Senior Fellow #SWP in Berlin. Here in personal capacity, views strictly my own.
1 added to My Authors
Sep 20 • 11 tweets • 3 min read
So now we have it: #Putin is escalating #RussiaInvadesUkraine. The events that started unfolding today indicate that we will experience a repetition of the week of 21 Februar (recognition of #DLNR and beginning of the invasion) – only at a different level. #StandwithUkraine
All four occupied or partly occupied territories (Luhansk, Donezk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson) have declared they will hold (fake) referenda 23-27 September. This looks very much like a concerted action, steered from Moscow (and, in the Kremlin administration, Sergey Kirienko).
Aug 26 • 14 tweets • 3 min read
A long 🧵 about a painful issue: #visaban for 🇷🇺 citizens:
The sight of 🇷🇺 tourists in the EU is difficult to bear. It is difficult to tolerate that people from the aggressor country that wages this horrific war in Ukraine can go somewhere, and have a good time. 1/14
I flew from Istanbul to Moscow in June. I found it hard to accept that I was surrounded by tanned 🇷🇺s returning home from the Turkish coasts. We were flying NOT over 🇺🇦, for obvious reasons, but over Moldova, Poland, Latvia, then turned east towards Moscow. 2/14
Mariupol also played an important role in the failure of the initial negotiation phase in May. Talks had already come to a near stand-still when the battle of Mariupol ended ... 2/11
Jul 20 • 9 tweets • 4 min read
Noteworthy quote from #Lavrov today. By pointing out that the "geography" of #RussiainvadesUkraine has changed + is no longer about the #Donbas but about the southern "and several other" territories, he seems to put in perspective his boss's statement in Tehran last night. 🧵1/8
Dodging the question whether he was ready to meet #Zelensky, #Putin referred to the Istanbul Communiqué of 29/03, which (would have) stipulated, among other things, the withdrawal of 🇷🇺troops behind the lines of 24/02. "We almost had a deal", he said. 2/8
The mood in Moscow is swinging back to “we can win this thing”. This is very dangerous.
To all who currently think aloud about 🇺🇦 giving up territory to end the war, the West provoking 🇷🇺 too hard or irreversibly pushing it into China’s arms, (1/8)
or a sanctions for grain deal (West partially lifting sanctions and 🇷🇺 ending blockade of 🇺🇦 ports - which is what Moscow cunningly demands): please be aware that you are corroborating this fatal belief in Moscow! (2/8)
May 25 • 11 tweets • 3 min read
🇺🇦’s effort to defend itself against #RussiasWar is jeopardized on various levels. Western leaders must be careful not to undermine it. „Freezing“ the conflict along the current lines of combat would be extremely disadvantageous for 🇺🇦 and set a dangerous precedent for Europe.
🇷🇺 intensifies its efforts to complete the occupation of the Donbas and the southeast of 🇺🇦, putting 🇺🇦's army under enormous strain. 🇷🇺 is simultaneously working to transform the newly occ terr into de facto statelets (building administrative structures, handing out passports).
May 22 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Alice Schwarzer findet @kstade jetzt sei "ein guter Zeitpunkt" für Verhandlungen und "sowohl Putin als auch Selenskyj verschlimmern durch Macho-Gehabe die Situation".
Wow. Da hat Alice Schwarzer aber einiges nicht verstanden. 1/6 #RussiainvadesUkraine #WeStandwithUkraine
Die Behauptung beiderseitiger Verantwortung für den Krieg ist grundfalsch. 🇷🇺führt einen völkerrechtswidrigen und verbrecherischen Angriffskrieg. 🇺🇦 führt einen legitimen Verteidigungskrieg. Gleichwohl lieben ganz linke und ganz rechte Kreise in 🇩🇪 dieses unsinnige Argument. 2/6
Apr 12 • 10 tweets • 2 min read
Ein paar Gedanken dazu, was nach 1.5 Monaten #RusslandsKrieg jetzt nötig ist. 1. 🇺🇦 braucht schnell mehr Waffen, leicht und schwer, um die 🇷🇺 Offensive im Osten und Südosten abzuwehren und Gelände zurückzugewinnen. Ausbildungszeiten etc. sind kein Argument.
