@sfplanning just released drafts of the keystone pieces of city's housing element: (1) analysis of site capacity (as zoned), (2) analysis of constraints.
tl,dr: big progress on conceptual level, huge problems in practice.
This 🧵 covers sites; stay tuned for constraints. 1/22
The big & welcome news is that SF, like LA, undertook to comply w/#AB1397 by modeling sites' probability of development during planning period & discounting sites' nominal zoned capacity by p(dev). 2/
The leadership of SF and LA on this issue, coupled with @California_HCD's rejection of nearly all housing elements from SoCal cities, is going put pressure on other cities to get on board the p(dev) train. 3/
This is *so* important, b/c for last 40 years, cities have gotten away with junk plans premised on patently false assumption that if a site could be developed during planning period, it would be developed. 4/ papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…
Reality check: in Bay Area, a typical 5th cycle "housing element site" had less than a 1-in-10 chance of development during planning period.
A site zoned for 100 homes should have counted for 10 or fewer, but it was counted for 100. 5/
But as LA and now SF have discovered, a city that's realistic about p(dev) will have to rezone. A lot.
Or at least it should... /7
SF hired an economics consultant to fit a p(dev) model to data from 2001-2018 and, as described, the model seems reasonable. So far, so good. /8
Consultant concluded that SF has p(dev)-adjusted capacity for ***less than 21,000 new homes, under current zoning, over the next 30 years.***
Whereas the city's state-assigned housing target exceeds 80,000 homes over just the next 8 years! /9
So, big rezoning? There ought to be! But SF purports to backfill most of deficit w/ handwavy, "trust us" assumptions about other sources of capacity, ultimately committing to rezone for only ~22,000 more units.
The money table is on p. 8. Let's break it down. /10
For starters, city posits that 50% of modeled capacity over next 30 years will materialize in next 8 years.
Rationale: state law is now better for development, so a model fit w/2001-18 data understates capacity under current law. Ok, that's directionally correct. /10
But even using that indulgent assumption, SF has "modeled" capacity for only about 10k homes, leaving massive shortfall (another 72k-84k units).
And this is where things get real wacky. /11
First, city posits that sites which "met criteria provided by mayor's office" for funding 100% affordable projects have p(dev) = 0.50!
City provides *zero* information about rate at which such sites have been developed in the past. /12
It takes real chutzpah to assert, w/o any evidence or even info about city's financial capacity to acquire these sites, that sites targeted for social housing have vastly higher p(dev) than other sites.
But this "saves" S.F. from rezoning for 8600 more units. /13
Now to the biggest skeletons: the "development pipeline."
City credits itself w/nearly 50,000 units from "housing ... projects that have been proposed or that have already received [planning] approvals but that have not received building permits." /14
What's the basis for these numbers? "[D]iscussion with city agencies working on the [pipeline] projects to assess units likely to be delivered over RHNA period."
That is, "trust us." /15
Notably absent: any analysis of what share of "pipeline" projects from last housing element got developed during the last planning period. (SF's last plan counted ~35,000 "filed or approved" units.) /16
Finally, after all the massaging of numbers, SF concludes that it ought to rezone for ~22,000 more homes, & that for fair-housing reasons, they should be located on west side of city.
Some housing advocates are rejoicing. /17
But: in connection w/ analysis of constraints (more on that later), SF hired consultant for pro-forma analysis of different types of housing projects in different areas...and the consultant concluded that *nothing pencils out on the west side*. /18
On basis of that study, @sfplanning says that w/ current permitting process, impacts fees, exactions, & construction costs, the *only* kind of project that's economically feasible is a 24+ story high-rise in city's highest-demand neighborhoods. /19
Yet SF "plans" to meet its ~22,000 unit shortfall (after hand-waving) by rezoning west-side corridors for 55'-85' projects that per city's own analysis would have *negative* rate of return.
This is a cruel joke. Except it's no joke. /20
Here's the big picture: to meet its 82k unit target, San Francisco must *triple* its typical annual housing production.
Rezoning the west side for 22,000 economically infeasible homes won't cut it. /21
@California_HCD should nix this plan unless SF: (1) backs up its "pipeline" & "mayor's office" projections w/ public data, & 2) commits to ministerial review + waiver of fees/exactions/standards that render projects economically infeasible until city reaches RHNA target.
/end
New decision from CA Court of Appeal on the fee-shifting provisions of AB 1633 has big implications for NIMBYs' incentive to challenge housing approvals under CEQA & beyond.
Context: As part of the 1970s revolution in admin law, states & the federal gov't actively encouraged self-appointed "private attorneys general" to sue, via attorneys' fee bounties.
/2
Asymmetric fee-shifting provisions were written into scores of public laws: If a plaintiff challenging a gov't decision wins, the gov't has to pay for the plaintiff's attorney; if the plaintiff loses, they don't have to pay for the gov's attorney.
"For a typical mid-rise apartment in San José, construction costs can exceed $700k–$900k per unit."
I 💯% agree w/ @MattMahanSJ that reducing construction costs should be a top priority for 2026 -- and that this is mainly a job for the state legislature.
Reason #1. CA's fiscal constitution + local political incentives push local govs to extract "value" from development w/ impact fees, IZ & transfer taxes.
This drives up the cost of building enormously.
/2
The state leg should preempt most such fees, IZ, & taxes, ***and create a substitute source of local revenue.***
My preferred alternative: a state parcel tax assessed on the "net potential square feet" or "net potential units" created by upzoning pursuant to state law.
/3
Could L.A. really land in the Builder's Remedy penalty box, just for f'ing around with a single low-income housing project which a nonprofit developer wants to build on city-owned land?
In October, @California_HCD sent L.A. a sharply worded letter, warning that the city's housing element had relied on the Venice Dell project both as a "pipeline project" and as part of the city's strategy to "affirmatively further fair housing."
/2 hcd.ca.gov/sites/default/…
The HCD letter also flagged five "policies" and two "programs" in L.A.'s housing element that per HCD should "facilitate the project."
The city's course of action has been "inconsistent with these policies."
Cooking in San Diego: A turquoise, 23-story test of the Permit Streamlining Act's new-and-improved "deemed approved" proviso.
This could turn into a big constitutional battle.
🧵/22
Enacted in 1977, the PSA put time limits on CEQA and other agency reviews of development proposals.
If an agency violated the time limits, the project was to be "deemed approved" by operation of law. Wow!
It proved wholly ineffectual.
/2
As @TDuncheon & I explained, courts first decided that the Leg couldn't possibly have meant for a project to be approved before enviro review was complete.
- San Francisco almost certainly must approve this 25-story project on a site zoned for 4 stories
- The city's new ordinance deregulating density in "well-resourced areas" will operate as de-facto downzoning of such sites
🧵
This project's site is zoned for retail use and is currently occupied by the Marina Safeway.
The zoning classification also allows residential use at density of 1 unit per 600 sqft of lot area or density of nearest residential district, whichever is greater.
/2
The nearest residential district, RM-4, allows density of 1 unit per 200 sqft of lot area.
That translates into 567 units on site.
Developer proposes to build 790 units, which requires a 39% density bonus (790/567 = 1.39).
By describing the credible commitment problem (the need to reassure developers of new housing or energy that their project won't face price controls for a very long time) I didn't mean to imply, as some critics on the right insist, that the problem is insurmountable.
/2
I think the problem can be greatly mitigated:
1. By offering DC-style "certificates of assurance" to developers, i.e., recordable contracts for compensation if the project is subjected to price controls within a defined period of time.
/3