Thread by @ulrichspeck

If we start to discuss the contours of a future peace deal between Russia and Ukraine, and especially the Western role as potential guarantor of such a deal, it's important to keep in mind that Ukraine's security problem is not new, and that there is plenty of history already.

The fundamental problem is that Russia, namely Putin but not only Putin, isn't accepting Ukraine's existence as a separate nation and independent, sovereign state. This is the reason, and the only reason, for the ongoing conflict, which came in its hot phase in 2014.

Is this likely to change now, as Russia appears not to be winning in Ukraine? It all depends probably on how this war ends. If Russia clearly looses, gets defeated, there is a chance that Russia finally accepts a reality that it cannot change.

If Russia wins even a bit of territory, it's likely that its neo-imperialist dreams aren't going to be abandoned. Just like in 2014/15 when Russia gained territory and tried to use this to weaken and undermine the Ukrainian state. When this attempt failed, Putin choose open war.

Whatever the Russian side wants or doesn't want, the key to Ukraine's security will be deterrence against Russia once this round of fighting is over.

In the past, we saw a number of half-hearted attempts by the US and Europe to help Ukraine against Russia. The Budapest Memorandum in 1994 was a promise that wasn't worth anything at all; just a way to convince Kyiv to hand over its nukes to Russia.

The promise from 2008 that Ukraine "will" become member of Nato -- but without giving it MAP (membership action plan) didn't help at all. It was a bad internal Western compromise between the US and Germany; and it may (or may not) have contributed to Russia's later belligerence.

The idea of 2013 that Russia wouldn't be provoked by Ukraine's rapprochement with the EU turned out to be a misconception. The view in Europe was that Russia was just afraid of Ukraine's Nato membership, and that the EU was not seen as a threat by Russia.

That was a misconception. The "threat" for Russia was always an independent, sovereign Ukraine -- it was not a threat for the Russia itself, but for its neo-imperial ambitions to dominate and control its neighborhood, in Russia's view an indispensable feature of a "great power".

The next failure where the Minsk agreement II in 2015 and the "Normandy format". This was Merkel's brainchild, and she was driving the policy in 2014/15 made of sanctions (sticks) and a process of negotiations (supposed carrots).

The idea was to bring Putin into the "postmodern" world of win-win-solutions and compromise; and the hope was that as the process drags on, Russia would loose interest in Ukraine and finally let it go.

For Putin, the idea was to use the process to weaken and undermine Ukrainian statehood; his instrument was the provision in the agreement that the de facto-Russia-occupied territories in the Donbas would have a say on major decisions of the Ukrainian state.

It was supposed to be cheaper than war, for Putin; namely by keeping intact the relationship with the West. And indeed Putin got rewarded, with Merkel giving green light to Nord Stream 2 and Macron ruling out the red carpet to him and starting to debate a "new security order".

Yet the Normandy format failed to deliver; Ukraine became stronger and more independent, with Western help. That's why Putin, for whom getting back Ukraine under Russian control was always a key priority - and a question of his legacy as a Russian leader - changed tactics again.

First he was trying to intimidate Ukraine and the West by amassing troops around Ukraine. Yet both were holding their line, and that's why he went to open war, crossing a line -- instead of operating in a grey zone of "credible deniability", he waged a massive war.

When thinking about a future agreement between Russia and Ukraine, and the western role in it, we should learn the lessons from those four failed attempts by the West to help Ukraine to assert its independence and sovereignty.

The three decisive elements are:
- Russia denies Ukraine its independence;
- Ukraine is militarily far weaker than Russia (this seems to change now);
- the West wants to help Ukraine but not risk a war with Russia

Kyiv is now talking about Western security guarantees. That's something the West gave on paper in 1994 but on paper only; it was something the West refused to give in 2008. In practice, the West decided not come to Ukraine's help twice when it was attacked, 2013/14 and 2022.

If the West now signs up to guarantees for Ukraine but is not ready to defend Ukraine's borders against Russia, accepting an escalation, the situation won't improve. The West must either go in fully, with own troops, or stay out. A guarantee on paper only won't work.

The appetite for conflict with Russia is clearly quite low, namely in Berlin and Paris but also in Washington and London. Very hard to see the West giving real guarantees which would not be very different from Nato membership.

That's why the other two variables are far more important. First, Russia must clearly loose, a defeat would diminish the chances that in the near future, Putin will wage another war. If this conflicts ends with considerable Russian territorial gains, another war is very likely.

Most importantly, the West must do everything to arm and train Ukraine's military; namely once this war is over. The more Ukraine is capable to defend its borders against Russia, the more secure it will be, and the more likely it is that Russia finally accept the new reality.