Yesterday on @CNN, I was asked several times about Ukraine "morale."
A difficult quality to define. It's something commanders (& all leaders) struggle to ensure.
There's tons of research on the subject. Even Clausewitz discusses it.
So here's a thread of some thoughts. 1/16
Clausewitz says that morale (& will) is critical. For soldiers & commanders.
He says this quality is found through moral & physical courage, the acceptance of battlefield responsibility, & suppression of fear.
Interesting. But how do you achieve that? 2/
On 2/24 I wrote a thread discussing how power on the battlefield is defined by resources and will. I said then the RU had advantage in "resources," but UKR had a greater advantage in "will." And I predicted UKR would win.
Will can often override resource advantage. 3/
I believe will & morale compliment each other.
There's been many articles on what contributes to morale & will. Some of them are random musings by business leaders, some are great research studies.
But my experiences show there are 10 key elements contributing to morale. 4/
Here are those elements (not in order of importance): 1. Trust in leaders, from the small unit level to the top of the "food chain" 2. Belief that leaders will share the individual's hardships. 3. The inherent self-discipline of individuals 5/
4. The discipline instilled by the leaders in a variety of ways. 5. Training...and the individual's trust in their own ability 6. Trust... in the quality of equipment 7. Trust...in your team. 6/
8. The provisions of physical comforts: food, sleep, warmth & the ability to contact loved ones. 9. Communication (about the situation & the related expectations: "what are we doing and why do we need to do it?") 10. The belief you are on a "winning team." 7/
It's not difficult to determine which side - Russian or Ukraine - has the advantage in these ten areas.
Examples:
"Trust in leaders & leader's sharing hardship." Two pictures that represent trust, or lack of it.
And, the organization takes on the personality of the leader: 8/
"The inherent self-discipline of soldiers, and the discipline instilled by the leaders."
Again, one can find many pictures and films showing the differences...but here are just two: 9/
"Training and the trust in equipment"
Both sides have similar equipment (though the RU's certainly have a quantity advantage).
But in seeing RU training...it's abysmal.
On the other side, starting in 2008, UKR adopted the EUCOM and NATO training model. 10/
My experience: seeing UKR soldiers arrive at Grafenwoehr to gain individual & unit proficiency (for operations in the Balkans & Afghanistan) and UKR sending young leaders to the Sergeant's course (WLC at Graf, with other European countries) is making a significant difference.11/
Additionally, the decision by the UKR Chief of Ground Forces to send increasing numbers of UKR senior leaders to US Military Schools (and US willingness to offer those slots) is also showing to be a major contributing factor to success. 12/
"Communication: What are we doing, and why?"
It's apparent - from reports of RU soldiers who did not know why they were being sent to UKR or told they were going on an "exercise" - that soldiers were not told of the mission or intent of the invasion.
On the other hand...13/
UKR's Army, Territorial Force & citizens are all aware of the threat to their sovereignty and freedom, and they continue to share their successes, and their challenges...with each other, and with the world. 14/
"Individual comfort: Food, sleep, warmth, contact with loved ones."
Both sides experiencing the demands & stressors of combat, but 2 RU reports sum up the difference:
"Our soldiers are digging trenches in the snow to sleep" and "We are requesting Chinese MREs." 14/
"Belief you are winning."
Today:
Reports of the "Bucha Pocket" north of Kyiv...UKR soldiers surrounding 10,000 RU troops N of the capital.
UKR Air Force (UAF) - with ground Air Defense - continuing to fight way above their weight.
A RU ship on fire in Berdyansk port. 15/
Yes, "morale" is a critical factor in combat.
Leader's know there are ways to instill that inherent desire for strong (high?) morale among their population and their forces.
Lots of lessons to be learned from this fight...just like any fight in any conflict. 16/16
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WRT national security & global threats, an extremely dangerous time re US "foes." -Massive Russian strikes in Ukraine -Georgia's "frozen conflict" heating up. -Moldova dealing with Russian troops in Transnistria -Russian economy collapsing...due to Putin's wars --Assad flees to Russia 1/4
-China intimidates Philippines, assaults Hong Kong's autonomy, represses Tibet & Xinjiang, threatens Taiwan, blocks international trade routes -N. Korea troops & weapons in Russia, increases missile capabilities -Hamas destroyed, but Hezbollah, IJ, MB & the Africa terror groups still active. 2/4
-Piracy increases in Persian Gulf and Red Sea regions -US, Mexico & Philippines rated as most active human trafficking countries -Draughts, famine & other climate change factors + outcome of conflicts causes increased migration into US & Europe. -Domestic terrorism indicators rising. 3/4
Watching the Israeli operations in S. Lebanon today, as the IDF releases numerous photos of arms caches found in & near homes. 1/7
These are similar to what US forces found throughout Iraq when we were there.
Using civilian locations provides terror organizations w/ unique advantages:
- difficult to find
- difficult to target
- when found, striking/destroying results in civilian casualties. 2/
This morning, the IAF also struck a 3.5 km tunnel complex between Syria & Lebanon that provided a means of bringing those weapons to Hezbollah.
Between 0900-1100 hrs local time today, Hezbollah launched over 100 rockets & drones into N. Israel. 3/
A few thoughts on what occurred in two different conflicts yesterday...the use of "killer pagers" by Israel and Ukraine's attack on the large ammo cache at Toropets military base 300+ miles inside Russia.
A short 🧵 1/12
First, the pagers.
In this article (gifted) from the @nytimes, the author claims there "no clear strategy" for this coordinated attack.
I disagree. Having used electronic & signals countermeasures in Iraq, the strategy is clear. 2/
Terrorist organizations - unlike conventional militaries who have encrypted signal capabilities - must find ways to communiate. It is important to continue to disrupt & counter this ability.
In Iraq, terrorist use of cell phones allowed US and ISF to glean valuable information & disrupt their networks. 3/