Ukraine's strike of the fuel depot at Belgorod was MUCH more than a bold tactical move.
While 1.5 M gallons of fuel is certainly a critical target & will be significant in this logistics war...there's more.
This is what's called a "deep strike" in US military parlance. 1/6
A deep strike is meant to cause physical damage to the enemy, but it's also designed to cause increased fear, a feeling that no where is safe, & it sends the message " we will come after you everywhere, especially when you're not expecting it." 2/
The Russians believed Belorus and RU territory were safe havens. They're now less confident of that.
The RUs believed they could return to bases in Belarus - to the motor pools they once occupied - and reconsolidate and they would be untouched. No more. 3/
A deep strike doesn't directly or immediately affect the front line troops ...but it does have a significant effect on the troops in the rear (the logistics folks, and those returning from the fight).
That's a big deal, and it has huge psychological implications. 4/
Beyond being bold & audacious, this UKR strike into Belgorod required more than just 2 helicopters striking a target...
It required analysis of target set, planning of the mission, preparation of the routes, jamming of the enemy radars, and a precise strike ability. 5/
The fact that the UKR leaders will not "confirm or deny" they did the strike is also - to me - an exclamation point.
It says to me "yeah, we did it, and when we get a chance we'll do it again."
That's panache. Ukraines got it going on. 6/6
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Watching the Israeli operations in S. Lebanon today, as the IDF releases numerous photos of arms caches found in & near homes. 1/7
These are similar to what US forces found throughout Iraq when we were there.
Using civilian locations provides terror organizations w/ unique advantages:
- difficult to find
- difficult to target
- when found, striking/destroying results in civilian casualties. 2/
This morning, the IAF also struck a 3.5 km tunnel complex between Syria & Lebanon that provided a means of bringing those weapons to Hezbollah.
Between 0900-1100 hrs local time today, Hezbollah launched over 100 rockets & drones into N. Israel. 3/
A few thoughts on what occurred in two different conflicts yesterday...the use of "killer pagers" by Israel and Ukraine's attack on the large ammo cache at Toropets military base 300+ miles inside Russia.
A short 🧵 1/12
First, the pagers.
In this article (gifted) from the @nytimes, the author claims there "no clear strategy" for this coordinated attack.
I disagree. Having used electronic & signals countermeasures in Iraq, the strategy is clear. 2/
Terrorist organizations - unlike conventional militaries who have encrypted signal capabilities - must find ways to communiate. It is important to continue to disrupt & counter this ability.
In Iraq, terrorist use of cell phones allowed US and ISF to glean valuable information & disrupt their networks. 3/
On a daily basis during my time in command of Army forces in Europe, every day the intelligence "black book" would provide more information on Putin's Russia attempts at malign influence against the west...and especially against the US.
Today, the @TheJusticeDept has taken action...but because of current divisions in the US, many Americans will have questions.
So let's talk about it...
A thread 🧵 1/12
During my service in Europe, I saw intelligence on:
-Rusian acts of sabotage within allied governments
-The creation of "frozen conflicts" w/in the territorial integrity of nations (including Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia/Azerbaijan, two of the three Baltic countries, and the Balkans)
-the stoking & support of migration & human trafficking
-malicious cyber activities against whole of governments (most egregious example was Estonia)
-disinformation campaigns and election interference
-attempted and successful assassinations on foreign soil. 2/
In my last year of command of @USArmyEURAF (that was 2012), the Russian television station @RT_com asked me to do an interview, as we had just conducted an exercise with the Russian Army and I had invited the Chief of the Russian Ground Forces Col-Gen Chirkin to a conference. 3/