Thread by @MarkHertling

A new 🧵 on "what may be next."

In the military, headquarters have various staff sections.

Personnel is the "1," Intel is the "2," operations is "3," logistics is "4," signal (communication) is the "6." And there's more.

One staff member is the "5" who are the planners. 1/19

The S5, G5 or J5 ("S" is staff, "G" is general staff in a HQ commanded by a General, "J" is a joint staff with a General or Admiral where various branches - Army, Navy, Air Force, etc -are represented) is the staff section focused on plans & strategy. 2/

These folks help the commander look toward the future.

They answer: What's going to happen next, and how to we prepare for it?

They work their planning & offer it so the commander can shift their force.

Don't know if the RU have a "5," but I know UKR does. 3/

That staff section is working overtime right now.

While neither force has formally shifted into a new "phase" of this campaign, they are both looking to adapt and thwart their enemy.

What are they facing? 4/

As someone who was once a staff planner, I'd suggest this is what's coming:
5/

The two areas that will see the most attention are the shift in RU war aims/strategy, and the adaptation of each force to what they may face next.

So here are some comments on each...

6/

This map is what I believe were the original Russian Strategic Objectives.

A Putin shift to a Main Effort in Donbas, with a potential link up of forces from N & S at Dnipro, would enable his Army to mass forces on what some claim are his "new" objective: Eastern UKR.
7/

Meanwhile, Zelensky remains adamant about maintaining territorial integrity & sovereignty.

Zelensky considering "neutral state status," given his desire to save citizen's lives. That's a change, but he claims he'll only do so if citizens approve a referendum on the issue. 8/

2. Force adaptation:
Russia status:
-Army & Air performance abysmal.
-Long range fires effective, but only for terrorizing citizens rather than supporting RU forces.
-Force moral is very poor
-All accounts indicate serious attrition in soldiers & equipment 9/

-RU attacks w/ too few forces hindered success on all axes of advance.
-RU general officer uncoordinated, junior officer & NCO leadership lacking
-Inept logistical support-as I said from the beginning-is certainly a key contributor in failure to reach tactical objectives. 10/

Ukraine status:
-Govt and Citizens support beyond expectation.
-Extremely high morale in UA & UAF
-UKR Commanders flexible & applying intel to maneuver forces to right locations.
-UAF, drones & indirect fires highly effective in supporting ground force defense & attacks
11/

-Logistics tenuous, but still delivered
-Support from NATO key in remains key in training, intel, log, SOF.
-Civilians taking brunt of RU attacks; refugee support requiring extensive manpower from military
-UKR generals coordinating fights on multiple fronts 12/

Bottom Line:

Putin initial strategy & related operations poor. He must:
1. shift main effort to east
2. reconstitute a badly attrited Army
3. establish logistics support
4. replace & instill leadership
5. mass forces on one fight to "win"
6. intercept UKR's logistics 13/

Problems:
1) 2,3,4 are cultural issues that are difficult to "fix" during a combat operation.
2) 3 further hindered by sanctions, 2 further hindered by a lack of RU reserve/a new conscription on 1 April.
3) 1 & 5 don't fit his narrative or his lust for gaining all of UKR. 14/

4) Putin's pariah status increases with every new civilian attack
5) It is difficult to strategically intercept logistics with long range, imprecise targeting (like we've seen recently). 15/

We've seen Putin succeed in many of these areas in adjusting during his "two wars" in Chenhnya, and to a lesser degree in Syria.

But he is facing a very different foe in Ukraine now. 16/

nytimes.com/2019/12/10/wor…

Zelensky also faces challenges:

1. Sustaining the morale of the UA, UAF & Territorials...as well as UKR's civilians who are bearing the brunt of RU war crimes.
2. Treating large number of civilian casualties & balancing the manpower to support them. 17/

3. Maneuvering & logistically resupplying his force to meet what may be a renewed massed attack of RU forces in the Donbas.
4. Maintaining his legitimacy on the world stage.

From what I've seen, 2 & 3 will be the toughest. 18/

These are just some thoughts...from the musings of a former planner and someone who has had to execute changing strategies and adapting a force on the battlefield.

All of these may be wrong, and I only offer for consideration. 19/19