Der Krieg wird dauern – und zu viel Zeit ist schon verloren gegangen. Die Frage ist jetzt: womit können Charkiw, Mariupol, Mikolajiw, Odesa etc. verteidigt werden? Dann sollte gemeinsam mit den Partnern alles daran gesetzt werden, dass das in 🇺🇦 ankommt. 2/9
Apr 6 • 9 tweets • 3 min read
There seems to be a notable shift in RU‘s propaganda this week. On 04/04 RIA Novosti published an article by a certain Timofey Sergeytsev which spells out (again) some of the key RU war goals: 🧵 1/9
„denazification needs to be pursued by the victor“ (= no compromise with UA is possible) and „the denazified country cannot be sovereign“ (= independent UA is to be wiped off the map). But Sergeytsev‘s interpretation of „denazification“ differs significantly 2/9
Mar 24 • 12 tweets • 3 min read
I was asked to think about possible end states and European security for an expert roundtable. It is still very early to discuss this, but here are my thoughts. I organize them around the question of the existence of an independent UA state, 🧵1/12 #RussiainvadesUkraine
because this is what this war is about: RU has attacked to destroy UA as an independent state; UA fights back to preserve their independent statehood.
1. RU wins, UA ceases to exist as an independent state. Moscow installs some kind of puppet regime in Kyiv, 2/12
Mar 11 • 11 tweets • 3 min read
I had no hope anything would come of the meeting of FMs #Kuleba and #Lavrov yesterday. 2 days ago I wrote that Moscow was beginning to feel the sanctions pressure – and looking for diplomatic wiggle room, without, however, dropping its maximalist positions: #RussiainvadesUkraine
demilitarisation of Ukraine and neutrality, recognition of Crimea annexation + DLNR. At his presser today Lavrov even went back to blustering about the „fascist junta“ in Kyiv. There was a lot of talk afterwards about Lavrov’s remoteness from the centre of decision making... 2/10
Mar 8 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
Moscow is starting to feel the pressure. What makes me say this? 1. RU seems stuck militarily. A big chunk of the RU force is already involved in the war. There are problems with reinforcements, heavy casualties and equipment losses. #RussiainvadesUkraine 1/8
The goals of the „spec-op“ have not been reached so far. RU seems hesitant to storm Kyiv or Odesa – street fighting in 2 big cities would be a major risk under the circumstances. The idea to occupy the whole or large parts of the country seems even more unrealistic.
Mar 6 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
My take of the talks so far and the failure of the humanitarian corridor around Mariupol: RU is not serious about the negotiations. Putin and his cronies do not care about humanitarian suffering either. I rest my case: 1/6 #RussiainvadesUkraine2/6 the composition of the RU delegation said it all, from the very beginning. Medinsky and Slutsky are policy clowns sent there to mess with the Ukrainian side. I do believe that the RU military is under pressure to end the operation. They have problems with reserves...
Mar 2 • 11 tweets • 3 min read
Some thoughts about why the Kremlin could miscalculate so catastrophically on basically everything: the steadfastness of the UA leadership, the resolve to resist in UA society, UA military capabilities, and their own capability to figth this war.
I see three factors:🧵1/11
1. There is a blatant lack of knowledge and understanding in RU about political and societal developments in neighbouring countries. They used to be part of the Soviet Union until 1991. After independence RU was first too poor to fund proper research on basically anything. 2/11
Feb 21 • 25 tweets • 3 min read
It's on. Putin speaks.
Now I understand why he wrote that article about Ukraine last summer: to have something to base this speech on... today's Ukraine is entirely a product of Russian policy... and off he goes.
Feb 21 • 29 tweets • 4 min read
Meanwhile in Moscow: Russian NSC is discussing situation in DLNR, Ukraine. Live translation via @ru_rbc This doesn’t bode well… reader.rbc.ru/share/8R8C9EsH…
Kozak explaining (at Putin‘s request) how Ukraine is not implementing but undermining Minsk Agreements.
Feb 20 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
Leaving Moscow after 5 d of intense conversations. Early in the week most people were hopeful about signs of deescalation. Moderates thought Kremlin was calming down. Hawks believed RU would get what it wants merely by mil posturing. This changed in past 2 days.
People who know about economy are extremely worried about consequences of sanctions. But they do not have the Kremlin‘s ear. Haven’t had it for a long time. Liberals fear war AND domestic consequences in Ru: more autocracy, more repression.
Jun 26, 2021 • 16 tweets • 4 min read
1/15 Looking at the outcome of the 🇷🇺 discussion at the EU Summit I have many questions. Why did 🇩🇪 and 🇫🇷 suggest an EU27 + Russia format when this was clearly not going to fly? Why the urgency?
2/15 Why is there so little reference in the Conclusions to the @JosepBorrellF report? Did the 🇩🇪 🇫🇷 initiative distract the chiefs? Did they not consider the EUHR’s suggestions worth discussing? Would the result have been different without the🇩🇪🇫🇷 push?