Lieutenants normally act as commanders of three vehicle platoons of Tanks, BMP's or BTR's.
That is, one commander for 3 vehicles and 8-to-19 men.
So, three lieutenants would command all the Mechanized Platoons of a Motor Rifle Company. 3/
Putting three lieutenants as the crew of a single BMP is a lot more than a desperation move.
It is a hard core signal that Russia has so run out of both trained and reliable manpower that it it putting the command staff of a Motor Rifle Company into a single armored
4/
...fighting vehicle. Consider the implications of that as you read the ISW thread.
My view is the Russians lack the trained manpower to pocket Ukrainians in the Donbas.
At best the Russians can push the Donbas line back 20-25 km, the logistical limits to their reduced truck
5/
...park from their existing rail heads.
The problem for the Russians is the arrival of the Switchblade 600 in the low hundreds, given the low Russian force density in the areas they have over run, means they will have to use railheads in Russia for republicworld.com/world-news/rus…
6/
...Donbas.
Media reports have it that the Russians are currently disembarking troops, vehicles & ammo 55km behind the Russian border.
The Switchblade 600 has a maximum one way flight range of 50 miles/80km carrying a Javelin warhead.
7/
If the Russians cannot stop a pair of Ukrainian Hind Helicopter gunships from rocketing Belograd, Russia fuel tanks.
They won't be able to stop a Switchblade 600 loitering munition (AKA a propeller driven mini-cruise missile) from killing Russian train engines in places 8/
...most likely to cause a Russian "logistical heart attack" in terms of delivering the thousands of tons of artillery ammunition needed for the defense of the territory it currently has, let alone take more.
9/
That the Ukrainians have not started immediately pushing back to take advantage of this development, to try pushing out of Kherson and relieve Mariupol also tells us something.
Ukrainian logistics have been pushed past their own breaking point.
The damage Russia has
10/
...inflicted on the Ukrainian Military & infrastructure means they do not have some combination of the logistics, usable equipment or trained manpower for large scale mobile mechanized operations to free Mariupol out of Kherson.
11/
Ukraine's military has pulled the Russian Army's major offensive fangs.
What we are seeing in Donbas are Russian spoiling attacks from it's 'least attrited' BTG meant to inflict material attrition on the Ukrainian Army to extend the Ukrainian logistical pause needed for
12/
...major mobile operations.
The longer that pause, the more existing Russian troops can dig in to hold on to captured territory and the closer those June 2022 reinforcements will be for a major counter stroke against exhausted Ukrainian mobile forces.
13/
IOW, the Russians are playing for time to get a longer attritional phase to delay/reduce the scope of future Ukrainian mobile operations with Switchblade 600 support.
We shall soon see if this will be successful.
14/end
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This is one of the most logistically incompetent hot takes by any German journalist in the Russo-Ukrainian War.
95% getting through is a 5% loss rate per trip
95%(x) for 10 to 20 kills means x = 200 to 400 trucks on this route
10 trips means 40% total fleet loss - 80 to 160 trucks
1/
You can follow the 5% loss curve in this 500 unit fleet at 10 exposures in the graphic below.
A 40% fleet loss in 10 days from a 5% drone loss rate is logistical collapse for the Russian Army in occupied Ukraine.
Only some trying to get AfD eyeballs would say different.
2/
This leaves out the fact that the Russian Army doesn't use *ANY* mechanized logistical enabler like pallets, Truck D-rings, forklifts, or telehandlers.
Russian trucks are in the drone kill zones 3 times as long as a Western truck due to loading times.
"The DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile, with a range of approximately 4,000 to 5,000 kilometers, was specifically designed and publicly nicknamed by Chinese military analysts as the "Guam Killer.""
As laid out by warquants -dot- com, China is buying one million OWA drones to destroy all US/Taiwan/Taiwan allied military logistics from Guam to the China coast.
A quantity of one million "Shaheed plus" class OWA drones has quality all its own.
Homicide statistics since the early 1960s are not comparable to earlier periods because medical advances have turned many fatal injuries into survivable ones.
I'm tempted to say the difference between military flag ranks who are competent at 2026 peer to peer warfare, and those who are not, is the understanding and application of attritional loss curves to combat loss rates, electronic warfare and logistics.
The set of curves I had an AI produce for me above have been used for air warfare many times starting at the end of WW2, in the USSBS after WW2 and by many classic RAND airpower studies from the 1950's to 1980's.
2/
All post 9/11/2001 Western flag ranks are counter-insurgency (COIN) trained & experienced.
They have no gut feel at all to statistical attrition models at all.
These "COIN-head" flags may prove to be highly resistant to changing this. Which is required to deal with drones.
2/
The effectiveness of drones is directly affected by the electronic warfare competence of the drone users.
The fact that the US Army defenestrated every EW practitioner in the 2000's and has compete "EW virgins" as flag rank leadership means it will fail with mass casualties in its first major drone war combat.
1/3