Lieutenants normally act as commanders of three vehicle platoons of Tanks, BMP's or BTR's.
That is, one commander for 3 vehicles and 8-to-19 men.
So, three lieutenants would command all the Mechanized Platoons of a Motor Rifle Company. 3/
Putting three lieutenants as the crew of a single BMP is a lot more than a desperation move.
It is a hard core signal that Russia has so run out of both trained and reliable manpower that it it putting the command staff of a Motor Rifle Company into a single armored
4/
...fighting vehicle. Consider the implications of that as you read the ISW thread.
My view is the Russians lack the trained manpower to pocket Ukrainians in the Donbas.
At best the Russians can push the Donbas line back 20-25 km, the logistical limits to their reduced truck
5/
...park from their existing rail heads.
The problem for the Russians is the arrival of the Switchblade 600 in the low hundreds, given the low Russian force density in the areas they have over run, means they will have to use railheads in Russia for republicworld.com/world-news/rus…
6/
...Donbas.
Media reports have it that the Russians are currently disembarking troops, vehicles & ammo 55km behind the Russian border.
The Switchblade 600 has a maximum one way flight range of 50 miles/80km carrying a Javelin warhead.
7/
If the Russians cannot stop a pair of Ukrainian Hind Helicopter gunships from rocketing Belograd, Russia fuel tanks.
They won't be able to stop a Switchblade 600 loitering munition (AKA a propeller driven mini-cruise missile) from killing Russian train engines in places 8/
...most likely to cause a Russian "logistical heart attack" in terms of delivering the thousands of tons of artillery ammunition needed for the defense of the territory it currently has, let alone take more.
9/
That the Ukrainians have not started immediately pushing back to take advantage of this development, to try pushing out of Kherson and relieve Mariupol also tells us something.
Ukrainian logistics have been pushed past their own breaking point.
The damage Russia has
10/
...inflicted on the Ukrainian Military & infrastructure means they do not have some combination of the logistics, usable equipment or trained manpower for large scale mobile mechanized operations to free Mariupol out of Kherson.
11/
Ukraine's military has pulled the Russian Army's major offensive fangs.
What we are seeing in Donbas are Russian spoiling attacks from it's 'least attrited' BTG meant to inflict material attrition on the Ukrainian Army to extend the Ukrainian logistical pause needed for
12/
...major mobile operations.
The longer that pause, the more existing Russian troops can dig in to hold on to captured territory and the closer those June 2022 reinforcements will be for a major counter stroke against exhausted Ukrainian mobile forces.
13/
IOW, the Russians are playing for time to get a longer attritional phase to delay/reduce the scope of future Ukrainian mobile operations with Switchblade 600 support.
We shall soon see if this will be successful.
14/end
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Remember all the professionally incompetent yo-yo naval officers & hangers on claiming FPV drones were not a threat to naval warships in 2023 WHEN I TOLD THEM THEY WOULD BE?
Reality just kicked them one and all in the 'nads...
I told these professionally incompetent US navalists accounts on X/Twitter in 2023 that both containerized drones and FPV drones were a deadly threat to every naval vessel on the water they were ignoring to their crew's peril.
We need to have a talk about Russian military corruption and its effects on the Russo-Ukrainian War.
It's kind of like these sun-rotted missile truck tires that make my reputation on Twitter.
Corruption happens slowly, then all at once.
Corruption🧵 1/
The Russian Army issued a "live off the land" order in early March 2022 resulted in lots of Russian enlisted stealing outside the line of sight of Russian junior officers.
This hollowed out discipline the RuAF "Professional Volunteers" in early 2022.
More information has come out on the FP-5 Flamingo which gives insights io both the systems and production engineering involved for low cost production.
I'm going to use the WW2 F6F Hellcat & M4 Sherman as examples of Ukrainian FP-5 design choices.
The FP-5 GLCM production photos released today shows what looks like a combination of carbon fiber composite, molded thermoplastics, and sheet metal.
Cruciform tail controls are all moving.
Wings are attached before launch like a 1960s USAF MGM-1 Matador. 2/
The FP-5 Transporter Erector Launch (TEL) trailer looks like a new custom build.
Iryna Terekh, head of production at Fire Point, stated to the AP that "Fire Point is producing roughly one Flamingo per day, and by October they hope to build capacity to make seven per day."
...With a similar configuration, drag will not be dominated by lift induced wing drag but will form drag which is typical for 500 knots air speed jets and missiles with low aspect ratio wings.
2/
...So a rule of thumb estimate is that you will need around 4 x the thrust of a Tomahawk F107-WR-402 700 lbf (3.1 kN) engine for an FP-5 Flamingo GLCM.
3/
Slowly, with a lot of notice, Trump is morphing into Pres. Biden
This territorial concession malarkey is exactly what the Biden Administration was playing games with in Nov 2021 via an op-ed by Samuel Charap of RAND in the Nov 19, 2021 Politico.
That Op-Ed advocated, in effect, that the US abandon Ukraine to Russia in exchange for other concessions by Russia, greenlighting Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
It was understood in Nov. 2021 era DC that Charap...