2| It was clear from the outset that despite shared goal of reviving JCPOA, path would be anything but easy. To destroy is easier than to rebuild, & even having a baseline text already available still required a way for both sides to resume commitments under new realities.
3| Negotiators set up working groups on sanctions relief and nuclear rollback, with a third on sequencing added later. Through June - the final round involving Rouhani's team - significant progress was made before the Iranian electoral calendar led to 5-month hiatus.
4| This was the most significant delay in the process, but not the only one. On US side, Biden team had internal deliberations on how to proceed upon taking office; more recently (exactly a month ago) Russian ask for sanx cordon sanitaire prompted a pause in the multiparty talks.
5| The good news is that technical elements of the 27-page deal are all but finalized, & have been for some time. While some important elements are still in play, main remaining disagreement - IRGC FTO - is a political and bilateral US/IRI issue. washingtonpost.com/national-secur…
6| The media tent is no longer standing outside Coburg, but that doesn't mean things are on hold. EU continues to convey proposals b/w Tehran & Washington to see if a workable formula can be found on an issue laden w symbolism & political sensitivities.
7| Whether they can square this final circle remains to be seen, but if they do things could fall into place quickly. Reality is that continued delays serve neither side's interests: nuclear program expands, sanctions relief remain elusive, and external factors can intrude.
8| Funnily enough, at the same point in the Trump administration the U.S. was still in the JCPOA and had held more direct conversations with the Iranians via the Joint Commission. Desire for a volte-face in policy doesn't always mean it will happen or happen quickly.
9|9 In sum, we're neither on the brink of an imminent breakthrough, nor is it necessarily doom and gloom. The U.S. and Europeans, and certainly the Iranians, all have Plan Bs percolating.
But all know that Plan A remains preferable, if difficult, to see through to conclusion.
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What's happening in #ViennaTalks? A state of play, best as I can tell [Thread]
2/ Last week, the main - but not sole - area of disagreement was over Iran's @IAEAOrg safeguards probe. U.S./E3 as well as the agency were clear that closing it was a non-starter.
DG Grossi went to Tehran on Saturday, secured an roadmap to address this.
One step forward.
3/ But the same day, right after 🇮🇱 PM’s visit, Russia's FM threw a wrench into the mix:
Facing what he described as an "avalanche of aggressive sanctions" against 🇷🇺 over 🇺🇦 Lavrov called for guarantees that these would not "in any way damage our right to free and full trade".
Why should we listen to policy makers who have been consistently wrong? These Democrats supported Trump's withdrawal and are responsible for allowing Iran to advance to the verge of nuclear weapons. jewishinsider.com/2022/03/eleven…
You'd be hard-pressed to find three people who've been as wrong over as long a period on how to address Iran's nuclear program. [Thread]
2| Here's @SenatorRisch talking to @NPR in 2017, prior to Trump's withdrawal. He laments the deal's sunsets (not 10 years, BTW), and says the solution is... sanctions. Well, we know how that worked out - no nuclear restrictions at all!
3| Here's @SenJohnBarrasso on @FoxNews in 2019, lauding the decision to withdraw because "it didn't step them from getting the path to the weapon".
Yet here we are, with Iran enriching near-weapons grade, under limited monitoring, weeks from breakout capability.
🧵گروه بحران: ششمین گزارش از وضعیت اجرای برجام بر اساس نزدیک به ۵۰ مصاحبه با مقامات کشورهای عضو برجام، آمریکا، منطقه و سازمان ملل. «مهلت نهایی» [ترجمه فارسی] @CrisisGroup
۲/ایران و آمریکا چند ماه است که به صورت غیرمستقیم بر سر احیای برجام در حال مذاکرهاند اما موفق نشدهاند راهکاری برای بازگشت مشترک پیدا کنند. جای تعجب ندارد که هر یک تقصیر را به گردن دیگری میاندازد. تروئیکای اروپایی و آمریکا در یک جبهه و روسیه و چین تا حدودی با ایران هم موضعاند.
۳/ ما تنشزایی هستهای ایران در سال گذشته را مرور کردیم. از نظر کمی و کیفی، مثل غنیسازی ۶۰٪ بعد از حمله به نطنز، پیشرفتها تصاعدی بوده. اگرچه هنوز اثری از ساخت سلاح هستهای نیست، اما زمان گریز – دستیابی به میزان کافی اورانیوم برای ساخت یک بمب اتمی – به سه هفته رسیده است.
🧵 New from @CrisisGroup: Our 6th - perhaps final - report on the status of the 2015 nuclear deal, based on more than 50 interviews conducted with officials from JCPOA parties, the U.S., UN and regional governments over the past several months 👇crisisgroup.org/middle-east-no…
2| U.S. & Iran have engaged in months of indirect talks aimed at restoring JCPOA. These have failed to deliver a framework for mutual compliance. Unsurprisingly, each sees the other at fault. E3 aligned w/ U.S.; Russia & China not unsympathetic to Iran but within limits.
3| We review Iran's nuclear escalation over past year, during which it made quantitative and qualitative leaps, inc raising enrichment to 60% - highest ever - after April attack at Natanz. Though still no evidence of weaponization, breakout time now a matter of weeks.
بیش از یک دهه است که بر بحران هسته ای ایران تمرکز کرده ام. در این سالها انواع اتهامات به من زده شده: از داماد زاهدی گرفته تا کارمند سیا، از لابی ج.ا. و مشاور ظریف گرفته تا هزاردستان و کارمند سوروس. هرگز اهمیتی به این حرفها و هجمه ها نداده و نمی دهم. اصل مواضع فرد است 1/
مهمترین مواضع من و گروه بحران در سالهای اخیر به این شرح بوده است:
- مخالفت با اقدام ترامپ در تضعیف برجام حتی پیش از خروج آمریکا 2/
- مخالفت با فشار حداکثری و یکی از رساترین صداها در مخالفت با تحریم ها و لابی های مربوطه
3/