This thread🧵will lay out the reasons I think the Russians blew the technological development necessary to deal with drone threats in Ukraine & elsewhere.
Like all really important problems, it starts with how badly you treat people...in this case, Russian engineers.👇 1/
Drones costing maybe $100,000 put between $50 million to $400 million in high tech aircraft out of action for months. There are a -lot- of implications in those numbers.
I wrote a blog post on that attack and 23 others between Jan & Aug 2018 here:
And while Russia is in a nasty situation regards up to date IC ships. The real issue with the TOR and Pantshir-1 isn't chips. It is the software processing it's radar returns.
Soviet era electrical engineers wrote really tight tight code that maxed out their systems performance compared to Western code practices.
They had no choice and were well rewarded when they did.
An electronically scanned radar has the ability to track a small, slow drone's doppler shift returns with the right software code using older IC chips, _IF_ you have the right engineering talent.
That talent left Putin's Russia.
Whatever Russia's corrupt military procurement system did in that time with the Pantshir-1 radar software.
It didn't involved anyone competent, assuming anything was done, other than someone stealing the money.
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I've been involved with three US Army FMTV reset programs.
So this newest report from Ukraine's Defense Express on the the repairability problems with Russian AFV's out of their reserves is so much fun to share with you all.
Defense Express pulled an article from the No. 10 issue of the Russian magazine "Material and Technical Support" on how horrid the vehicles coming out of reserve are plus problems with battle damaged reserve vehicles.
"The central takeaway from this publication is that the actual repairability of Russian tanks is 3-5 times lower than what is claimed in official manuals. This discrepancy has extended repair times for equipment by at least 15-20%."
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The infographic figure below is a typical commercial production line curve.
Ukraine's stated production and use of the Peklo (Hell) cruise missile marks it as being on the 'start of production to market entry' ramp up part of the curve below.
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Over two dozen Peklo were shown in this public unveiling by Ukraine, which is over 1/4 of the stated production to date.
How many were pre-production prototypes or low rate initial pilot production models isn't knowable. 3/
"According to Andriy Klymenko , head of the Institute for Black Sea Strategic Studies , both vessels are very old and have a "river" class, which implies certain limitations.
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He published and commented on the relevant map, which indicates the approximate location of the tanker disaster.
"It is about 8 miles from the seaport of Taman (a transshipment port south of the Kerch Strait).
3/
This will require a Russian military railway service train to be deployed to this spot for possible future Ukrainian Switchblade 600 follow up strikes.
I asked around and I was pointed to Ukrainian GNSS (AKA global positioning satellite signals) Spoofing as a more likely cause of the Shaheed-136 clone failures.
Also, that would have nothing with reduced glide bomb drops.
3/
In another round of very useful translation, @sambendett points out the Russians have learned that drones are how combat power is measured in the 21st century.
The Russians didn't share drone tech with the SAA at scale.
Ukraine did with the HTS starting in June 2024. 1/