In the picture you can see a flying ATGM. It’s certainly Swedish NLAW. (2/8)
The moment before an explosion. (3/8)
NLAW using proximity fuze. This is the overfly top attack (OTA) mode. The missile flies about one metre above the line of sight, initiating the warhead above the target's weaker top armour with the help of magnetic sensors. (4/8)
NLAW using a single dynamic compensated 102 mm warhead of approximately 1, 5 kilograms of HMX (HEAT). This is important. There is no secondary explosion, as for example Javelin has. The sharped charge projects a high-velocity jet of plasma through tank armour. (5/8)
NLAW targeted the place without strong armour and without reactive armour (6/8)
Destroying the interior, commander and gunner is certainly dead, driver should survive. You can see the flames from under the turret. Engine is still (temporarily) working, there is a bar between. (7/8)
Tank was destroyed. End (8/8)
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Su-34 afaik can't carry FAB-3000 and that's because of size (diameter), not weight. There is a 3000kg load certified for the Fullback (Brahmos), but there are safety regulations that afaik do not allow the FAB-3000 to be carried... 1/9
...and I doubt that will change. The bomb with the largest weight certified for the Su-34 is the KAB-1500 family iirc.
A PGM set for the KAB-3000 is possible, although very problematic, the bomb itself is designed as a free-fall bomb, this will require design changes,..
2/9
...in particular the installation of a nose cap and also CG things.
Virtually the only platform that could carry such a weapon is Tu-22M3, but it is vulnerable and quite "critical" for Russia. It would require a completely different mission coverage. VKS routinely flies...
3/9
@krakek1 As promised, here is my (much more) consistent argumentation line. (so a moment of procrastination between work and illness:(
I emphasize this is an ongoing discussion, as is the acquisition of a non-nuclear strategic arsenal (a relatively new thing).
1/x
For starters, DL missions (as part of the strategic deterrent), which is a whole other can of worms, need to be separated out, leaving aside for discussion purposes (different scenario).
Axiom1:
the aim is to prevent the emergence of a conflict initiated by the Russian Federation in order to achieve limited military success against the North Atlantic Alliance in order to improve its position in the European security system.
3/x
This👇 Few people realize that however the war ends, even if it ends at the status quo as it is on the front line(s) at the moment, Ukraine's future will lie in the ability to engage targets in the European part of Russia and conventionally deter Russia.
Conventional deterrence will consist of the ability to service all type of targets up to 1800 (2000) km (Urals). This will lead to building a robust deterrence by denial capabilities. Ukrainian leaders are talking about this publicly, and the sooner we realise this, the better
Btw, NATO's Eastern Flank countries (PL,FI) are thinking the same way. Strategic non-nuclear deterrence (on strat-army level) will be based on an ability to engage variety of types of targets at long ranges-infrastructure, production cababilities, as well as ICBM silos,C2s etc..
About war (in Slovak), they asked me one question specifically for Lithuania. I think, the Kaliningrad (and Suwalki Gap) issue deserves own thread. 1/2 postoj.sk/108903/rusko-r…
Firstly – you can’t exclude this problem from Poland. Russian military thinking is considering it as a common issue. All ru military exercises focusing on Baltics region (Ladoga2009, Poryv2009 and Zapad2009) at least partially reflected it as a “problem” of Poland.
2/12
Secondly – Suwalki gap is time to time mentioned as an “Achilles heel of NATO”, “new Fulda” and so on, which sometimes manipulate the whole image of the problematics.
3/12