@sfplanning just released drafts of the keystone pieces of city's housing element: (1) analysis of site capacity (as zoned), (2) analysis of constraints.
tl,dr: big progress on conceptual level, huge problems in practice.
This 🧵 covers sites; stay tuned for constraints. 1/22
The big & welcome news is that SF, like LA, undertook to comply w/#AB1397 by modeling sites' probability of development during planning period & discounting sites' nominal zoned capacity by p(dev). 2/
The leadership of SF and LA on this issue, coupled with @California_HCD's rejection of nearly all housing elements from SoCal cities, is going put pressure on other cities to get on board the p(dev) train. 3/
This is *so* important, b/c for last 40 years, cities have gotten away with junk plans premised on patently false assumption that if a site could be developed during planning period, it would be developed. 4/ papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…
Reality check: in Bay Area, a typical 5th cycle "housing element site" had less than a 1-in-10 chance of development during planning period.
A site zoned for 100 homes should have counted for 10 or fewer, but it was counted for 100. 5/
But as LA and now SF have discovered, a city that's realistic about p(dev) will have to rezone. A lot.
Or at least it should... /7
SF hired an economics consultant to fit a p(dev) model to data from 2001-2018 and, as described, the model seems reasonable. So far, so good. /8
Consultant concluded that SF has p(dev)-adjusted capacity for ***less than 21,000 new homes, under current zoning, over the next 30 years.***
Whereas the city's state-assigned housing target exceeds 80,000 homes over just the next 8 years! /9
So, big rezoning? There ought to be! But SF purports to backfill most of deficit w/ handwavy, "trust us" assumptions about other sources of capacity, ultimately committing to rezone for only ~22,000 more units.
The money table is on p. 8. Let's break it down. /10
For starters, city posits that 50% of modeled capacity over next 30 years will materialize in next 8 years.
Rationale: state law is now better for development, so a model fit w/2001-18 data understates capacity under current law. Ok, that's directionally correct. /10
But even using that indulgent assumption, SF has "modeled" capacity for only about 10k homes, leaving massive shortfall (another 72k-84k units).
And this is where things get real wacky. /11
First, city posits that sites which "met criteria provided by mayor's office" for funding 100% affordable projects have p(dev) = 0.50!
City provides *zero* information about rate at which such sites have been developed in the past. /12
It takes real chutzpah to assert, w/o any evidence or even info about city's financial capacity to acquire these sites, that sites targeted for social housing have vastly higher p(dev) than other sites.
But this "saves" S.F. from rezoning for 8600 more units. /13
Now to the biggest skeletons: the "development pipeline."
City credits itself w/nearly 50,000 units from "housing ... projects that have been proposed or that have already received [planning] approvals but that have not received building permits." /14
What's the basis for these numbers? "[D]iscussion with city agencies working on the [pipeline] projects to assess units likely to be delivered over RHNA period."
That is, "trust us." /15
Notably absent: any analysis of what share of "pipeline" projects from last housing element got developed during the last planning period. (SF's last plan counted ~35,000 "filed or approved" units.) /16
Finally, after all the massaging of numbers, SF concludes that it ought to rezone for ~22,000 more homes, & that for fair-housing reasons, they should be located on west side of city.
Some housing advocates are rejoicing. /17
But: in connection w/ analysis of constraints (more on that later), SF hired consultant for pro-forma analysis of different types of housing projects in different areas...and the consultant concluded that *nothing pencils out on the west side*. /18
On basis of that study, @sfplanning says that w/ current permitting process, impacts fees, exactions, & construction costs, the *only* kind of project that's economically feasible is a 24+ story high-rise in city's highest-demand neighborhoods. /19
Yet SF "plans" to meet its ~22,000 unit shortfall (after hand-waving) by rezoning west-side corridors for 55'-85' projects that per city's own analysis would have *negative* rate of return.
This is a cruel joke. Except it's no joke. /20
Here's the big picture: to meet its 82k unit target, San Francisco must *triple* its typical annual housing production.
Rezoning the west side for 22,000 economically infeasible homes won't cut it. /21
@California_HCD should nix this plan unless SF: (1) backs up its "pipeline" & "mayor's office" projections w/ public data, & 2) commits to ministerial review + waiver of fees/exactions/standards that render projects economically infeasible until city reaches RHNA target.
/end
Ditching public hearings on housing proposals ("ministerial approval") is good, but it doesn't give city council members any affirmative reason to facilitate -- or simply not obstruct -- development.
/2
What would improve their incentives?
- Replace single-member district elections w/ at-large or multi-member district elections. There's strong causal evidence that SMD elections depress housig production.
- Fix Prop. 13, or create new state -> local fiscal...
It's exciting to see the public-intellectual drumbeat around "Abundance" manifest in this year's crop of California housing bills.
They're far more ambitious--and promising--than anything I've seen previously. 🧵/17
#1: CEQA reform that's broad, deep, and clean.
@Scott_Wiener's SB 607:
- authorizes admin mapping of good-for-infill areas & greatly simplifies CEQA review of housing in those areas (in line with the recommendations of this...
paper, papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…, and this @CALittleHoover report, lhc.ca.gov/report/califor…)
- limits the administrative record in all CEQA cases, which will simplify & speed litigation
- limits scope of enviro study for projects that nearly qualify for an exemption
/3
AB 1893 is @BuffyWicks's "builder's remedy grows up" bill.
It tried to clarify the development standards that apply to those housing projects which a city may not disapprove (or render infeasible) on grounds of noncompliance w/ zoning.
/2
Under subd. (d) of the HAA, there have long been two such classes of projects:
(1) in cities w/o compliant housing element: any housing project ("builder's remedy")
(2) in cities w/ compliant HE: projects on HE inventory sites at HE-allowed density ("baby builder's remedy")
An L.A. rebuild problem which @GavinNewsom & Leg ought to fix, post-haste:
- Many people who lost their homes are underinsured & can't afford to rebuild.
- Many others are inexpert at supervising contractors & vulnerable to being scammed.
for many such folks is probably to sell their burned out property to a developer, for cash or cash + option to purchase a new townhome or condo that the developer will build on the property.
(fast-lane for like-for-likes, slow lane for everything else), is going to depress what developers bid for properties and reduce opportunities for homeowners to strike "my lot for $ today + townhome tomorrow" deals w/ developers.
/3
This Tuesday, LA County Commission will vote on a clusterf*ck resolution to speed the rebuilding of firetraps -- while exempting "fire impacted communities" from virtually all state housing laws for the next 5 years. 1/5
(link: )
I figured there'd be some nonsense after the fires, but nothing like this.
The County proposes a two-track permitting system: fast lane for like-for-like rebuilds; slow lane for everything else. 2/5 file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/s…
The uber-nonsense begins on p. 13, where the resolution calls for a letter to the Governor and state legislative delegation from all L.A. county commissioners, demanding that "fire-impacted communities" (an undefined term--all of L.A. County?) be exempted from... 3/5