This thread🧵will lay out the reasons I think the Russians blew the technological development necessary to deal with drone threats in Ukraine & elsewhere.
Like all really important problems, it starts with how badly you treat people...in this case, Russian engineers.👇 1/
Drones costing maybe $100,000 put between $50 million to $400 million in high tech aircraft out of action for months. There are a -lot- of implications in those numbers.
I wrote a blog post on that attack and 23 others between Jan & Aug 2018 here:
And while Russia is in a nasty situation regards up to date IC ships. The real issue with the TOR and Pantshir-1 isn't chips. It is the software processing it's radar returns.
Soviet era electrical engineers wrote really tight tight code that maxed out their systems performance compared to Western code practices.
They had no choice and were well rewarded when they did.
An electronically scanned radar has the ability to track a small, slow drone's doppler shift returns with the right software code using older IC chips, _IF_ you have the right engineering talent.
That talent left Putin's Russia.
Whatever Russia's corrupt military procurement system did in that time with the Pantshir-1 radar software.
It didn't involved anyone competent, assuming anything was done, other than someone stealing the money.
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There is an tragi-comic story behind this Russian foreign ministry claim.
The Russian use the term "direct participation" because of a lie by Chancellor Scholz a year ago when he claimed the computer system used to program the Taurus missiles... 1/
The CO of the top scoring Buk [Nato designation SA-11 Gadfly] battery in the PSU did an interview ~2 years ago (early 2023).
He said they used their own Mavic drones to check that their camouflage and
Zoltan Dani & A2/AD doctrine🧵 1/
...that their battery concealment was good enough to fool Russian drones.
So, the PSU does a drone quality assurance check on its camo during the "hide" phase of the hide-shoot-scoot cycle, AKA you have to survive in order to have the opportunity to shoot enough to become the highest scoring SAM battery.
In contrast, the Russian VKS parks their missile TELARs in the middle of a field to get maximum obstacle clearance and range. Then they are shocked when hit by deep strike assault drone or GMLRS rocket.
In 2005, the Strategypage -dot- com web site had the following on the downing of an F-117 over Serbia.
These tactic are the heart of Ukrainian IADS doctrine.
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How to Take Down an F-117
November 21, 2005: The Serbian battery commander, whose missiles downed an American F-16, and, most impressively, an F-117, in 1999, has retired, as a colonel, and revealed many of the techniques he used to achieve all this. Colonel Dani Zoltan, in 1999, commanded the 3rd battery of the 250th Missile Brigade. He had search and control radars, as well as a TV tracking unit.
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The battery had four quad launchers for the 21 foot long, 880 pound SA-3 missiles. The SA-3 entered service in 1961 and, while it had undergone some upgrades, was considered a minor threat to NATO aircraft. Zoltan was an example of how an imaginative and energetic leader can make a big difference. While Zoltan’s peers and superiors were pretty demoralized with the electronic countermeasures NATO (especially American) aircraft used to support their bombing missions, he believed he could still turn his ancient missiles into lethal weapons
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The list of measures he took, and the results he got, should be warning to any who believe that superior technology alone will provide a decisive edge in combat. People still make a big difference. In addition to shooting down two aircraft, Zoltan’s battery caused dozens of others to abort their bombing missions to escape his unexpectedly accurate missiles. This is how he did it.
The problem for this USN-Taiwan "hellscape strategy" is it's obsolete given that the Chinese have access to Russia's newest generation of FPV interceptor drones to counter it, via using China's "5 times bigger than the rest of the world combined" drone industry & sea militia.
One of the 'benefits' of being a 33 year 3 month vet of the US military procurement enterprise is you are around when the bodies are buried, directly or through people you know.
Such was the case with US Army anti-drone procurement.
This is an email correspondent of mine talking about US Army anti-drone kit testing, prior to 2010, about a competition between two anti-drone contractors --
"The toughest part of detecting drones is figuring out if they're drones or birds.
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That was actually the big 'step' they managed.
But, no, the directed pulse did not interfere with their radar. And the test they did they took down seven drones in less than seven seconds at range. 3/