There seems to be a notable shift in RU‘s propaganda this week. On 04/04 RIA Novosti published an article by a certain Timofey Sergeytsev which spells out (again) some of the key RU war goals: 🧵 1/9
„denazification needs to be pursued by the victor“ (= no compromise with UA is possible) and „the denazified country cannot be sovereign“ (= independent UA is to be wiped off the map). But Sergeytsev‘s interpretation of „denazification“ differs significantly 2/9
from the previous use of the term, incl in official statements. The gist of his „oeuvre“ is that „denazification“ not only concerns UA pol leadership, but needs to be extended to ALL OF UA, bc the majority of the population supported UA’s „fascist leadership“. 3/9
Sergeytsev is not a regular RIAN author. He is a „polit-tekhnolog“ (RU for pol consultant, but with a highly manipulative aspect) who worked with RU and UA politicians in the past. His last publication with RIAN appeared roughly 1 year ago. 4/9
We cannot know whether the Kremlin is behind this article. But we see similar formulations surface in official statements, see Lavrov’s comments on the horrifying discoveries in Bucha. 5/9
This new rhetorical turn could have several purposes: 1. RU leadership increases propaganda noise inside the country to stifle doubts and also empathy with regard to the victims of the Bucha killings - as more news about atrocities committed by RU troops will surface. 6/9
2. Putin may still decide to declare war and conduct national mobilisation. This week’s propaganda twist could indicate that all options remain open. RU's military campaign will now focus on the east and south-east of UA, and they will fight tooth and nail to achieve results: 7/9
consolidate occupation of large territories in the Donbas, secure land bridge between Crimea and Donbas, attack and destroy Odesa? - preferably before „Victory Day“ on 9 May. Very bleak prospects indeed for the coming weeks. 8/9
Events of the past days also seriously jeopardize the UA-RU negotiation track. Trust is at zero level on UA side. RU cynically insists #Bucha is a Western/UA intsenirovka to disrupt negotiations. The talks were never very promising . But this might derail them altogether. 9/END
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
I was asked to think about possible end states and European security for an expert roundtable. It is still very early to discuss this, but here are my thoughts. I organize them around the question of the existence of an independent UA state, 🧵1/12 #RussiainvadesUkraine
because this is what this war is about: RU has attacked to destroy UA as an independent state; UA fights back to preserve their independent statehood.
4 scenarios:
1. RU wins, UA ceases to exist as an independent state. Moscow installs some kind of puppet regime in Kyiv, 2/12
large parts of UA will be permanently occupied by RU and proxy troops; like BY UA will become an integral part of the space controlled by RU, and this space will have a direct boundary with the EU and NATO. 3/12
I had no hope anything would come of the meeting of FMs #Kuleba and #Lavrov yesterday. 2 days ago I wrote that Moscow was beginning to feel the sanctions pressure – and looking for diplomatic wiggle room, without, however, dropping its maximalist positions: #RussiainvadesUkraine
demilitarisation of Ukraine and neutrality, recognition of Crimea annexation + DLNR. At his presser today Lavrov even went back to blustering about the „fascist junta“ in Kyiv. There was a lot of talk afterwards about Lavrov’s remoteness from the centre of decision making... 2/10
...in the Kremlin. This has been a well-known fact for many years. And yes, he seemed nervous and fiddled during the presser. His position has changed – from a professional and experienced diplomat, feared, loathed, but also respected and even admired by some in the West, 3/10
Moscow is starting to feel the pressure. What makes me say this? 1. RU seems stuck militarily. A big chunk of the RU force is already involved in the war. There are problems with reinforcements, heavy casualties and equipment losses. #RussiainvadesUkraine 1/8
The goals of the „spec-op“ have not been reached so far. RU seems hesitant to storm Kyiv or Odesa – street fighting in 2 big cities would be a major risk under the circumstances. The idea to occupy the whole or large parts of the country seems even more unrealistic.
2/8
2. Unprecedented sanctions imposed with unprecedented pace start to bite. So does international isolation, even if Beijing signals continuing support. Western weapons supplies to UA not to be underestimated in this context either.
3/8
My take of the talks so far and the failure of the humanitarian corridor around Mariupol: RU is not serious about the negotiations. Putin and his cronies do not care about humanitarian suffering either. I rest my case: 1/6 #RussiainvadesUkraine
2/6 the composition of the RU delegation said it all, from the very beginning. Medinsky and Slutsky are policy clowns sent there to mess with the Ukrainian side. I do believe that the RU military is under pressure to end the operation. They have problems with reserves...
3/6 ...and supplies, and they suffer more losses than they ever expected. But Putin is not ready to consider retreat, compromise. Plus the majority of RU population are either supportive or silent with exhaustion. The protests are limited to the unhappy minority, which...
Some thoughts about why the Kremlin could miscalculate so catastrophically on basically everything: the steadfastness of the UA leadership, the resolve to resist in UA society, UA military capabilities, and their own capability to figth this war.
I see three factors:🧵1/11
1. There is a blatant lack of knowledge and understanding in RU about political and societal developments in neighbouring countries. They used to be part of the Soviet Union until 1991. After independence RU was first too poor to fund proper research on basically anything. 2/11
In the 2000s, attention shifted to other topics, notably China/Asia. I remember the director of a big research institute telling my once that their attempt to create a department about Russia’s immediate neighbourhood was met with indifference if not ridicule. 3/11
Now I understand why he wrote that article about Ukraine last summer: to have something to base this speech on... today's Ukraine is entirely a product of Russian policy... and off he goes.
"We will show Ukraine what real decommunisation is" sounds like a very serious threat to dismember the country.