore Art9 not engaged

OD: Ask court to take distinction between holding belief, which is absolute, and manifestion which (9.2) can be qualified. BC & I don't disagree here on law but do on application you should make

EJ: but this is the basic question
OD: yes, and again I think BC & I agree, you need to determine reasons for actions taken.

OD: And re association, publication on workplace "channels". Fact that it had not happened doesn't mean it wouldn't.

OD: those are all my points.

EJ: please all remain in hearing for now - panel and I will have a brief conference re where we go from here

BC: would like to make a couple of points, factual correction
BC: first is re website. It has been asserted that they were unaware at the time of *pleading* re what was standard practice. Must correct that

BC: The ONLY doc ever disclosed (CGD declined to disclose further in support of abandoned application) - suggests they *did* know when pleading and there is NO evidence they did not.

BC: And re not calling HS and EM - OD says because not important personnel - but CGD have known for a long time about the "opposition" email re EM, and that we would use it. It is not true that CGD didn't know it was important; you are allowed to draw adverse inferences

EJ: thank you Mr Cooper. As I said, panel will withdraw for brief discussion on Whatsapp, everyone else please stay.

[Panel withdraw]

[We resume]

EJ: we have nothing further to raise with either barrister. We will start deliberations this afternoon, and we have most of tomorrow, and Friday. We have also set April 7th to meet.
Cannot predict how far we will get in that time.

EJ: We will keep both parties informed. Am sure everyone will understand that it will take us time to reach decision, document, discuss with parties. It will be a lengthy process.

EJ: Aware of much public interest - please be aware it will be lengthy.
EJ: Court will continue to meet via video but those will be private sessions not open to the public

EJ: there is Q in chat re transcript for OD's replies today. No, there is no recording and as said at outset, none must be made.

EJ: Asks everyone to leave.

[THE END - of the public court sessions, at least]

Thank you everybody that has been following the case, and for your interest in our #OpenJustice tweeting.

@threadreaderapp please unroll

https://twitter.com/MForstater/status/1506593758770569228?t=asGimNNwbFuIed_Vgm_0Vg&s=19