Lieutenants normally act as commanders of three vehicle platoons of Tanks, BMP's or BTR's.
That is, one commander for 3 vehicles and 8-to-19 men.
So, three lieutenants would command all the Mechanized Platoons of a Motor Rifle Company. 3/
Putting three lieutenants as the crew of a single BMP is a lot more than a desperation move.
It is a hard core signal that Russia has so run out of both trained and reliable manpower that it it putting the command staff of a Motor Rifle Company into a single armored
4/
...fighting vehicle. Consider the implications of that as you read the ISW thread.
My view is the Russians lack the trained manpower to pocket Ukrainians in the Donbas.
At best the Russians can push the Donbas line back 20-25 km, the logistical limits to their reduced truck
5/
...park from their existing rail heads.
The problem for the Russians is the arrival of the Switchblade 600 in the low hundreds, given the low Russian force density in the areas they have over run, means they will have to use railheads in Russia for republicworld.com/world-news/rus…
6/
...Donbas.
Media reports have it that the Russians are currently disembarking troops, vehicles & ammo 55km behind the Russian border.
The Switchblade 600 has a maximum one way flight range of 50 miles/80km carrying a Javelin warhead.
7/
If the Russians cannot stop a pair of Ukrainian Hind Helicopter gunships from rocketing Belograd, Russia fuel tanks.
They won't be able to stop a Switchblade 600 loitering munition (AKA a propeller driven mini-cruise missile) from killing Russian train engines in places 8/
...most likely to cause a Russian "logistical heart attack" in terms of delivering the thousands of tons of artillery ammunition needed for the defense of the territory it currently has, let alone take more.
9/
That the Ukrainians have not started immediately pushing back to take advantage of this development, to try pushing out of Kherson and relieve Mariupol also tells us something.
Ukrainian logistics have been pushed past their own breaking point.
The damage Russia has
10/
...inflicted on the Ukrainian Military & infrastructure means they do not have some combination of the logistics, usable equipment or trained manpower for large scale mobile mechanized operations to free Mariupol out of Kherson.
11/
Ukraine's military has pulled the Russian Army's major offensive fangs.
What we are seeing in Donbas are Russian spoiling attacks from it's 'least attrited' BTG meant to inflict material attrition on the Ukrainian Army to extend the Ukrainian logistical pause needed for
12/
...major mobile operations.
The longer that pause, the more existing Russian troops can dig in to hold on to captured territory and the closer those June 2022 reinforcements will be for a major counter stroke against exhausted Ukrainian mobile forces.
13/
IOW, the Russians are playing for time to get a longer attritional phase to delay/reduce the scope of future Ukrainian mobile operations with Switchblade 600 support.
We shall soon see if this will be successful.
14/end
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This Ukrainian fiber optic FPV drone attack underlines that 20th century style tactical truck based logistics are obsolete in the age of mass, cheap, 50 km FPV drones.
Drones costing less than $2,000 are killing trucks costing over $150,000.
The issue of Western truck production versus drone production is stark
Ukraine in 2025 is making ~12,000 FPV and grenade dropping class small drones a month.
The peak annual US Army FMTV production was in 2005 for a total of 8,168 trucks.
Those trucks are 20 years old.
2/
21st Century truck logistics in the age of 50 km unjammable fiber optic guided FPV drones requires systematic combat service support engineering to build vehicle "net tunnels" to protect from powered and persistent drones.
Injection molding gets you a lot of one thing cheaply. Think lots of fiber optic guided FPV drones, which are immune to radio jamming.
3D/AM allows a lot of modifications to meet the changing requirements of war. Think rapidly evolving Ukrainian interceptor drone designs.
2/
The issue for Ukraine versus Russia is Ukraine has to more widely disperse its industrial base because Russia has a bigger cruise and 500 km(+) ballistic missile production base.
Ukraine's need to disperse production and evolve drones means 3D/AM is a better industrial fit.
3/3
The Coyote I was a propeller interceptor like the Ukrainian FPV's, but it wasn't "enough" for the higher end drone threat like the TB-2 Bayraktar.
2/
So the US military abandoned kinetic solutions the lower end drone threat.
And it has to pretend that high power microwave weapons and jamming will be the answer to fiber optic guided FPV's at weed height and grenade dropping drones behind tree lines.
The arrival of the Ukrainian Gogol-M, a 20-foot span fixed-wing aerial drone mothership, with over a 200km radius of action while carrying a payload of two 30km ranged attack drones under its wings, underlines the impact of low level airspace as a drone "avenue of approach."
2/
The Gogol-M flys low and slow, below ground based radar coverage like a helicopter.
It opens up headquarters, ground & air logistics in the operational depths to artificial intelligence aided FPV drone attacks.
This is the main example of one of the most unprofessional delusions held by the US Navalist wing of the F-35 Big/Expensive/Few platform and missile cult.
Russian fiber optic FPV's have a range of 50km - over the horizon!
Drones simply don't have ground line of sight issues like soldiers do.
Drones can see in more of the electromagnetic spectrum than humans.
And the US Army refuses to buy enough small drones (1 m +) to train their troops to survive on the drone dominated battlefield.🤢🤮
2/3
"Just send a drone" is the proper tactic for almost everything a 21st century infantryman does from patrolling, raiding enemy positions, sniping and setting up forward observation posts.
3/3