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Israel claims that a senior Hamas leader was in the Jabalia Refugee Camp when it was struck by Israeli bombs. Israel claims that the deaths of Palestinian refugees in the camp are collateral damage permitted under the law of war.
Israel is wrong.
Any discussion of collateral damage, however, must answer a threshold legal question whether or not the commander in question was actually inside the camp at the time of the strike.
Unless that question can be answered to a reasonable degree of certainty, a bombing operation of the sort carried out by Israel is unlawful, regardless of the level of collateral damage to surrounding persons and objects.
1) For all those armchair generals who snipe at Russian military performance, reflect on what the US and NATO have and haven’t been doing for the past 20 years. Neither could survive long in the kind of war Ukraine and Russia are fighting today—it is beyond their imagination.
2) The use of massed fires is something NATO is incapable of doing—they lack the equipment and doctrine. The use of precision guided munitions is no substitute—the delivery systems will be rapidly attrited by Russian counter fires. Russian artillery supremacy is a game changer.
3) The perceived NATO air power advantage will melt away in the face of Russia’s integrated air defense network. Neither the US nor NATO has trained or operated against such a threat. And if Russia is able to nullify or neutralize US/NATO air power—checkmate.
1/ Big Arrow War—a primer. For all those scratching their heads in confusion, or dusting off their dress uniforms for the Ukrainian victory parade in Kiev, over the news about Russia’s “strategic shift”, you might want to re-familiarize yourself with basic military concepts.
2/ Maneuver warfare is a good place to start. Understand Russia started its “special military operation” with a severe manpower deficit—200,000 attackers to some 600,000 defenders (or more). Classic attritional conflict was never an option. Russian victory required maneuver.
3/ Maneuver war is more psychological than physical and focuses more on the operational than on the tactical level. Maneuver is relational movement—how you deploy and move your forces in relation to your opponent. Russian maneuver in the first phase of its operation support this.