Thread by @Indrani1_Roy

Okay. There is a lot about LCA Tejas production rate by HAL. Now that we know SP-27 to SP-35 have taken to the air within 4.5 months, does it mean that HAL is capable of producing Tejas at 24 aircrafts/year.

Short answer: No.

Long answer: please read on.

1. Unlike many things, the production rate of fighters once the underlying technology has stabilized is a directly related to the number of fighters ordered. It is fairly complex endeavour. But let us understand the first principles.

2. The primary problem is that the machinery, tools, jigs etc. that are required to build state-of-the-art fighters are a few times more expensive than a fighter itself. Therefore, how many such machinery, tools, jigs should be brought is directly related to number of orders.

3. There is a simple rule of thumb that seems to hold for most modern fighter aircrafts. Typically, one builds one line for a rate of 8-12 aircraft per year. At financially (to keep the cost of each fighter) manageable, one should at least run an assembly line for at least 5 yrs.

4. You can see HAL do this. But this is nothing new to HAL. When Rafale had not won international orders, Dassault had slowed down production rate to 8 aircrafts per year to the French AF + Navy. Once the export orders came in, they scaled back up.

5. The first assembly line is the most expensive. Because along with the hangar, workshop, you have to build test facilities, runways etc. etc.

That's why, if you have a low production rate, say 8 aircraft per year, the per unit cost shoots up.

6. This is where HAL has an unfair advantage over our pvt. players. They already have these facilities build up and can amortize these facilities for new lines. Moving on.

If you wanted higher production rates, there are two paths.

7. The production rate of any assembly line is defined by its slowest part. One identifies this part and brings in automation. This has high upfront cost, but saves time, manual labour and generally improves quality.

8. But there is a limit to how much one can speed up an assembly line. The second method is to simply duplicate it, doubling the production rate. Nothing fancy.

But you see, you get to use more automation and testing facilities and runways etc.

9. The better utilization of these machines and facilities leads to better amortization of the capital costs, bringing the per unit cost down. This is the industry is called "the kicking in of economies of scale"

10. This percolates all the way down from full aircraft, down to primary-level parts, to secondary-level parts and so on.

In short, More orders, mean faster delivery at better quality and lower per unit costs.

11. The Americans are a champion of this. It is really worth learning. And the Chinese, Koreans Turks are learning it rapidly.

We, in India, like to count beans, and have handed over most of the power to the bean counters.

12. Our bean-counters and their masters (aka the politicians) have overhauled procurement policies more often than using them to make any procurements!

Meanwhile, technologist driving production, test & design (aka second class citizens) die a slow death.

13. Frustrated, many give up. Others get used to the pace. In the meanwhile, a new policy is drafted only to be replace in <5 years. Chalta hai!

Let me give you an example of how we Indians have mercilessly killed our aviation industry.

14. The Tata group is one of the best, patriotic and productive conglomerates of India. They were selected to build the C295s. Again the simple rule of thumbs applied there. We wanted TASL to build a handful of C295s.

15. They argued the obvious. To set up a financially-viable line of even assembling the aircraft from parts, the minimum number is 8 aircraft per year for 5 years (rough figures), i.e. 40 aircrafts.

16. 16 C295s will be imported from Europe, the remaining 40 will be assembled in TASL. This simple decision known to every Tom-Dick-&-Harry took 10 years! But thankfully, it was at least taken.

17. To Tata's credit, they flatly said, any number below this we can't make financially-viable line. It is simply not possible for us.

Let's come to HALs and GoIs and IAFs exploitation of each other with respect to Tejas.

18. IAF placed an order for 20 Tejases first. HAL agreed.
Remember our rule of thumb.
A few years latter, IAF placed an order of another 20 Tejases. HAL agreed again.

Then, there were reports, but Tejas almost costs the same as an Su-30. Ofcourse! Su-30 was ordered in the 100s.

19. It is miracle that Tejas still is the most economical light aircraft in the world currently. It costs as much as JF17 or FA-50. But, its a miracle.

HAL, GoI and IAF deserve each other. It hurts me immensely to say this. But this is the truth!

20. So all of you who think that HAL and IAF has turned a corner, I haven't seen any of it yet.

Those who have followed me over the years know how much I have fought for these organizations. To work for IAF was my dream. That I did not, is a lament I will take to my death.

21. But, I am saying things as I see it. This sudden burst of production is the unclogging of the COVID affected pipeline. 3 cheers to the management and workers to stick to the April deadline.

But this is not sustainable.

22. There is no reason (forget incentive) for HAL to increase production rate of Mk1s beyond 8 aircraft per year up to the first year of Mk1A deliveries. That time is 3 years away. In that time HAL has only 18 trainers to deliver + 8 Mk1As to deliver.

23. Remember thumb-rule #1. 8 aircraft per year per assembly line. Current outstanding orders only allow financial viability to keep 1 line going at the minimum viable rate.
After that they will increase to 16 aircraft per year, i.e. 2 lines.

24. So, moderate your expectations and pray for export orders, because I don't see our procurement mechanism taking any actions in spite of knowing the simplest of thumb rules of aircraft manufacturing.

Jai Hind!