This thread🧵will lay out the reasons I think the Russians blew the technological development necessary to deal with drone threats in Ukraine & elsewhere.
Like all really important problems, it starts with how badly you treat people...in this case, Russian engineers.👇 1/
Drones costing maybe $100,000 put between $50 million to $400 million in high tech aircraft out of action for months. There are a -lot- of implications in those numbers.
I wrote a blog post on that attack and 23 others between Jan & Aug 2018 here:
And while Russia is in a nasty situation regards up to date IC ships. The real issue with the TOR and Pantshir-1 isn't chips. It is the software processing it's radar returns.
Soviet era electrical engineers wrote really tight tight code that maxed out their systems performance compared to Western code practices.
They had no choice and were well rewarded when they did.
An electronically scanned radar has the ability to track a small, slow drone's doppler shift returns with the right software code using older IC chips, _IF_ you have the right engineering talent.
That talent left Putin's Russia.
Whatever Russia's corrupt military procurement system did in that time with the Pantshir-1 radar software.
It didn't involved anyone competent, assuming anything was done, other than someone stealing the money.
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This is one of the most logistically incompetent hot takes by any German journalist in the Russo-Ukrainian War.
95% getting through is a 5% loss rate per trip
95%(x) for 10 to 20 kills means x = 200 to 400 trucks on this route
10 trips means 40% total fleet loss - 80 to 160 trucks
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You can follow the 5% loss curve in this 500 unit fleet at 10 exposures in the graphic below.
A 40% fleet loss in 10 days from a 5% drone loss rate is logistical collapse for the Russian Army in occupied Ukraine.
Only some trying to get AfD eyeballs would say different.
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This leaves out the fact that the Russian Army doesn't use *ANY* mechanized logistical enabler like pallets, Truck D-rings, forklifts, or telehandlers.
Russian trucks are in the drone kill zones 3 times as long as a Western truck due to loading times.
"The DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile, with a range of approximately 4,000 to 5,000 kilometers, was specifically designed and publicly nicknamed by Chinese military analysts as the "Guam Killer.""
As laid out by warquants -dot- com, China is buying one million OWA drones to destroy all US/Taiwan/Taiwan allied military logistics from Guam to the China coast.
A quantity of one million "Shaheed plus" class OWA drones has quality all its own.
Homicide statistics since the early 1960s are not comparable to earlier periods because medical advances have turned many fatal injuries into survivable ones.
I'm tempted to say the difference between military flag ranks who are competent at 2026 peer to peer warfare, and those who are not, is the understanding and application of attritional loss curves to combat loss rates, electronic warfare and logistics.
The set of curves I had an AI produce for me above have been used for air warfare many times starting at the end of WW2, in the USSBS after WW2 and by many classic RAND airpower studies from the 1950's to 1980's.
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All post 9/11/2001 Western flag ranks are counter-insurgency (COIN) trained & experienced.
They have no gut feel at all to statistical attrition models at all.
These "COIN-head" flags may prove to be highly resistant to changing this. Which is required to deal with drones.
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The effectiveness of drones is directly affected by the electronic warfare competence of the drone users.
The fact that the US Army defenestrated every EW practitioner in the 2000's and has compete "EW virgins" as flag rank leadership means it will fail with mass casualties in its first major drone war combat.
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